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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON MARKET DYNAMICS IN THE PRESENCE OF LEARNING
Xi Weng
George Mailath
I investigate how the presence of learning affects the market dynamics in three different
market settings. The first chapter studies how the interplay of individual and social learning
affects price dynamics. I consider a monopolist selling a new experience good over time to
many buyers. Buyers learn from their own private experiences (individual learning) as well
as by observing other buyers’ experiences (social learning). Individual learning generates
ex post heterogeneity, which affects the buyers’ purchasing decisions and the firm’s pricing
strategy. When learning is through good news signals, the monopolist’s incentive to exploit
the known buyers causes experimentation to be terminated too early. After the arrival of a
good news signal, the price could instantaneously go down in order to induce the remaining
unknown buyer to experiment. When learning is through bad news signals, experimentation
is efficient, since only the homogeneous unknown buyers purchase the experience good. The
second chapter is based on the observation that workers learn at different rates about their
productivity and therefore expect different wage paths across firms. We show that under
strict supermodularity there is always positive assortative matching: differential learning is
always dominated by the impact of productivity. Surprisingly, this holds even if learning is
faster in the low type firm. The key assumption driving this result is that this is a pure
Bayesian learning model.We also derive a new equilibrium condition in this class of continu-
ous time models in addition to the common smooth-pasting and value-matching conditions.
This no-deviation condition captures sequential rationality and results in a restriction on the
second derivative of the value function. The third chapter develops a continuous-time war
of attrition model with learning to investigate whether learning is possible to make it easier
to reach an agreement. I show that with exogenous private learning, it may be easier to
v
reach an agreement initially but it becomes more and more difficult over time. The expected
delay will always be higher than the expected delay without learning. I also show that when
allowing only one player to learn leads to a shorter delay than allowing both to learn.
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Chapter 1
Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of
Social Learning
1.1 Introduction
In many markets for new experience goods, the buyers are facing both common and id-
iosyncratic uncertainty. Take the market for new drugs, for example. The effectiveness of a
new drug first depends on the unknown common quality. However, a good quality does not
guarantee that the drug is effective for everybody. Each patient’s idiosyncratic uncertainty
also matters.1 Patients learn from others’ experiences (social learning) as well as their own
(individual learning). The success of the new drug for one patient is good news about prod-
uct quality, but it does not necessarily mean that the drug would also be effective for other
patients.
Consider a monopolist selling a new experience good to many buyers in such a market.
The monopolist and the buyers initially are equally unsure about the effectiveness of the
product. How will this monopolist price strategically if she observes each buyer’s past actions
and outcomes? Without success of the product, everyone becomes increasingly pessimistic.
1Although the F.D.A. conducts an extensive period of pre-launch testing in the pharmaceutical industry,
some drugs enter the market with substantial uncertainty about their product qualities. For example, dietary
supplements do not need to be pre-approved by the F.D.A. before entering the market. There is also a “hurry-
up mechanism,” which allows approval of a drug that has not yet been proved effective in thorough clinical
trials but has shown promise that it might benefit patients with life-threatening diseases. A recent example
is a cancer drug Avastin, which was approved by the F.D.A. based on one clinical trial (New York Times
(2010)).
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In order to keep the buyers purchasing the product, the price has to be reduced. How will the
monopolist react when the product is revealed to be effective for one buyer? Will strategic
pricing achieve an efficient allocation?
In this paper, dynamic monopoly pricing is modelled as an infinite-horizon, continuous-
time process. The monopolist sells a perishable experience good. She cannot price-discriminate
across buyers. At each instant of time, the monopolist first posts a price, which is contingent
on the available public information about the experiences of the buyers. Each buyer then
decides to either buy one unit of the experience good or take an outside option (modelled as
another good of known characteristics). The experience good generates random lump-sum
payoffs according to a Poisson process. The arrival rate of the lump-sum payoffs depends
on an unknown product characteristic and an unknown individual attribute, both of which
are binary. For tractability, we assume the public arrival of lump-sum payoffs immediately
resolves both the common uncertainty and the idiosyncratic uncertainty of the receiver. As
a result, there is a simple dichotomy of the learning process: in the social learning phase,
the uncertainty about the product characteristic has not been resolved; in the individual
learning phase, there is common knowledge about the product characteristic. A key feature
of the model is that buyers become ex post heterogeneous in the individual learning phase:
some buyers have received lump-sum payoffs, while others have not.
The model setting consists of two different cases. In the good news case, the experience
good generates positive lump-sum payoffs; in the bad news case, it generates negative lump-
sum damages (e.g., side effects of new drugs). This paper gives full characterizations of the
symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium for both cases. In the good news case, because of the
ex post heterogeneity, the interplay of individual and social learning leads to implications
significantly different from the ones obtained when only social learning exists. In particular,
the buyers’ purchasing behavior, the equilibrium price path and efficiency all significantly
differ from the pure social learning model.
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In the benchmark case where there is a single buyer in the market, that buyer’s purchasing
decision is purely myopic. The key reason is that in this one-buyer case, the equilibrium
price is set such that the buyer is indifferent between purchasing the experience good and
taking the outside option. The buyer’s continuation value is independent of the learning
outcomes. Since learning is not valuable, the buyer only compares the instantaneous cost
and benefit when making the purchasing decisions.2 With many buyers, this property also
holds when the buyers’ payoffs are perfectly correlated, but it no longer applies when the
buyers’ payoffs are only partially correlated. Consider a situation where two ex ante identical
unknown buyers make different purchasing decisions (an “unknown” buyer refers to a buyer
whose value of the good has not been fully revealed). One buyer keeps purchasing the
experience good, while the other buyer deviates to take the outside option for a small amount
of time. If the experimenter does not receive any lump-sum payoffs during that period, she
becomes more pessimistic about her individual attribute. Without price discrimination, if the
monopolist sells to two different buyers, the optimal price is set to make the more pessimistic
buyer indifferent between the alternatives. The deviator, who is more optimistic about the
experience good, pays less than what she is willing to pay. This implies that with multiple
buyers and partial payoff correlations, there could be non-trivial intertemporal incentive
considerations in making the purchasing decisions.
We first characterize the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium when there are two buy-
ers. In the social learning phase – when no lump-sum payoff has arrived yet – the critical
tradeoff for the monopolist is between selling to both buyers and exiting the market; in the
individual learning phase – after lump-sum payoffs have arrived to one buyer – the criti-
cal tradeoff is between selling to both buyers and selling only to the known buyer who has
received lump-sum payoffs. In both learning phases, the equilibrium purchasing behavior
2In a dynamic duopoly pricing model (e.g., Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (1996)), learning determines the
future competition positions of different sellers. The buyer generally is not making myopic decisions since
her continuation value varies with posterior beliefs. But if one seller’s price is fixed to a constant, the buyer’s
optimal decisions become purely myopic in the framework of Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (1996).
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is determined by a cutoff in the posterior belief about the unknown buyer’s individual at-
tribute. Each unknown buyer purchases the experience good above this cutoff and takes the
outside option below this cutoff.
By comparing cutoffs in different learning phases, we distinguish a mass market from a
niche market. The cutoff in the social learning phase is higher than the cutoff in the indi-
vidual learning phase in a mass market, but lower in a niche market. Along the equilibrium
path, in a mass market, the monopolist always sells to both buyers after the arrival of the
first lump-sum payoff; in a niche market, if the first lump-sum payoff arrives too late, exper-
imentation by the unknown buyer will be immediately terminated. When experimentation
by the unknown buyer occurs in the individual learning phase, the equilibrium price is set
the same as in the one-buyer case. Although the unknown buyer is indifferent between the
alternatives, the known buyer receives a larger consumer surplus, since she is more optimistic
about the experience good than the unknown buyer.
The presence of idiosyncratic uncertainty has two important implications for the equilib-
rium price. First, in the social learning phase, since there is a future benefit by taking the
outside option for a small amount of time, each unknown buyer receives a value higher than
the outside option to deter deviation. This deterrence effect forces the monopolist to reduce
the price in order to provide the extra subsidy. Second, it also affects how price responds
to the arrival of lump-sum payoffs. In particular, when the first lump-sum payoff arrives,
there might be an instantaneous drop in price. This is driven by two opposing effects on the
unknown buyer’s reservation value. On the one hand, the arrival of a good news signal makes
the unknown buyer more optimistic. This informational effect raises the unknown buyer’s
reservation value. On the other hand, the unknown buyer loses the chance of becoming the
first known buyer. The resulting loss of rents lowers the unknown buyer’s reservation value.
This continuation value effect is driven by ex post heterogeneity. If the buyers’ payoffs are
perfectly correlated, there is no such effect, and the equilibrium price always goes up after
4
the arrival of the first lump-sum payoff.
If the buyers’ payoffs are perfectly correlated, efficiency is achieved for any number of
buyers since the monopolist is able to fully internalize the social surplus by subsidizing ex-
perimentation. However, if the buyers’ payoffs are only partially correlated, the equilibrium
experimentation level is always lower than the socially efficient one. This is due to the exis-
tence of ex post heterogeneity: the known buyers are willing to pay more than the unknown
buyers in the individual learning phase. Without price discrimination, the monopolist faces a
tradeoff between exploitation of the known buyers and exploration for a higher future value.
The exploitation incentive always causes experimentation to be terminated too early. The
inefficiency in the individual learning phase reduces the monopolist’s incentives to subsidize
experimentation in the social learning phase. As a result, the equilibrium experimentation
is inefficiently low in the social learning phase as well.
We then characterize the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium in the bad news case.
It is shown that the equilibrium is always efficient as is the case when the buyers’ payoffs
are perfectly correlated. The key insight is that although buyers become heterogeneous in
the individual learning phase, the buyers who have received lump-sum damages will never
purchase the experience good. The potential buyers are only the unknown ones, who are ex
post homogeneous in a symmetric equilibrium. Another important difference between the
good and bade news cases is that no extra subsidy is needed in the bad news case since
deviations of an unknown buyer make the deviator more pessimistic. As a result, there is no
deterrence effect and no continuation value effect. The instantaneous price reaction to the
arrival of the first lump-sum damage is always to go down.
The presence of multi-dimensional beliefs complicates the analysis significantly: the pos-
terior belief about the product characteristic and the posterior beliefs about the individual
attributes are all relevant for decision-making. The dimension of the state space is reduced
by the fact that given the priors, the posterior about the product characteristic is a function
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of the posteriors about the individual attributes. When considering the symmetric Markov
perfect equilibrium, on the equilibrium path, one posterior is sufficient to represent all the
posteriors. But off the equilibrium path, the deviations lead to heterogeneous posterior be-
liefs about the individual attributes. Even in that case, the problem is transformed in a
way such that all value functions can be explicitly derived by solving ordinary differential
equations. The benefit of this approach is to ensure that the traditional value matching and
smooth pasting conditions can still be applied to characterize the optimal stopping decisions.
Related Literature
Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (1996) and Felli and Harris (1996) are two early papers analyzing
the impact of price competition on experimentation. They show that if there is only in-
dividual learning, the dynamic duopoly competition with vertically differentiated products
can achieve efficiency. However, Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2000) show that in the presence
of social learning, the dynamic duopoly competition cannot achieve efficiency. Bergemann
and Va¨lima¨ki (2002) and Bonatti (2009) allow ex ante heterogeneity in the sense that buyers
are different in their willingness to pay.3 Both papers assume a continuum of buyers. At
each instant of time, an individual buyer only makes a myopic optimal choice and strategic
interactions between the buyers don’t exist.
Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2006) also consider a dynamic monopoly pricing problem, but
with a continuum of buyers and independent valuations. The difference in crucial modelling
assumptions leads them to investigate different properties of equilibrium price path. The
framework of a continuum of buyers makes it impossible to discuss the impact of a single
good news signal on price. Instead, Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2006) are more concerned
about whether price would always go down or eventually go up in equilibrium. Bose, Orosel,
Ottaviani, and Versterlund (2006) and Bose, Orosel, Ottaviani, and Versterlund (2008) de-
3Villas-Boas (2004) also investigates a duopoly model with ex ante heterogeneity along a location. He
considers a two-period model and is mainly concerned about consumer loyalty, i.e., whether in the second
period, buyers return to the seller they bought from in the first period.
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velop another way of modelling dynamic monopoly pricing under social learning. Their
model is closer to the herding literature: each short-lived buyer makes a purchasing decision
in a pre-determined sequence. In contrast, in our model, all buyers are long-lived and are
making purchasing decisions repeatedly.
This paper is also closely connected to the continuous-time strategic experimentation
literature. A nonexhaustive list of related papers includes Bolton and Harris (1999), Keller
and Rady (1999), Keller and Rady (2010) and Keller, Rady, and Cripps (2005).4 The
analysis of our model setting is greatly simplified by the use of exponential bandits, building
on Keller, Rady, and Cripps (2005). Most of the papers in the strategic experimentation
literature assume a common value environment, where the players’ payoffs are perfectly
correlated. This enables us to use a uni-dimensional posterior belief as the unique state
variable to characterize the value functions. By considering a partial payoff correlation,
we introduce multi-dimensional posterior beliefs and show that the dimensionality of the
problem can be reduced by expressing one posterior as a function of other posteriors.
In addition to the theoretical body of work, there are a few empirical studies attempting
to quantify the importance of learning considerations on consumers’ dynamic purchasing
behavior. However, most of the existing works have exclusively focused on modelling indi-
vidual consumer behavior and analyzing the impact of idiosyncratic uncertainty (see, e.g.,
Ackerberg (2003), Crawford and Shum (2005), Erdem and Keane (1996) and so on). Several
recent works, including Ching (2010), Chintagunta, Jiang, and Jin (2009), Kim (2010), use
both individual learning and social learning to investigate the diffusion of new drugs. In par-
ticular, Ching’s paper is based on the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984. This act
eliminates the clinical trial study requirements for approving generic drugs and encourages
more entries of generic drugs that have uncertain product qualities. Ching shows that both
4The strategic experimentation framework is also used as a building block to investigate broader issues.
For example, Strulovici (2010) investigates voting in a strategic experimentation environment; Bergemann
and Hege (2005), Ho¨rner and Samuelson (2009) and Bonatti and Ho¨rner (2009) consider moral hazard
problems when effort affects speed of learning.
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individual learning and social learning are needed to explain the slow diffusion of generic
drugs into the market.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the model and
defines the solution concept. Section 1.3 and Section 1.4 solve a symmetric Markov perfect
equilibrium and discuss the efficiency of the equilibrium for the good news case and the bad
news case, respectively. Section 1.5 concludes the paper.
1.2 Model Setting
Time t ∈ [0,+∞) is continuous. The market consists of n ≥ 2 buyers indexed by i =
1, 2, · · · , n and one monopolist, who are all risk-neutral with the common discount rate
r > 0. The monopolist with a zero cost of production sells a risky product with unknown
value. At each point in time, a buyer can either buy one unit of the risky product or take a
safe outside option/product.
If a buyer purchases the safe product, she receives a known deterministic flow payoff s >
0.5 The value of the risky product to a buyer i consists of two components: a deterministic
flow payoff ξf ≥ 0 and a random lump-sum payoff ξl. The arrival of lump-sum payoffs
depends on both an intrinsic characteristic of the product (common uncertainty) and the
quality of the match between the product and that buyer (idiosyncratic uncertainty). The
product characteristic is either high (λ = λH ) or low (λ = λL = 0), and the match between
buyer i and the risky product is either relevant (κi = 1) or irrelevant(κi = 0). The arrival
of random lump-sum payoffs ξl is independent across buyers and modelled as a Poisson
process with intensity λκi. Therefore, a buyer i is able to receive random lump-sum payoffs
if and only if both the product characteristic is high and the individual match quality is
relevant. Before the game starts, nature chooses randomly and independently the product
characteristic and the individual match quality for each buyer. The common priors are such
5Alternatively, we can assume the flow payoff is random but drawn from a commonly known distribution
with expectation s > 0.
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that: q0 = Pr(λ = λH), and for each buyer i, ρ0 = Pr(κi = 1). The product characteristic
and the match qualities are initially unobservable to all players (seller and buyers), but the
parameters λH , ξf , ξl, ρ0 and q0 are common knowledge.
We consider two cases in the above setting. In the good news case, ξl > 0 and the arrival
of lump-sum payoffs makes the risky product more attractive than the safe one. We assume
the risky product is superior to the safe one only when the buyers can receive lump-sum
payoffs:
Assumption 1.1. (Good News Case) In the good news case, ξl > 0 and ξf < s < ξf +λHξl.
In the bad news case, ξl < 0 and the arrival of lump-sum payoffs makes the risky product
less attractive than the safe one. We impose the requirement that the risky product is
superior to the safe one only when the buyers cannot receive lump-sum payoffs:
Assumption 1.2. (Bad News Case) In the bad news case, ξl < 0 and ξf > s > ξf + λHξl.
All players observe each buyer’s past actions and outcomes. As a result, both the seller
and the buyers hold common posterior beliefs about the common characteristic and any
given buyer’s match quality. In both cases, if one buyer receives a lump-sum payoff from the
risky product, every player immediately knows that that buyer’s match is relevant and the
product characteristic is high. The non-arrival of lump-sum payoffs may be due to either a
low characteristic or an irrelevant match. Social learning is important because it provides
additional information about the product characteristic even if the buyers’ match qualities
are drawn independently. Although the assumption λL = 0 seems a little restrictive, the
current model is rich enough to include the extreme cases of common value (ρ0 = 1, q0 < 1)
and independent values (q0 = 1, ρ0 < 1).
At each instant of time t, the monopolist first announces a price based on the previous
history and then each buyer decides which product to purchase conditional on the previous
history and the announced price. It is assumed that the monopolist cannot price-discriminate
and so charges the same price to all buyers.
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1.2.1 Belief Updating
Denote by Nit the total number of lump-sum payoffs received by buyer i before time t. Let
Pt be the price charged by the monopolist at time t. Set ait = 1 if buyer i purchases the
risky product at time t; ait = 0 if buyer i purchases the safe product at time t. A public
history before time t is defined as:
ht , ({aiτ , Niτ}ni=1, Pτ )0≤τ<t .
Posterior beliefs are defined as:
qt , Pr[λH | ht] and ρit , Pr[κi = 1 | λH , ht]
such that the posterior belief of receiving lump-sum payoffs is given by
Pr[λκi = λH | ht] = ρitqt.
Given a pair of priors (ρ0, q0), the posteriors (ρ1t, · · · , ρnt, qt) evolve according to Bayes’
rule. A buyer i who has not received any lump-sum payoff before time t expects an arrival
of lump-sum payoffs from the risky product with rate λHaitρitqt. If a lump-sum payoff is
received, ρit immediately jumps to 1; otherwise, ρit obeys the following differential equation
at those times t when ait is right continuous:
6
ρ˙it = −λHaitρit(1− ρit). (1.1)
If no buyer has received a lump-sum payoff, then with an expected arrival rate λHqt
∑n
i=1 aitρit,
some buyer receives a lump-sum payoff and qt jumps to 1. Otherwise, qt obeys the following
6If buyer i has not received good news within time t and t+ h, then the posterior belief ρi,t+h could be
written as:
ρi,t+h =
ρite
−λH
∫ h
0
ai,t+τdτ
ρite
−λH
∫ h
0
ai,t+τdτ + 1− ρit
.
Since aiτ is right continuous with respect to time at time t, there exists some h¯ > 0 such that ai,t+τ = ai,t
for all τ ≤ h¯. Hence by definition,
ρ˙it = lim
h→0
ρi,t+h − ρi,t
h
= −λHaitρit(1− ρit).
q˙t is derived similarly.
10
differential equation at those times when ait is right continuous for ∀i:
q˙t = −λHqt(1− qt)
n∑
i=1
aitρit. (1.2)
The posterior belief q can be expressed as a function of ρi’s. When no buyer has received a
lump-sum payoff for a length of time t, let xit , ρ0e−λH
∫ t
0 aiτdτ +1−ρ0 denote the probability
of the event that unknown buyer i has not received lump-sum payoffs for a length of time t
conditional on λH . By Bayes’ rule
qt =
q0
∏n
i=1 xit
q0
∏n
i=1 xit + 1− q0
. (1.3)
From equation (1.1),
ρit =
ρ0e
−λH
∫ t
0 aiτdτ
xit
=⇒ 1− ρit = 1− ρ0
xit
. (1.4)
Substituting (1.4) into (1.3) yields:
qt =
q0(1− ρ0)n
q0(1− ρ0)n + (1− q0)
∏n
i=1(1− ρit)
. (1.5)
Notice that equation (1.5) also holds when at least one buyer has received lump-sum payoffs.
In that situation, at least one of the ρit’s is one and qt is also one. After long history of
no realization of lump-sum payoffs, the posteriors ρit would converge to zero while qt would
not. This reflects the fact that ρit is a conditional probability and qt is bounded below by
q0(1− ρ0)n.
A nice property about equation (1.5) is that it only depends on ρit’s and does not explicitly
depend on previous purchasing decisions or time t. Differential equations (1.1) and (1.2)
imply: given a particular history of purchasing decisions, both ρit and qt can be written as a
function of time. In the critical history when nobody has received lump-sum payoffs, ρit is
sufficient to encode time t and the relevant information about previous purchasing decisions,
which are needed for the the updating of qt. Therefore, we are able to express qt as a function
of ρt , (ρ1t, · · · , ρnt) for a given pair of priors (ρ0, q0).
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1.2.2 Strategies and Payoffs
Throughout the paper, we focus on symmetric Markov perfect equilibria. The natural state
variables include a posterior about common uncertainty q and posteriors about idiosyncratic
uncertainty ρ. Given a pair of priors (ρ0, q0), it suffices to use posterior beliefs ρt as state
variables since q can be expressed as a function of ρ. This enables us to reduce the dimen-
sionality of the state space by one. The state variable ρt is required to be feasible in the
sense that
ρt ∈ Σ = {ρ ∈ [0, 1]n : either ρi = 1 or ρi ≤ ρ0 all for i}.
Purchasing Decision Given a pair of priors (ρ0, q0), buyer i’s acceptance policy is a function
of states ρ and price P
αi : Σ× R→ {0, 1}.7
Since lump-sum payoffs arrive with rate ρitqtλH , the expected flow of utility associated
with purchasing decision ait is
aitρitqtλHξl + ait(ξf − Pt) + (1− ait)s.
The choice of ait affects not only flow utility but also how beliefs ρt and qt are updated.
Given beliefs ρ ∈ Σ, monopolist’s strategy P and other buyers’ strategies α−i, buyer i’s
value (sum of normalized expected discounted utility) from purchasing strategy αi is
Ui(αi, P, α−i;ρ) = E
∫
re−rt {αi(ρt, Pt) (ρitq(ρt)λHξl + ξf − Pt) + (1− αi(ρt, Pt))s} dt
where the expectation is taken over {ρt : t ∈ [0,∞)} with ρ0 = ρ and q(ρt) is given by
equation (1.5).
7More accurately, the strategy should be written as αi(ρ, P ; ρ0, q0). Throughout the paper, (ρ0, q0) will
be dropped since no confusion is caused.
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Pricing Decision Given a pair of priors (ρ0, q0), the monopolist’s price is a function of states
ρ
P : Σ→ R.
Given buyers’ strategies {αi}ni=1, the flow profits associated with price Pt are
n∑
i=1
αi(ρt, Pt)Pt.
The choice of Pt affects not only flow profits but also the purchasing decisions and so how
beliefs are updated. Given beliefs ρ and buyers’ strategies {αi}ni=1, the monopolist’s value
(sum of normalized expected discounted profits) from the pricing policy P is
J(P, α;ρ) = E
∫
re−rt
n∑
i=1
αi(ρt, P (ρt))P (ρt)dt
where the expectation is taken over {ρt : t ∈ [0,∞)} with ρ0 = ρ.
Admissible Strategies A critical issue associated with continuous time model setting is that
a well-defined strategy profile need not yield a well-defined outcome. Some restrictions on
strategies have to be imposed to overcome this issue. In particular, we require the Markovian
strategy profile (P, α) to be admissible. The formal definition can be found in the appendix.
If a strategy profile satisfies this requirement, the induced outcome is well behaved in the
sense that the purchasing decisions ait and pricing decisions Pt are right continuous functions
when there is no arrival of lump-sum payoffs.
1.2.3 Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium
We consider a Markov perfect equilibrium in symmetric strategies. The formal definition of
our solution concept is the following:
Definition 1.1. Given a pair of priors (ρ0, q0), an admissible Markov strategies profile
{P ∗, α∗} is a Markov perfect equilibrium if for all i, feasible beliefs ρ and all admissible
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strategies P˜ and α˜i:
8
J(P ∗, α∗;ρ) ≥ J(P˜ , α∗;ρ) and Ui(α∗i , P ∗, α∗−i;ρ) ≥ Ui(α˜i, P ∗, α∗−i;ρ).
Moreover, {P ∗, α∗} is symmetric if for all permutations pi : {1, · · · , n} → {1, · · · , n},
P (ρ˜) = P (ρ) where ρ˜i = ρpi−1(i) and αi(ρ, P ) = αpi(i)(ρ˜, P ).
1.3 Equilibrium in the Good News Case
In the good news case, ξl > 0 and the arrival of a lump-sum payoff makes the risky product
more favorable to the receiver of this payoff. In this section, we normalize ξf = 0 and
ξl = v > 0. Assumption 1.1 implies g , λHv > s > 0.
Since the arrival of one lump-sum payoff immediately resolves common uncertainty, there
are only two situations to consider: a social learning phase, where the common uncertainty
has not been resolved, and an individual learning phase, where the common uncertainty has
been resolved. In the individual learning phase, an unknown buyer just needs to learn her
individual match quality and for such a buyer i, without the arrival of a lump-sum payoff,
posterior belief ρi is updated according to equation (1.1).
In the social learning phase, both individual learning and social learning exist. If unknown
buyers behave symmetrically, they share the same posterior belief ρ, and belief q about λH
is given by equation (1.5):
q =
(1− ρ0)nq0
(1− ρ0)nq0 + (1− ρ)n(1− q0) . (1.6)
Therefore, in a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium, it suffices to use the common posterior
belief ρ as the unique state variable.
8Strategies P˜ and α˜i need not be Markovian. The definition of admissible non-Markovian strategies can
also be found in the appendix.
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1.3.1 Socially Efficient Allocation
Before solving for a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium, we first solve for the socially
efficient allocation. The linear utility function enables us to obtain the efficient allocation
policy by solving a specific multi-armed bandit problem where payoffs are given by the
aggregate surplus.
Given the priors ρ0 and q0, the socially efficient allocation is characterized by a cutoff
strategy in posterior belief ρ. There are two cutoffs ρeI and ρ
e
S for the individual learning
phase and the social learning phase, respectively. In the individual (social) learning phase, it
is optimal for the social planner to keep the unknown buyers experimenting until belief drops
to ρeI (ρ
e
S) and no lump-sum payoff has been received before that. A backward procedure is
used to solve for the socially efficient allocation. We first characterize the socially efficient
allocation in the individual learning phase and then use the optimal social surplus function
in the individual learning phase to solve the cooperative problem in the social learning phase.
Socially Efficient Allocation in the Individual Learning Phase In the individual learning
phase, suppose k buyers have received good news; then it is socially optimal for them to
keep purchasing the risky product by assumption 1.2 and the social surplus function is
Ωk(ρ) = kg + (n− k)W (ρ)
where
W (ρ) = sup
α∈{0,1}
E
∫ ∞
t=0
re−rt[αρtg + (1− α)s]dt
is the optimal value for an unknown buyer with posterior belief ρ.
Since the unknown buyers are facing a standard independent two-armed bandit problem,
previous research (see Keller, Rady, and Cripps (2005)) has characterized the optimal cutoff
and value function W . It is efficient for the remaining n − k unknown buyers to stop
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purchasing the risky product once the posterior belief ρ reaches
ρeI =
rs
(r + λH)g − λHs
and still no lump-sum payoff has been received. Since in the individual learning phase, the
common uncertainty has been resolved (q = 1), the efficient cutoff ρeI does not depend on
the priors ρ0 and q0. The value function for a buyer with posterior belief ρ is
W (ρ) = max
{
s, gρ+
λHs
r + λH
(
rs
(r + λH)(g − s))
r/λH (1− ρ)(1− ρ
ρ
)r/λH
}
. (1.7)
Efficiency in the Social Learning Phase In the social learning phase, the socially efficient
allocation solves the symmetric cooperative problem (see claim A.1 in the appendix):
ΩS(ρ) = sup
α(·)∈{0,1}
E
{∫ h
t=0
re−rtn[α(ρt)ρtq(ρt)g + (1− α(ρt))s]dt+ e−rhΩ(ρh | α)
}
where
EΩ(ρh | α) = q
n∑
k=1
(
n
k
)
ρk
(
1− e−λH
∫ h
0 αtdt
)k (
ρe−λH
∫ h
0 αtdt + 1− ρ
)n−k
Ωk(ρh)
+
[
q
(
ρe−λH
∫ h
0 αtdt + 1− ρ
)n
+ 1− q
]
ΩS(ρh)
and
ρh =
ρe−λH
∫ h
0 αtdt
ρe−λH
∫ h
0 αtdt + 1− ρ
.
In the continuous time framework, the probability that more than two buyers receive
lump-sum payoffs at the same time is zero. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (HJB
equation hereafter) for the above problem hence is simplified as:
rΩS(ρ) = max
{
rns, rnρq(ρ)g + nρq(ρ)λH(Ω1(ρ)− ΩS(ρ))− λHρ(1− ρ)Ω′S(ρ)
}
, (1.8)
where Ω1(ρ) = g + (n − 1)W (ρ) is the social surplus when one buyer receives a lump-sum
payoff.
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The first part of the maximand corresponds to using the safe product, the second to the
risky product. The effect of using the risky product for the social planner can be decomposed
into three elements: i) the (normalized) expected payoff rate rnρq(ρ)g, ii) the jump of the
value function to Ω1(·) if one buyer receives a lump-sum payoff, which occurs at rate nλH
with probability pq(ρ), and iii) the effect of Bayesian updating on the value function when
no lump-sum payoff is received. When no lump-sum payoff is received, both ρ and q are
updated. The updating of q is implicitly incorporated as a function of ρ.
The optimal cutoff ρeS is pinned down by solving the following differential equation:
rΩS(ρ) = rnρq(ρ)g + nρq(ρ)λH(Ω1(ρ)− ΩS(ρ))− λHρ(1− ρ)Ω′S(ρ), (1.9)
with boundary conditions:
ΩS(ρ
e
S) = ns (value matching condition) and Ω
′
S(ρ
e
S) = 0 (smooth pasting condition).
Substitute the two boundary conditions into differential equation (1.9) and we immedi-
ately show that the cutoff ρeS should satisfy
rnρq(ρ)g + nρq(ρ)λHΩ1(ρ) = (r + nρq(ρ)λH)ns. (1.10)
In the appendix, we show that equation (1.10) implies a unique solution ρeS for a given
pair of priors (ρ0, q0). The socially efficient allocation in the social learning phase can be
characterized as follows:
Proposition 1.1. (Characterize socially efficient allocation) For any posteriors (ρ, q), it is
socially efficient to purchase the risky product in the social learning phase if and only if
ρq >
rs
(r + λH)g + (n− 1)λHW (ρ)− nλHs.
When the common uncertainty is resolved, it is always socially efficient for the unknown
buyers to continue experimentation until the posterior reaches ρeI .
Proof. In the appendix.
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Figure 1.1: Solutions to the Cooperative Problem with Two Players
Given the priors, the unique pair of efficient cutoffs (ρeS(ρ0, q0), q
e
S(ρ0, q0)) is determined
by equations
qeS =
(1− ρ0)nq0
(1− ρ0)nq0 + (1− ρeS)n(1− q0)
(1.11)
and
qeS =
rs
ρeS[(r + λH)g + (n− 1)λHW (ρeS)− nλHs]
, (1.12)
where W (·) is given by equation (1.7). Figure 1.1 is an illustration of how we can use
equations (1.11) and (1.12) to determine the efficient cutoffs in the social learning phase.
Equation (1.12) describes a stationary stopping curve because it consists of all pairs of
stopping cutoffs (ρeS, q
e
S) and this equation is independent of priors (ρ0, q0). Equation (1.11)
describes how ρ and q evolve jointly over time starting from ρ0 and q0. This equation indeed
depends on priors.
Unlike the individual learning phase, the cutoff ρeS does depend on the priors (ρ0, q0).
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We formulate the problem so that ρ is the unique state variable in order to avoid solving
partial differential equations. But the actual optimal stopping decision depends not only
on belief ρ but also on q. For a fixed ρ0, a higher q0 means that the society can afford to
experiment more and thus the efficient cutoff ρeS should be lower. For a fixed pair of priors
(ρ0, q0), a two-dimensional optimal stopping problem is transformed into a one-dimensional
one by expressing q as a function of ρ. As a result, we are able to apply traditional value
matching and smooth pasting conditions to solve our optimal stopping problems.
1.3.2 Characterizing Equilibrium for n = 2
In the two-buyer case, there are three situations to consider. When the common uncertainty
is not resolved, denote US as the value function for each unknown buyer; and JS as the value
function for the monopolist. When one buyer has received lump-sum payoffs, denote UI as
the value function for the unknown buyer; VI as the value function for the known buyer;
and JI as the value function for the monopolist. When both buyers have received lump-sum
payoffs, denote V2 as the value function for the known buyers; and J2 as the value function
for the monopolist.
For ζ = S, I, denote α0ζ (α
1
ζ) as the strategy for the known (unknown) buyers. Let Pζ be
the price charged by the monopolist. Then definition 1.1 implies that a triple of (Pζ , α
0
ζ , α
1
ζ)
is a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium if the following conditions are satisfied:
• for ζ = I, α0ζ = 1 if P ≤ g − s and = 0 otherwise;
• for ζ = S, the unknown buyers choose acceptance policy α1ζ to maximize:
Uζ(ρ) = sup
α1ζ
E
{∫ τ
t=0
re−rt
[
α1ζ(ρtqζ(ρt)g − Pζ(ρt)) + (1− α1ζ)s
]
dt
+e−rτ (
1
2
VI(ρτ ) +
1
2
UI(ρτ ))
}
and given α1ζ , the monopolist chooses price Pζ(ρt) to maximize
Jζ(ρ) = sup
Pζ(·)
E
{∫ τ
t=0
2re−rtα0ζ(Pζ(ρt))dt+ e
−rτJI(ρτ )
}
,
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where τ is the first (possibly infinite) time at which a new unknown buyer receives
good news;
• for ζ = I, the unknown buyer chooses acceptance policy α1ζ to maximize:
Uζ(ρ) = sup
α1ζ
E
{∫ τ
t=0
re−rt
[
α1ζ(ρtqζ(ρt)g − Pζ(ρt)) + (1− α1ζ)s
]
dt+ e−rτV2(ρτ )
}
and given (α0ζ , α
1
ζ), the monopolist chooses price Pζ(ρt) to maximize
Jζ(ρ) = sup
Pζ
E
{∫ τ
t=0
re−rt
[
α0ζ(Pζ(ρt)) + α
1
ζ(ρt, Pζ(ρt))
]
dt+ e−rτJ2(ρτ )
}
;
• beliefs update according to Bayes’ rule: ρt satisfies the law of motion, i.e., equation
(1.1); qζ(ρt) = 1 for ζ = I and qζ(ρt) is given by equation (1.6) for ζ = S;
• when both buyers have received received lump-sum payoffs, the price is g−s such that
J2 = 2(g − s) and V2 = s.
First, it is straightforward to see that the known buyers always buy the risky product if the
price is lower than g−s and not buy otherwise. Second, when both unknown buyers purchase
the risky product, the conditional probability that any given unknown buyer becomes good
is simply 1/2, since the two unknown buyers’ payoff distributions are identical. Finally, if
both buyers turn out to be good, it is optimal for the monopolist charging price g − s to
extract all of the surplus.
Niche Market vs. Mass Market
As in the social planner’s problem, the equilibrium purchasing behavior can be characterized
by two cutoffs ρ?S and ρ
?
I . If no buyer has received lump-sum payoffs, the price is falling
over time to keep both unknown buyers experimenting until posterior ρ reaches ρ?S. After
that, both buyers purchase the safe product. If one buyer has received lump-sum payoffs,
the monopolist stops selling to the unknown buyer and only serves the known buyer when
posterior belief about the unknown buyer is below ρ?I .
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The efficient cutoff in the individual learning phase ρeI is always smaller than the efficient
cutoff in the social learning phase ρeS for any pair of priors (ρ0, q0). Under strategic interac-
tions, it turns out that ρ?I could be either smaller or larger than ρ
?
S. We can distinguish a
mass market from a niche market by comparing these two cutoffs.
Definition 1.2. (Niche market and mass market)
1. The market is niche if the cutoffs determined by (ρ0, q0) satisfy: ρ
?
S ≤ ρ?I , and
2. The market is mass if the cutoffs determined by (ρ0, q0) satisfy: ρ
?
S > ρ
?
I .
In a mass market, the arrival of good news never terminates experimentation while in a
niche market, experimentation is shut down by the arrival of the first lump-sum payoff at
ρ ≤ ρ?I . Obviously, whether a mass or niche market appears in equilibrium depends on the
priors, which in turn determines the relative importance of social learning and individual
learning. We expect that experimentation would continue after the first arrival of lump-sum
payoffs if the individual learning component is quite important and vice versa.
Equilibrium in the Individual Learning Phase
A backward procedure is used to characterize ρ?I and ρ
?
S. In the individual learning phase,
the equilibrium cutoff ρ?I and the various value functions are provided by the following
proposition.
Proposition 1.2. Fix a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium. In the history such that the
common uncertainty is resolved, the unknown buyer purchases the risky product if and only
if the posterior belief ρ is larger than
ρ?I ,
r(g + s)
2rg + λH(g − s) .
The equilibrium price is PI(ρ) = gρ− s and the unknown buyer receives value UI(ρ) = s; the
known buyer receives value
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VI(ρ) = max
{
s, s+ g(1− ρ)(1− [ (1− ρ)ρ
?
I
ρ(1− ρ?I)
]r/λH )
}
; (1.13)
and the monopolist receives value
JI(ρ) =
{
2(gρ− s) + (g + s− 2gρ?I) 1−ρ1−ρ?I [
(1−ρ)ρ?I
(1−ρ?I )ρ ]
r/λH if ρ > ρ?I
g − s otherwise.
Proof. In the appendix.
It is straightforward to see that the equilibrium cutoff ρ?I is strictly larger than the efficient
cutoff ρeI . This is because ex post heterogeneity means the known buyer is willing to pay
more than the unknown buyer. In the absence of price discrimination, the monopolist faces a
tradeoff between exploitation of the known buyers and exploration for a higher future value.
The incentive to charge a high price and extract the full surplus from the known buyer
causes an early termination of experimentation. Another remark is that the unknown buyer
is making a myopic choice in the individual learning phase since there is no learning value
attached to the purchasing behavior (the unknown buyer always receives value s regardless
of whether she receives the lump-sum payoffs).
Equilibrium in the Social Learning Phase
Now consider the situation where none of the buyers have received lump-sum payoffs yet.
Assume that the posterior belief ρ is large enough that both buyers purchase the risky
product in equilibrium. To characterize the equilibrium price and cutoff, we proceed as
follows. First, we use the incentive compatibility constraint to derive the value function
of the experimenting buyers. Second, we derive expressions of equilibrium price and the
monopolist’s value function based on the experimenting buyers’ value function derived in
the first step. Finally, we apply value matching and smooth pasting conditions (see, e.g.,
Dixit (1993)) to pin down the equilibrium cutoff.
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To keep both unknown buyers experimenting, the unknown buyers’ value should be
such that i) each buyer has an incentive to participate (i.e., the value is larger than the
outside option s); ii) each buyer should not benefit from the following deviations: stopping
experimentation for a very small amount of time and then switching back to the specified
equilibrium behavior.
The deviations described in constraint ii) are similar to one-shot deviations in discrete
time models. Formally, it implies that for any ρ > ρ?S, there exists h¯ such that for all h ≤ h¯,
US(ρ) ≥ Uˆ(ρ;h) =
∫ h
t=0
re−rtsdt+ρq(1− e−λHh)e−rhUI(ρ) + [1−ρq(1− e−λHh)]e−rhUD(ρ, ρh)
(1.14)
where Uˆ(ρ;h) denotes the value for a deviator who deviates for h length of time. The de-
viator receives a deterministic payoff s within the h length of time. After the deviation,
with probability ρq(1 − e−λHh), the non-deviator has received lump-sum payoffs and the
continuation value for the deviator is UI(ρ) = s; with the complementary probability, the
non-deviator has not received lump-sum payoffs and the two unknown buyers become asym-
metric. In the latter situation, the deviator receives a continuation value UD(ρ, ρh) where
superscript D stands for “deviator.” The non-deviator ρh is more pessimistic than the devi-
ator ρ since ρh =
ρe−λHh
ρe−λHh+(1−ρ) < ρ. Obviously, equation (1.14) is a tighter constraint than
the participation constraint since UI(ρ) = s and U
D(ρ, ρh) ≥ s.
The most important technical result in this paper is to evaluate limh→0
US(ρ)−Uˆ(ρ;h)
h
. The
result is given by lemma A.1 in the appendix. Here we just provide a sketch of the proof.
Sketch of the proof for lemma A.1. The main difficulty of the proof is to evaluate
the off-equilibrium-path value function UD(ρ, ρh). First notice that ρ > ρ
?
S means that it is
optimal for the monopolist to sell to both unknown buyers on the equilibrium path. Then,
for h sufficiently small, it is still optimal for the monopolist to sell to both unknown buyers
after an h-deviation.
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In other words, given a sufficiently small h, there exists some h¯′ such that for all h′ ≤ h¯′,
we have:
UD(ρ, ρh) = E
∫ h′
t=0
re−rt(ρtqtg − P˜t)dt
+ ρq˜h(1− e−λHh′)e−rh′VI(ρh+h′) + ρhq˜h(1− e−λHh′)e−rh′s
+ [1− ρq˜h(1− e−λHh′)− ρhq˜h(1− e−λHh′)]e−rh′U(ρh′ , ρh+h′). (1.15)
In the above expression, ρt is the posterior about the deviator and starts from ρ0 = ρ;
q˜h is the posterior about the product characteristic after an h-deviation such that: q˜h =
q0(1−ρ0)2
q0(1−ρ0)2+(1−q0)(1−ρ)(1−ρh) ; and P˜t is the off-equilibrium-path price set by the monopolist after
an h-deviation. Obviously, the value function UD(ρ, ρh) depends on the off-equilibrium-path
price and cannot be evaluated directly.
Meanwhile, notice the non-deviator’s value can be expressed as:
UND(ρ, ρh) = E
∫ h′
t=0
re−rt(ρ′tqtg − P˜t)dt
+ ρq˜h(1− e−λHh′)e−rh′s+ ρhq˜h(1− e−λHh′)e−rh′VI(ρh′)
+ [1− ρq˜h(1− e−λHh′)− ρhq˜h(1− e−λHh′)]e−rh′U(ρh+h′ , ρh′), (1.16)
where ρ′t is the posterior about the non-deviator and starts from ρ
′
0 = ρh.
The key step is to decompose UD(ρ, ρh) as:
UD(ρ, ρh) = U
ND(ρ, ρh) + (U
D(ρ, ρh)− UND(ρ, ρh)).
The reason for doing this decomposition is that the off-equilibrium-path price is cancelled
when we subtract UND(ρ, ρh) from U
D(ρ, ρh), Hence, Z(ρ, ρh) , UD(ρ, ρh) − UND(ρ, ρh) is
independent of the off-equilibrium-path price P˜ and can be evaluated directly.
Buyer ρh’s value U
ND(ρ, ρh) can be computed without using the off-equilibrium-path
price. If the non-deviator has not received lump-sum payoffs during an h-deviation, she
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becomes more pessimistic than the deviator. If the monopolist wants to make a sale to
both buyers, the optimal price is set according to the reservation value of the more pes-
simistic buyer. An expression of UND(ρ, ρh) can be derived from the ρh buyer’s incentive
compatibility constraint. In the appendix, we show that this implies a first-order ordinary
differential equation for UND(ρ, ρh), which can be solved by imposing the boundary condition
that U(ρh, ρh) = US(ρh).
Second, given any t < h′, notice equations (1.15) and (1.16) also hold for posteriors
(ρ(t), ρh(t)) where
ρ(t) =
ρe−λH t
ρe−λH t + (1− ρ) , and ρh(t) =
ρhe
−λH t
ρhe−λH t + (1− ρh) .
Redefine
Z(t) = Z(ρ(t), ρh(t)) = U(ρ(t), ρh(t))− U(ρh(t), ρ(t))
to be a function of time t . A first-order ordinary differential equation about Z(t) can
be obtained by subtracting equation (1.16) from equation (1.15) and letting the length of
time interval converge to zero. Solving the ordinary differential equation, the expression for
Z(ρ, ρh) can be recovered by substituting time t as functions of ρ(t) and ρh(t). The boundary
condition is such that Z = 0 once ρh reaches ρ
?
S.
After UD(ρ, ρh) is evaluated, limh→0
US(ρ)−Uˆ(ρ;h)
h
can be computed directly. 
Lemma A.2 in the appendix implies that in equilibrium, a profit-maximizing monopolist
should always make the incentive constraints to be “binding” in the sense that
lim
h→0
US(ρ)− Uˆ(ρ;h)
h
= 0.
Lemma A.1 and lemma A.2 together gives an important characterization of the on-equilibrium-
path value function US:
Proposition 1.3. Fix the monopolist’s strategy such that ρ?S is the equilibrium cutoff in
the social learning phase. In a mass market, given any ρ > ρ?S, a necessary and sufficient
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condition for the unknown buyers to keep experimenting is that the value US(ρ) satisfies
differential equation
0 = 2(r + λHρq)(US(ρ)− s) + λHρ(1− ρ)U ′S(ρ) + (r + λHρ)g(1− ρ)q(
(1− ρ)ρ?I
ρ(1− ρ?I)
)r/λH
− λHgρ(1− ρ)q −
[
r + λHρ
?
S
1− ρ?S
(
ρ?I
1− ρ?I
)r/λH − λH( ρ
?
S
1− ρ?S
)1+r/λH
]
g(1− ρ)2q(1− ρ
ρ
)r/λH .
(1.17)
In a niche market, given any ρ > ρ?S, a necessary and sufficient condition for the unknown
buyers to keep experimenting is that the value US(ρ) satisfies differential equation
0 = 2(r + λHρq)(US(ρ)− s) + λHρ(1− ρ)U ′S(ρ)
+
rλHg
r + λH
(1− ρ)2qρ?S
1− ρ?S
(
(1− ρ)ρ?S
ρ(1− ρ?S)
)r/λH − rg
r + λH
λHρ(1− ρ)q (1.18)
for ρ ≤ ρ?I ; and differential equation
0 = 2(r+λHρq)(US(ρ)−s)+λHρ(1−ρ)U ′S(ρ)+(r+λHρ)g(1−ρ)q(
(1− ρ)ρ?I
ρ(1− ρ?I)
)r/λH−λHgρ(1−ρ)q
− r
[
r + λH + λHρ
?
I
(r + λH)(1− ρ?I)
(
ρ?I
1− ρ?I
)r/λH − λH
r + λH
(
ρ?S
1− ρ?S
)1+r/λH
]
g(1− ρ)2q(1− ρ
ρ
)r/λH (1.19)
for ρ > ρ?I .
The necessity of proposition 1.3 just comes from combining lemma A.1 and lemma A.2.
In the appendix, we prove the sufficiency of this result as well: given the on-equilibrium-path
value function US(ρ) and off-equilibrium-path value function U
D(ρ, ρh), it is not optimal for
an experimenting buyer to deviate.
The ordinary differential equations in proposition 1.3 can be solved by using observation
A.1 in the appendix. In a mass market, for any ρ > ρ?S, the value function US(ρ) is given by
US(ρ) = s+
λH
2r + λH
gρ(1− ρ)q − g(1− ρ)q[ (1− ρ)ρ
?
I
ρ(1− ρ?I)
]r/λH
+
[
r + λHρ
?
S
r(1− ρ?S)
(
ρ?I
1− ρ?I
)r/λH − λH
r
(
ρ?S
1− ρ?S
)1+r/λH
]
g(1− ρ)2q(1− ρ
ρ
)r/λH
+ C(1− ρ)2q(1− ρ
ρ
)2r/λH . (1.20)
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In a niche market, for any ρ?S < ρ ≤ ρ?I , the value function US(ρ) is given by
US(ρ) = s+
rλH
(2r + λH)(r + λH)
gρ(1− ρ)q − λHg
r + λH
ρ?S(1− ρ)2q
1− ρ?S
(
(1− ρ)ρ?S
ρ(1− ρ?S)
)r/λH
+ D(1− ρ)2q(1− ρ
ρ
)2r/λH ; (1.21)
and for ρ > ρ?I , the value function US(ρ) is given by
9
US(ρ) = s+
λH
2r + λH
gρ(1− ρ)q − g(1− ρ)q[ (1− ρ)ρ
?
I
ρ(1− ρ?I)
]r/λH
+
[
r + λH + λHρ
?
I
(r + λH)(1− ρ?I)
(
ρ?I
1− ρ?I
)r/λH − λH
r + λH
(
ρ?S
1− ρ?S
)1+r/λH
]
g(1− ρ)2q(1− ρ
ρ
)r/λH
+ (D − 2λHg
2r + λH
(
ρ?I
1− ρ?I
)1+2r/λH )(1− ρ)2q(1− ρ
ρ
)2r/λH . (1.22)
Since there is learning value attached to purchasing behavior, the unknown buyer is not
making a myopic choice. The monopolist has to provide extra subsidy to deter deviations
because the deviator gains rents by becoming more optimistic: US(ρ) > s.
Denote the equilibrium price in the social learning phase to be PS(ρ). Then, the value
for a buyer from purchasing the risky product can be characterized by the following HJB
equation:
rUS(ρ) = r(ρq(ρ)g − PS(ρ)) + λHρq(ρ)(UI(ρ)− US(ρ)) + λHρq(ρ)(VI(ρ)− US(ρ))
− λHρ(1− ρ)U ′S(ρ) (1.23)
where q(ρ) = q0(1−ρ0)
2
q0(1−ρ0)2+(1−q0)(1−ρ)2 , UI(ρ) = s, and VI(ρ) is given by equation (1.13).
Meanwhile, by selling the products, the monopolist’s value can be characterized as follows:
rJS(ρ) = 2rPS(ρ) + 2λHρq(ρ)(JI(ρ)− JS(ρ))− λHρ(1− ρ)J ′S(ρ). (1.24)
where JI(ρ) is given by proposition 1.2.
9The undetermined coefficient in the differential equation is chosen such that US(ρ) is continuous at ρ
?
I .
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Equations (1.23) and (1.24) are value functions if both unknown buyers purchase the
risky product. The RHS of equation (1.23) can be decomposed into four elements: i) the
expected payoff rate from purchasing the risky product r(ρq(ρ)g − PS(ρ)); ii) the jump of
the value function to VI if a given buyer receives a lump-sum payoff; iii) the drop of the
value function to UI = s if the other buyer receives a lump-sum payoff; and iv) the effect
of Bayesian updating on the value function when no lump-sum is received. Equation (1.24)
could be interpreted similarly.
The on-equilibrium-path price PS(ρ) can be derived from the on-equilibrium-path value
function US(ρ). It is straightforward to show: in a mass market,
PS(ρ) = ρq(ρ)g − s+ λH
2r + λH
gρ(1− ρ)q(ρ) + Cq(ρ)(1− ρ)2(1− ρ
ρ
)2r/λH (1.25)
for ρ > ρ?S; while in a niche market,
PS(ρ) = ρq(ρ)g − s− λH
2r + λH
gρ(1− ρ)q(ρ) +Dq(ρ)(1− ρ)2(1− ρ
ρ
)2r/λH (1.26)
for ρ?S < ρ ≤ ρ?I , and
PS(ρ) = ρq(ρ)g − s+ λH
2r + λH
gρ(1− ρ)q(ρ)
+ (D − 2λHg
2r + λH
(
ρ?I
1− ρ?I
)1+2r/λH )q(ρ)(1− ρ)2(1− ρ
ρ
)2r/λH (1.27)
for ρ > ρ?I . In the above equations, C and D are constants in equations (1.20) to (1.22). No-
tice in equations (1.26) and (1.27), the signs in front of term λH
2r+λH
gρ(1−ρ)q(ρ) are different.
This reflects the change in continuation value when ρ drops below ρ?I . By proposition 1.2,
for ρ ≤ ρ?I , upon the arrival of the first lump-sum payoff, the monopolist immediately shuts
down experimentation and charges price g − s. This greatly reduces the unknown buyers’
incentives to experiment. However, it is easy to check that in a niche market, the price PS(ρ)
is still continuous at ρ?I .
We substitute the price expression PS(ρ) into equation (1.24) and characterize the equi-
librium cutoff ρ?S by applying value matching and smooth pasting conditions:
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US(ρ
?
S) = s, JS(ρ
?
S) = 0, J
′
S(ρ
?
S) = 0.
Proposition 1.4. (Characterize the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium) In the social
learning phase, the unknown buyers purchase the risky product under posterior beliefs (ρ, q)
if and only if
ρq >
rs
rg + λH(VI(ρ) + JI(ρ))− λHs.
A mass market appears if and only if
1− q0
q0(1− ρ0)2 >
g
(1− ρ?I)s
. (1.28)
Moreover, for all ρ0 < 1 and q0 < 1, the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium is inefficient
so that experimentation is terminated too early.
Proof. In the appendix.
The unique equilibrium cutoff ρ?S is characterized by equation
ρq(ρ) =
rs
rg + λH(VI(ρ) + JI(ρ))− λHs. (1.29)
It is straightforward to show the equilibrium is inefficient by comparing the efficient stopping
curve with the equilibrium stopping curve. The inefficiency in the individual learning phase
causes a leakage of the social surplus for the monopolist, which reduces the monopolist’s in-
centives to subsidize experimentation in the social learning phase. Therefore, the equilibrium
experimentation is terminated too early in the social learning phase as well.
There are two remarks about proposition 1.4. First, it is straightforward to check that
at ρ?S, the smooth pasting condition for US(·) is also satisfied: U ′S(ρ?S) = 0. Explicitly,
the monopolist is solving an optimal stopping problem given the price she has to charge in
order to keep the unknown buyers experimenting. Implicitly, given the equilibrium pricing
strategy PS(·), the unknown buyers are facing an optimal stopping problem as well. At the
equilibrium cutoff, the smooth pasting condition for US(·) should also be satisfied. This fact
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Figure 1.2: Equilibrium Price Dynamics
is useful when we discuss efficiency for any n ≥ 2 buyers because it enables us to characterize
the equilibrium cutoff without solving for the value functions. Second, the appearance of a
mass market depends on the relative importance of social learning and individual learning.
Given q0, when ρ0 goes up, the monopolist has higher incentives to keep the remaining
unknown buyer experimenting. A mass market is more likely to appear as a result.
Equilibrium Price Path
After solving for the equilibrium cutoff ρ?S, the constants C and D in equations (1.20) and
(1.21) can be pinned down from the value matching condition and then the expression for the
equilibrium prices can be derived. Figure 1.2 depicts different price paths in the symmetric
Markov perfect equilibrium depending on how many buyers have received lump-sum payoffs.
The presence of idiosyncratic uncertainty has two important implications for the equilib-
rium price.
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First, in the social learning phase, assume instead that the equilibrium value for each
unknown buyer is exactly s. Then the equilibrium price should be:
P˜S(ρ) = ρq(ρ)g − s+ λH
r
ρq(ρ)(VI(ρ)− s).
To deter the buyers from taking the outside option, the equilibrium value for each un-
known buyer must be strictly larger than s. The actual equilibrium price price PS(ρ) is
strictly less than P˜S(ρ) because of this deterrence effect. Figure 1.3 compares the equilib-
rium price path with and without the deterrence effect. It shows that the price reduction
caused by the deterrence effect is quite significant.
Second, the instantaneous price reaction to the arrival of the first lump-sum payoff might
be ambiguous. In particular, when the first lump-sum payoff arrives, there could be an in-
stantaneous drop in price in order to encourage the buyer who remains unsure to experiment
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as shown by figure 1.2. To understand the negative response of the price to the arrival of
a good news signal, we first compare the equilibrium price in the individual learning phase
PI(ρ) and the price without the deterrence effect P˜S(ρ). Equation
PI(ρ)− P˜S(ρ) = ρ(1− q(ρ))g − λH
r
ρq(ρ)(VI(ρ)− s)
shows that the arrival of good news brings two opposite effects on the reservation value of the
buyer who remains unsure. There is a positive informational effect captured by ρ(1− q(ρ))g:
the arrival of good news reveals that the product characteristic is high and hence makes the
unknown buyer more optimistic about the unconditional probability of receiving lump-sum
payoffs. However, there is another negative continuation value effect: the buyer who remains
unsure loses the chance of becoming the first known buyer to extract rents. The price has
to be lower to compensate for the loss of rents if the monopolist wishes to make a sale to
the unknown buyer.
The comparison of the informational effect and the continuation value effect depends on
the comparison of 1− q(ρ) and q(ρ)(VI(ρ)− s).
Corollary 1.1. For ρ0 < 1 and q0 < 1,
q(ρ)(VI(ρ)−s)
1−q(ρ) is strictly increasing in ρ.
Proof. Plug the formula of q(ρ) and VI(ρ) into
q(ρ)(VI(ρ)−s)
1−q(ρ) and we can get
q(ρ)(VI(ρ)−s)
1−q(ρ) is
proportional to
1− [ (1−ρ)ρ?I
ρ(1−ρ?I ) ]
r/λH
1− ρ ,
which is strictly increasing in ρ.
The above corollary implies: in the early days of the market, ρ is higher and it is more
likely to have P˜S(ρ) > PI(ρ); in the late days of the market, ρ is lower and it is more likely
to have P˜S(ρ) < PI(ρ). Since the equilibrium price PS(ρ) is strictly below P˜S(ρ) due to
the deterrence effect, the above statement also holds if we replace P˜S(ρ) with PS(ρ). Figure
1.4 describes a situation where with the same priors, the price might either drop or jump
depending on the arrival time of the first lump-sum payoff.
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Figure 1.4: Instantaneous Price Response to the First Arrival of Good News
1.3.3 Efficiency
This section discusses the efficiency property of the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium
for an arbitrary number of buyers. We first investigate the extreme case of the perfect payoff
correlation (ρ = 1) and then compare that result to the one in the partial payoff correlation
case.
Perfect Payoff Correlation Under this special case, buyers are ex post homogeneous. In
other words, immediately after one buyer receives a lump-sum payoff, it becomes common
knowledge that all buyers are able to receive lump-sum payoffs, and the monopolist should
immediately raise the price to g − s to extract all of the surplus.
In the social learning phase, similarly the monopolist should set a price such that i) each
experimenting buyer has an incentive to participate (i.e., each buyer’s value is larger than
the outside option); ii) it is not optimal for each experimenting buyer to have “one-shot”
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deviations. The common value assumption simplifies the analysis of the “one-shot deviation”
problem since the deviator always has the same posterior belief as the buyers who have not
deviated. It turns out that under the common value case, restrictions i) and ii) coincide and
the strategic equilibrium is always efficient.
Proposition 1.5. When the buyers’ payoffs are perfectly correlated (ρ = 1), the unknown
buyers will always receive value s in equilibrium and the symmetric Markov perfect equilib-
rium is efficient.
Proof. In the appendix.
The intuitive explanation for the above efficiency result is that the ex post homogeneity
means the monopolist does not need to face the tradeoff between exploitation and explo-
ration. This enables the monopolis to completely internalize the social surplus and overcome
the free riding problem by subsidizing experimentation.
Partial Payoff Correlation Since ex post heterogeneity exists in the partial payoff correlation
case, it is natural to conjecture that the inefficiency result in proposition 1.4 can be extended
to a general n case. The induction argument is used to avoid solving for every value function
explicitly.
Theorem 1.1. Consider a market with any n ≥ 2 buyers. The symmetric Markov perfect
equilibrium is inefficient in both the social learning and individual learning phases if ρ0 < 1
and q0 < 1. Moreover, the equilibrium experimentation is always terminated too early.
Proof. In the appendix.
We are in a position to summarize the roles played by ex post heterogeneity. First, in the
social learning phase, ex post heterogeneity means there is a future benefit for the deviator
by becoming more optimistic than the non-deviators. The monopolist has to provide extra
subsidy to deter deviations. In the common value case, such a future benefit does not exist
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and there is no need to provide extra subsidy. Second, in the individual learning phase,
ex post heterogeneity implies that the receivers of lump-sum payoffs are more optimistic
than the unknown buyers. If the monopolist wishes to serve all buyers, the known buyers
extract rents. This generates a loss of rents for the buyers who stay unsure upon the arrival
of the first lump-sum payoff. The reduction in continuation values leads to an ambiguous
instantaneous price reaction to the arrival of the first lump-sum payoff. On the contrary,
in the common value case, the equilibrium value for the buyers is always the same as the
outside option and there is no continuation value effect. Hence, upon the arrival of the first
lump-sum payoff, the instantaneous reaction of the equilibrium price is always to go up.
Finally, ex post heterogeneity generates a tradeoff between exploitation and exploration for
the monopolist. The equilibrium experimentation level is lower than the socially efficient
level as we have seen in the two-buyer case. On the other hand, in the common value case,
there is no ex post heterogeneity and the monopolist is able to fully internalize the social
surplus.
1.4 Equilibrium in the Bad News Case
In the bad news case, the arrival of lump-sum payoffs (we call them lump-sum damages
hereafter) would immediately reveal that the risky product is unsuitable for the buyer.
Denote ξf = A and λHξl = −B < 0. Condition A − B < s < A is imposed such that
the risky product is superior to the safe one only when the buyers cannot receive lump-sum
damages.
1.4.1 Socially Efficient Allocation
Different from the good news case, large priors (ρ0, q0) mean that the probability of receiv-
ing lump-sum damages is high and this discourages the social planner from taking the risky
product. Therefore, instead of solving an optimal stopping problem (i.e., terminating exper-
imentation when belief reaches a certain cutoff), in the bad news case, we solve an optimal
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starting problem, i.e., beginning experimentation when belief is lower than a certain cutoff.
As in the good news case, we discuss socially efficient allocation separately in the indi-
vidual learning and social learning phases.
Socially Efficient Allocation in the Individual Learning Phase In the individual learning
phase, suppose k buyers have received lump-sum damages. The social surplus function
could be written as (the known buyers will take the safe product and receive s for sure)
Ωk(ρ) = ks+ (n− k)W (ρ)
where
W (ρ) = sup
α∈{0,1}
E
∫ ∞
t=0
re−rt[α(A− ρtB) + (1− α)s]dt
defines the optimal control problem for the unknown buyer. The corresponding HJB equation
is
W (ρ) = max
{
s, A− ρB + 1
r
[λHρ(s−W (ρ))− λHρ(1− ρ)W ′(ρ)]
}
. (1.30)
Solve the optimal starting problem defined by equation (1.30) and we get the following
result:
Proposition 1.6. In the individual learning phase, if k ≥ 1 buyers are known to receive
lump-sum damages, it is socially efficient for those k buyers to always purchase the safe
product. For the remaining n− k unknown buyers, it is socially efficient to start experimen-
tation if and only if
ρ ≤ ρeI =
(r + λH)(A− s)
λHA+ rB − λHs.
The value functions for a typical buyer with posterior belief ρ is given by:
W (ρ) = max
{
s, A− λHA+ rB − λHs
r + λH
ρ
}
.
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Socially Efficient Allocation in the Social Learning Phase In the social learning phase, we
similarly write down the HJB equation as:
ΩS(ρ) = max
{
ns, n(A− ρq(ρ)B) + 1
r
[λHnρq(ρ)(Ω1(ρ)− ΩS(ρ))− λHρ(1− ρ)Ω′S(ρ)]
}
.
(1.31)
The optimal starting problem (1.31) is solved by solving differential equation
(r + λHnρq)ΩS(ρ) = rn(A− ρqB) + λHnρq[(n− 1)W (ρ) + s]− λHρ(1− ρ)Ω′S(ρ), (1.32)
with boundary condition ΩS(ρ
e
S) = ns.
10
The socially efficient allocation in the social learning phase is characterized by the fol-
lowing proposition:
Proposition 1.7. Given any q0 < 1, there exists a unique ρ
e
S(q0) > ρ
e
I (ρ
e
S(q0) could be one)
such that it is socially efficient to start experimentation in the social learning phase if and
only if ρ ≤ ρeS(q0).
Proof. In the appendix.
1.4.2 Equilibrium
In any symmetric equilibrium, buyers can be divided into two groups: known buyers and
unknown buyers. Let α0k (α
1
k) be the strategy for the known (unknown) buyers where sub-
script k indicates the number of buyers who have received lump-sum damages. Let Vk, Uk
and Jk be value functions for the known buyers, the unknown buyers and the monopolist,
respectively, when k buyers have received lump-sum damages. Finally, let Pk denote the
price charged by the monopolist. Definition 1.1 implies that the triple of (Pk, α
0
k, α
1
k) is a
symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium if:
10Notice that W (ρ) is not continuously differentiable at ρeI (smoothing pasting condition is no longer
satisfied). But it is Lipschitz continuous and hence the solution to the above boundary value problem is still
unique.
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• α0k = 1 if P ≤ A−B − s and = 0 otherwise;
• for any k < n, given Pk, the unknown buyers choose acceptance policy α1k to maximize:
Uk(ρ) = sup
α1k
E
∫ τ
t=0
re−rt[α1k(A− ρtqk(ρt)B − Pk(ρt)) + (1− α1k)s]dt
+ e−rτ
(
1
n− kVk+1(ρτ ) +
n− k − 1
n− k Uk+1(ρτ )
)
where τ is the first (possibly infinite) time at which a new unknown buyer receives
good news;
• given (α0k, α1k), the monopolist chooses price Pk(ρt) to maximize
Jk(ρ) = sup
Pk
E
{∫ τ
t=0
re−rt
[
kα0k(Pk(ρt)) + (n− k)α1k(ρt, Pk(ρt))
]
dt+ e−rτJk+1(ρτ )
}
• beliefs update according to Bayes’ rule: ρt satisfies the law of motion, i.e., equation
(1.1); qk(ρt) = 1 for k ≥ 1 and qk(ρt) is given by equation (1.6) for k = 0;
• for k = n, the monopolist will not serve any buyer such that Jn = 0 and Vn = s.
First, it is straightforward to see that the known buyers will buy the risky product if the
price is lower than A−B− s and not buy otherwise. Second, the assumption A−B− s < 0
implies that selling to the known buyers is purely losing money. Hence, a profit-maximizing
monopolist should never set the price lower than A − B − s in order to sell to the known
buyers. This also implies that Vk is always s. Third, when n− k unknown buyers purchase
the risky product, the conditional probability that any given unknown buyer receives lump-
sum damages is simply 1/(n− k), since the n− k unknown buyers’ payoff distributions are
identical. Finally, the cutoff strategy for the monopolist means that she will start selling to
the unknown buyers if the belief ρ is lower than a certain cutoff. Once the monopolist starts
to sell to the unknown buyers, she will continue to sell as long as no lump-sum damage is
received.
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In a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium, when experimentation takes place on the
equilibrium path, the monopolist also has to charge a price such that both the participation
constraint and the no profitable one-shot deviation constraint are satisfied. In the bad news
case, it turns out that the “one-shot” deviations don’t impose more restrictions than the
participation constraint.
Claim 1.1. In equilibrium, the most pessimistic unknown buyer’s value is always s.
Claim 1.1 implies that the on-equilibrium-path value for each unknown buyer is always
s since they are equally pessimistic. This is different from proposition 1.3 in the good news
case. In the good news case, a one-shot deviation makes the non-deviators more pessimistic
if they haven’t received any lump-sum payoffs during the deviation period. In that situation,
the price charged by the monopolist is lower than what the deviator is willing to pay. The
deviator can benefit from a deviation and thus the equilibrium value for the experimenting
buyers has to be larger than s to deter deviations. However, in the bad news case, a one-shot
deviation makes the deviator more pessimistic. After the deviation, if the monopolist wishes
to serve all unknown buyers, the optimal price is determined by what the deviator is willing
to pay; if the monopolist does not wish to serve all unknown buyers, the deviator is the first
buyer to be excluded. In both cases, the deviator cannot gain more than the outside option
after a deviation. Therefore, setting the on-equilibrium-path value to be s is enough to deter
deviations.
The equilibrium price path could be derived from claim 1.1: in the individual learning
phase, the monopolist would charge PI(ρ) = A − ρB − s and in the social learning phase,
the monopolist would charge PS(ρ) = A − ρq(ρ)B − s. The arrival of the first lump-sum
damage will unanimously lead to a drop in price if q0 < 1 but the subsequent arrival of
lump-sum damages will not have any impact on price. The negative response in price to
the arrival of the first lump-sum damage reflects the fact that there is no continuation value
effect from claim 1.1. The informational effect always discourages the unknown buyers from
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experimenting and reduces the price. But the subsequent arrival of bad news reveals no
more information to the remaining unknown buyers and hence has no effect on the price at
all. Solve the monopolist’s optimal starting problem and we get the following theorem:
Theorem 1.2. Consider a market with n ≥ 2 buyers. The symmetric Markov perfect
equilibrium is efficient in both the social learning and the individual learning phases.
Proof. In the appendix.
The above theorem is very intuitive: different from the good news model, there is no
tradeoff between exploitation and exploration in the individual learning phase because the
buyers who have received lump-sum damages will never purchase the risky product. As
a result, although buyers become ex post heterogeneous, the potential buyers of the risky
product are always the unknown ones, who are ex post homogeneous in a symmetric equi-
librium. Hence, the equilibrium is always efficient in the individual learning phase. The
efficiency in the social learning phase is a little surprising. It seems that the monopolist can-
not fully internalize social surplus since the unknown buyers can benefit from social learning
by switching to the safe product. The intuition turns out to be incorrect. In the good news
case, society benefits from the arrival of good news but the receivers of the lump-sum payoffs
pay less than what they are willing to pay. In other words, the known buyers “steal” some
of the social surplus from the monopolist and this causes inefficiency. On the contrary, in
the bad news case, society benefits from the non-arrival of the bad news. The unknown
buyers cannot “steal” social surplus from the monopolist when no lump-sum damages have
been received.
1.5 Conclusion
By combining common and idiosyncratic uncertainty, this paper relaxes the usual common
value assumption made in the social learning literature (see, e.g., Banerjee (1992), Bikhchan-
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dani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) and Rosenberg, Solan, and Vieille (2007)).11 We consider
a dynamic monopoly pricing environment where the monopolist cannot price-discriminate
among the buyers. The partial payoff correlation among the buyers generates ex post het-
erogeneity. If the monopolist wishes to make a sale to several buyers, the optimal price is set
to make the most pessimistic buyer indifferent between the alternatives. In the good news
case, this has significant implications both on the equilibrium path and off the equilibrium
path. On the equilibrium path, the receivers of lump-sum payoffs become more optimistic
than the non-receivers. This implies: i) the arrival of the first good news signal generates
a reduction in the continuation value for the buyers who stay unsure, and this effect might
lead to an instantaneous drop in price; and ii) the monopolist faces different buyers after the
arrival of lump-sum payoffs and the absence of price discrimination leads to an inefficient
level of experimentation. On the contrary, if there is a perfect payoff correlation among the
buyers, the arrival of the first good news signal always leads to a jump in price and the
equilibrium is efficient.
There is another subtle off-equilibrium-path implication. By taking the outside option,
each buyer can extract rents if she becomes more optimistic than other buyers after the
deviation. This generates a future benefit from deviation. If the monopolist wishes to make
a sale to several unknown buyers, each unknown buyer receives a value higher than the
outside option to deter deviations. Such a deterrence effect leads to a significant reduction
in the equilibrium price. If there is perfect payoff correlation among the buyers, there is no
need to provide such an extra subsidy.
However, in the bad news case, the above implications do not exist for two reasons. On
the equilibrium path, the receivers of lump-sum damages immediately take the outside option
and the buyers who stay in the experience good market are still ex post homogeneous. Off
the equilibrium path, a buyer cannot benefit from deviations because the deviator becomes
11An exception is Murto and Va¨lima¨ki (2009), who consider partial payoff correlation in an observational
learning setting.
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more pessimistic after a deviation.
There are several extensions to consider in the future. For tractability, we have assumed
that the arrival of lump-sum payoffs immediately resolves the common uncertainty and the
idiosyncratic uncertainty of the receiver. It is possible to consider a model where the arrival
of lump-sum payoffs cannot immediately resolve the common uncertainty or the idiosyncratic
uncertainty of the receiver. For example, we may assume lump-sum payoffs arrive at another
Poisson rate when the product characteristic is low. As long as ex post heterogeneity exists,
the resulting equilibrium would be inefficient as well.
Another natural extension of the current model is to consider a dynamic duopoly pricing
environment. This issue is partially investigated by Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2002), who
consider a model with a continuum of buyers such that buyers are choosing according to their
myopic preferences at each instant in time. It would be interesting to consider a model with
a finite number of buyers such that each buyer’s choice has non-trivial effects on learning
and future prices.
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Chapter 2
Assortative Learning (Joint with Jan
Eeckhout)
2.1 Introduction
High ability workers sort into more productive jobs. Due to complementarities in production,
their higher marginal product allows them to command higher wages. The Beckerian model
of assortative matching is very well suited to explain those patterns of sorting. Unfortunately,
it is mute on the issue of turnover of workers between different jobs. Instead, the Jovanovic
(1979) learning model has long been the canonical framework for analyzing turnover in the
labor market1 over the life cycle. Workers and firms learn about match-specific human capital
and will tend to stay in a match if learning reveals the match is good. Experimentation occurs
early on which leads to decreasing turnover over the life cycle. Because in Jovanovic (1979)
learning is about the match and not about the worker, there is neither worker heterogeneity
nor sorting. In this paper, we offer a unified approach of learning and sorting. We establish
a solution method for a market equilibrium in a continuous time economy with multiple
learning opportunities (multi-armed bandit) and derive a no-deviation condition, a condition
hitherto unknown. We show that under supermodularity, positive assortative matching
obtains in equilibrium, even if learning rates differ across firms.
1Of course, also the search model inherently exhibits turnover, but with observable types turnover is
constant over the life cycle. Moscarini (2005) brings together search and learning in the Jovanovic framework.
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In the labor market, the learning experiences of workers are most likely to differ across
different firms. Starting in a top law firm or a multinational will induce different paths of
information revelation than working in a local family business. The worker now faces a trade-
off between different experimentation experiences: take a lower wage at a high productivity
firm where information may be revealed at a different rate or accept higher wage and learn
more slowly. It is intuitive that sorting and learning are intimately connected.
Modelling the labor market as a multi-armed bandit problem and solving it is challenging.
Most existing learning models and continuous time games are tractable because they are
essentially one-armed bandit problems with a fixed outside option that acts as an absorbing
state. One-armed bandit problems typically have attractive properties, including reservation
strategies. Instead, multi-armed bandits in general do not have reservation strategies when
arms are correlated, even if the learning rate is the same across firms. But our labor market
is not exactly identical to the canonical bandit problem. First, there are a continuum of
experimenters. Second, because of competitive wage determination a` la Jovanovic (1979),
the payoffs are endogenous. Finally, because workers learn about general human capital
instead of match-specific human capital, the arms are positively correlated.
We find that it is the combination of competitive wage determination (endogenous pay-
offs)and the incentives needed to avoid a deviation that give rise to a new condition which we
call the no-deviation condition. This condition must be satisfied in addition to the common
equilibrium conditions of value-matching and smooth-pasting. The no-deviation condition
can be interpreted as the continuous time version of the one-shot deviation principle.2 We
prove that the no-deviation condition implies that the second derivative of worker’s value
function at the cut-off belief is the same in the high type as well as in the low type firms.
2The idea of sequential rationality is of course not new and has also been employed in continuous time
games by Sannikov (2007) who uses the concept of self generation. And Cohen and Solan (2009) use
dependence of strategies on a small interval dt to restrict the set of Markovian strategies, in the spirit of our
dt-shot deviation. It is precisely the one-shot deviation in conjunction with endogenous payoffs that leads
to the equalization of the second derivative of the value functions.
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Recall that value matching requires that at the cut-off the worker’s value functions take the
same value in both firms, the smooth-pasting condition requires that the first derivative is
the same, and now the no-deviation requires equal second derivatives as well.
We show that supermodularity of the production technology is a necessary and sufficient
condition for positive assortative matching, and that the equilibrium allocation is unique.
Those workers with the highest beliefs about their ability will in equilibrium sort into those
firms that are most productive. Moreover, we can analytically solve for the equilibrium allo-
cation in terms of the cut-off belief, and we derive in closed form the stationary distribution
of beliefs.
While in most of the analysis we consider common variance across firms, it turns out
that the sorting result holds for different learning rates (noise) across firms, even if the rate
of learning is slower in the high type firm. It is conceivable that with supermodularity and
a learning rate no smaller in high types firms there will be positive sorting. The high type
firm is both superior in the learning rate and in productive efficiency. But if high type firms
learn at a sufficiently slower rate (the noise is sufficiently high), then the signal-to-noise
ratio in the high type firm may well be lower. The reason why this nonetheless does not
affect the learning is that the value of learning also depends on the degree of convexity of
the value function (from Ito’s Lemma), in addition to the signal-to-noise ratio. But by the
no-deviation condition, at the cut-off belief, the degree of convexity is the same in both
firms and therefore the equilibrium value of learning is the same, no matter the difference in
signal-to-noise ratios. Key here is that wages are endogenous and determined competitively.
That is why this property does not necessarily hold in the canonical multi-armed bandit
problem.
We analyze the planner’s problem and show that a planner’s stationary allocation coin-
cides with the decentralized equilibrium allocation, even if learning rates differ across different
firms. This is surprising since there is a market incompleteness: wages are spot market prices
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only and cannot be made contingent on future realizations. It turns out that the efficiency
result and proof crucially hinges on the martingale property inherent in Bayesian learning.
The martingale property implies that no matter how fast workers learn, the expected beliefs
about their ability will stay the same. Since under strict supermodularity, the differential
in expected output between working in high and low productivity firms is monotonically in-
creasing in the likelihood that the worker has high ability, reallocating a group of low belief
workers to a better match will decrease expected outputs no matter how fast they learn.
We extend our analysis of Bayesian learning to allow for observable human capital accu-
mulation. This adds realism in the sense that workers learn on the job and increase their
productivity with tenure, yet we do not resort to non-Bayesian updating. Now cut-off types
that characterize the equilibrium allocation depend on the degree of observable experience,
and beliefs continue to follow a martingale process. The properties of our equilibrium extend
to this more general human capital accumulation case.
The motivation of our analysis and the results are obviously closest related to the labor
market learning literature (Jovanovic (1979), Harris and Holmstro¨m (1982), Moscarini (2005)
and Papageorgiou (2009)).3 Yet, there is a close relation to both the experimentation litera-
ture (Bolton and Harris (1999), Keller, Rady, and Cripps (2005), Strulovici (2010)) and the
literature on continuous time games (Sannikov (2007), Faingold and Sannikov (2007)). Most
models of learning have a finite set of players and have an absorbing state. Ours has a con-
tinuum of agents and there is learning in all states. Moreover, it is essentially a competitive
model with equilibrium prices and therefore payoffs from learning are endogenous.
The idea of analyzing a matching model where the current allocation determines the
future type is first explored in Anderson and Smith (2000). They find the opposite result of
3Papageorgiou (2009) analyzes a learning model with heterogeneity. He estimates the version of
Moscarini’s search model with two-sided heterogeneity. With search frictions, wage setting is non-competitive
and as a result, the no-deviation condition is not imposed in addition to value matching and smooth pasting.
Nonetheless, his findings provide us with realistic estimates of the labor market characteristics of our model.
See also Groes, Kircher, and Manovskii (2009) for estimates of a different learning model.
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ours: positive assortative matching fails even under supermodularity. They analyze a two-
sided matching model of reputations with imperfect information about both matched types.4
Our setup differs substantially, but the main difference is in the information extraction. Their
agents infer the type of each of the matched partners from the realization of a joint signal.5
Another key characteristic of our model is that it is a pure Bayesian learning model
where beliefs follow a martingale. In Section 2.8 we show that our result holds for Bayesian
updating processes other than the Brownian motion (we extend our result to a generalized
Le´vy process), and we also establish that positive assortative matching can fail if the updating
process is not Bayesian (this can be interpreted for example as a technology of unobserved
human capital accumulation in addition to the information extraction).
2.2 The Model Economy
Population of Firms and Workers. The economy is populated by a unit measure of workers
and a unit measure of firms. Both firms and workers are ex ante heterogeneous. The
firm’s type y ∈ {H,L} represents its productivity. The type y is observable to all agents
in the economy. The fraction of H type firms is pi and all firms are infinitely lived. The
worker ability x ∈ {H,L} is not observable, both to firms and workers, i.e., information is
symmetric.6 Nonetheless, both hold a common belief about the worker type, denoted by
p ∈ [0, 1]. Upon entry, a newly born worker is of type H with probability p0 and of type L
with probability 1− p0. Workers die with exogenous probability δ. New workers are born at
4Our model is more closely related to the standard firm-worker model to which they compare their two-
sided model in the discussion. There is only a one-sided inference problem in that model and they find that
positive assortative matching arises for extreme beliefs p = 0 and 1, but conjecture it does not in the interior.
5The difficulty is to account for agents switching partners. Anderson and Smith (2000) resolve this by
assuming symmetric learning in discrete time. Both sides of the market update in an identical fashion and
under PAM their new matched partner coincides exactly with the updated type of their old partner. As a
result, in a candidate PAM equilibrium there is never any switching.
6This substantially simplifies the problem at hand. With private signals Cripps, Ely, Mailath, and
Samuelson (2008) show that with a finite signal space there will be common learning, but not necessarily
with an infinite signal space as is the case in our model here.
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the same rate.7
Preferences and Production. Workers and firms are risk-neutral and discount future payoffs
at rate r > 0. Utility is perfectly transferable. Output is produced in pairs of one worker
and one firm (x, y). Time is continuous. Positive output produced consists of a divisible
consumption good and is denoted by µxy. We assume that more able workers are more
productive in any firm, µHy ≥ µLy,∀y and refer to it as worker monotonicity. While it is
often useful, we do not in general assume firm monotonicity, which would be µxH ≥ µxL, ∀x.
Strict supermodularity is defined in the usual way:
µHH − µLH > µHL − µLL, (2.1)
and with the opposite sign for strict submodularity. In the entire paper, we will refer to
strict supermodularity when we just mention supermodularity, likewise for submodularity.
Information. Because worker ability is not observable to both the worker and the firm, parties
face an information extraction problem. They observe a noisy measure of productivity,
denoted by Xt. Cumulative output is assumed to be a Brownian motion with drift µxy and
common variance σ2
Xt = µxyt+ σZt (2.2)
where Zt is a standard Wiener process and as a result, Xt is normally distributed with mean
µxyt and variance σ
2t. By Girsanov’s Theorem the probability measures over the paths of
two diffusion processes with the same volatility but different bounded drifts are equivalent,
that is, they have the same zero-probability events. Since the volatility of a continuous-time
diffusion process is effectively observable, the worker’s type could be learned directly from
the observed volatility if σ depends on workers’ types.8
7Without death, we know the posterior belief will converge with probability one to p = 1 or p = 0. Death
here actually acts as a shuﬄing device to guarantee a non-trivial stationary distribution of posterior beliefs.
8However, we can allow σ to be firm-specific. In section 2.8 we analyze the general case of firm-dependent
σy.
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Equilibrium. We consider a stationary competitive equilibrium in this economy. With two
types of firms and a continuum of p’s in this market, take a competitive wage schedule wy(p)
as given which specifies wage for every possible type p worker working in firm y.9 Denote
by Vy the stationary discounted present value of the competitive profits for firm y. The
flow profit can be written as rVy.
10 Now we are ready to define the notion of competitive
equilibrium:
Definition 2.1. A stationary competitive equilibrium consists of a competitive wage schedule
wy(p) = µy(p)−rVy, where µy(p) = pµHy+(1−p)µLy denotes worker p’s expected productivity
in firm y = H,L and worker p chooses the firm y with the highest discounted present value.
The market clears such that the measure of workers in L firms is 1− pi and the measure of
workers in H firms is pi.
2.3 Preliminaries
2.3.1 Benchmark: No Learning
Workers differ in the common beliefs p of being a high type. We shut down learning so that
beliefs are invariant. This can be viewed as a special case of the learning model with the
variance σ2 going to infinity. We assume that there is no birth or death so we essentially
have a static problem. Suppose without loss of generality that p is uniformly distributed
on [0, 1]. We continue to maintain the assumption that the worker does not know her true
type or that she has no private information about it. Denote µy(p) = pµHy + (1− p)µLy for
y = H,L and r as the discount rate.
9Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (1996) and Felli and Harris (1996) consider a two-firm, one-worker/buyer
model with strategic price setting in a world with independent arms. With ex ante heterogeneous firms and
workers and correlated arms, we instead focus on competitive price setting which is closest in spirit to the
Beckerian benchmark.
10Notice since there is no free entry, Vy need not to be zero. We could model free entry as long as in
equilibrium there is a non-degenerate distribution of firm types in the economy. We consider this does not
add to the insights of our model.
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Under the above notion of competitive equilibrium, it is easy to verify the following claim
(All of the results in this paper are in the sense of “almost surely” because we allow a zero
measure of agents to behave differently):
Claim 2.1. Under strict supermodularity, PAM is the unique (stationary) competitive equi-
librium allocation: H firms match with workers p ∈ [1 − pi, 1], L firms match with workers
p ∈ [0, 1 − pi). The opposite (NAM) holds under strict submodularity: H firms match with
workers in [0, pi).
Since there is no learning, essentially this result is identical to Becker’s (1973) result,
but with uncertainty. Noteworthy about this version of Becker is that even though for
PAM there is supermodularity of the ex-post payoffs (µHH + µLL > µHL + µLH), there need
not be monotonicity in expected payoffs, i.e., µH(1 − pi) may be smaller than µL(1 − pi).
In fact, that will be reflected in the firm’s equilibrium payoffs: VH ≥ VL if and only if
µH(1− pi) ≥ µL(1− pi).
As in Becker, the equilibrium allocation is unique, but there may be multiple splits
of the surplus. In the case of PAM, we only require at the cutoff type p = 1 − pi that
wH(p) = wL(p). There are multiple equilibrium payoffs if the surplus of a match between L
and p = 0 is positive. Instead, if µL(0) = 0,
11 there is a unique equilibrium payoff.
2.3.2 Belief Updating
In the presence of learning we can now derive the beliefs and subsequently the value functions.
The posterior belief pt that the worker has a high productivity is a sufficient statistic for
the output history. Now, we can use the following well-known result: conditional on the
output process (Xt)t≥0, (pt)t≥0 is a martingale diffusion process. Moreover, this process
can be represented as a Brownian motion. Based on the framework of our model, denote
sy = (µHy − µLy)/σ, y = H,L, Σy(p) = 12p2(1− p)2s2y and then we get:
11And there is limited liability, i.e., workers and firms cannot receive negative payoffs.
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Lemma 2.1. (Belief Consistency) Consider any worker who works for firm y between t0
and t1. Given a prior pt0 ∈ (0, 1), the posterior belief (pt)t0<t≤t1 is consistent with the output
process (Xy,t)t0<t≤t1 if and only if it satisfies
dpt = pt(1− pt)sydZ¯y,t
where
dZ¯y,t =
1
σ
[dXy,t − (ptµHy + (1− pt)µLy)dt].
The proof of this Lemma is in Faingold and Sannikov (2007) or Daley and Green (2008).
The basic idea behind the proof is a combination of Bayes’ rule and Ito’s lemma. Given the
period t posterior belief pt and dXt, we know the posterior belief at period t+ dt is:
pt+dt =
pt exp{− [dXt−µHydt]
2
2σ2dt
}
pt exp{− [dXt−µHydt]22σ2dt }+ (1− pt) exp{− [dXt−µLydt]
2
2σ2dt
}
.
Hence,
dpt = pt+dt − pt = pt(1− pt)
exp{− [dXt−µHydt]2
2σ2dt
} − exp{− [dXt−µLydt]2
2σ2dt
}
pt exp{− [dXt−µHydt]22σ2dt }+ (1− pt) exp{− [dXt−µLydt]
2
2σ2dt
}
.
Apply Ito’s Lemma and we obtain the above result.
Lemma 2.1 establishes that dp depends on three elements: p(1− p), which peaks at 1/2;
the signal-to-noise ratio of output, sy = (µHy − µLy)/σ and dZ¯y, the normalized difference
between realized and unconditionally expected flow output, which is a standard Wiener pro-
cess with respect to the filtration {Xy,t}. Obviously, beliefs move faster the more uncertainty
about worker’s quality (p close to 1/2); the less variation in the output process (smaller σ)
and the larger the productivity difference (higher µHy − µLy).
Learning considerations will change the benchmark results. Moreover, supermodularity
not only affects the value of the static output created as in the standard Beckerian model,
but it also has dynamic effect by changing the speed of learning. For example, under super-
modularity (µHH − µHL > µLH − µLL), the learning speed is faster in the high type firm,
51
which is especially significant for p close to 1/2. Intuitively speaking, learning makes it more
attractive to match with a high type firm even though statically it is better for her to match
with a low type firm without learning.
2.3.3 Value Functions
Given the wage schedule, each worker is facing a two-armed bandit problem. We restrict the
workers’ strategies to be Markovian:
a : [0, 1]→ {H,L}.
The value function of a type p worker can be written as:
W (p) = sup
a:[0,1]→{H,L}
{
E
∫ ∞
t=0
e−(r+δ)twat(pt)dt
}
s.t.dpt = pt(1− pt)satdZ¯at,t and at , a(pt).
Denote Wy(p) to be the value function of a worker with posterior in a neighborhood of p
optimally choosing firm y.
The value function Wy(p) is given by
12:
rWy(p) = µy(p)− Vy + Σy(p)W ′′y (p)− δWy(p), (2.3)
from Ito’s Lemma. The term µy(p)− Vy is equal to the flow wage payoff and corresponds to
the deterministic component of the diffusion Xy,t, and the term Σy(p)W
′′
y (p) is the second-
order term from the transformation W of the diffusion process Xy,t. First-order and all
higher-order terms vanish as the time interval shrinks to zero. The general solution to this
differential equation is:
Wy(p) =
µy(p)− Vy
r + δ
+ ky1p
1−αy(1− p)αy + ky2pαy(1− p)1−αy , (2.4)
12Note that we critically need the assumption that the worker does not have any private information about
his type. If this assumption is violated, the worker’s value functions could not be written like this.
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where
αy =
1
2
+
√
1
4
+
2(r + δ)
s2y
≥ 1.
First notice that the boundedness of the value function implies that if 0 is included in the
domain, then ky1 = 0 and if 1 is included in the domain, then ky2 = 0. If not, with αy > 1
the value of W shoots off to infinity. Second, Σy(p)Wy
′′(p) is the value of learning and this is
an option value in the sense that the worker has the choice to change his job as he learns his
type p. It is easy to verify that this value is zero if the worker never changes his job.13 From
the Martingale property of the Brownian motion, at any p the expected value of p in the next
time interval is equal to p. There is as much good news as bad news to be expected in the
next period. It is the option value of switching to a more suitable match that generates the
value of learning. Equation (2.4) implies that this option value can be decomposed into two
parts: ky1p
1−αy(1− p)αy (ky2pαy(1− p)1−αy) denotes the option value of switching to a more
suitable match when p goes down (up). The option value ky1p
1−αy(1−p)αy (ky2pαy(1−p)1−αy)
must be zero if 0 (1) is included since no switch happens as p goes down (up).
2.4 Analysis and Results
2.4.1 Characterization of the Equilibrium Allocation
Now consider any candidate stationary equilibrium where a type p worker switches from firm
y to y′. Since the worker is essentially facing a two-armed bandit problem given the wage
schedule, optimality in stopping time requires the value-matching condition (the worker gets
the same value at the cutoff) and the smooth-pasting condition (the marginal of both value
functions is identical) (see Dixit (1993)). For example, if for p ∈ [p1, p2), the worker works
in the low type firm and for p ∈ [p2, p3), the worker works in the high type firm, then we
13In that case, p can take both the values 0 and 1. So the boundedness of the value function requires that
both ky1 and ky2 are zero and hence Wy
′′(p) = 0 for every p.
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must have:14
WL(p2) = WH(p2) and WL
′(p2) = WH ′(p2). (2.5)
Notice that workers are price takers. As a result, there is no strategic interaction between
players where equilibrium solves for the fixed point of individual strategies. It is also impor-
tant to point out that both the value-matching condition and the smooth-pasting condition
are on-equilibrium path conditions. They have nothing to do with the off-equilibrium path
(i.e., instead of accepting offers from low type firms, workers with p ∈ [p1, p2) are tempted
to accept offers from high type firms). In the following lemmas we characterize the value
functions establishing convexity and monotonicty:
Lemma 2.2. The equilibrium value functions Wy are strictly convex for p ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. In Appendix.
The intuition for this Lemma is the following. Preferences and output are linear in p,
and the option value of learning is strictly positive, hence the value function with the option
of learning is convex. To see this, observe that since the measure of both types of firms
are strictly positive, market clearing requires that workers with some p’s will be employed
by high type firms while workers with other p’s will be employed by low type firms. This
implies that some worker has to change jobs at some point and the option value of learning
Σy(p)Wy
′′(p) is strictly positive. Hence we have W ′′y (p) > 0, for all p ∈ (0, 1) since Σy(p) > 0.
On the other hand, when p = 0 or 1, the posterior belief will always stay at 0 or 1 by Bayes’
rule such that learning never happens. It is easy to verify that W ′′y (p) = 0 for p = 0 or 1.
Given the strict convexity of equilibrium value functions and the smooth pasting condi-
tion, we can immediately derive the following Lemma:
14We slightly abuse notation hers since WL is not defined on p2. A more precise way of writing the
equations is WL(p2+) = WH(p2) and WL
′(p2+) = WH ′(p2). In what follows, we will continue to use the
expression in the text in order to economize on notation.
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Lemma 2.3. The equilibrium value functions Wy are strictly increasing.
Proof. In Appendix.
One important implication is that if we define W(p) as the envelope of all equilibrium
value functions Wy(p), then this envelope function W(p) is continuous, strictly increasing
and strictly convex for p ∈ (0, 1). Suppose workers with p ∈ [0, p) are employed by type
y firm and workers with p ∈ (p¯, 1] are employed by type −y firm. Then we should have:
W ′y(0) =
µHy−µLy
r+δ
< W ′−y(1) =
µH,−y−µL,−y
r+δ
. This gives us another result:
Lemma 2.4. Under supermodularity, in any equilibrium p = 0 workers match with L firms;
p = 1 workers match with H firms. The opposite under strict submodularity. Moreover,
min(∆H ,∆L)
r + δ
< W ′(p) <
max(∆H ,∆L)
r + δ
,
where ∆H = µHH − µLH and ∆L = µHL − µLL.
Intuitively this result is best understood by using the standard sorting argument from
Becker (1973). At p = 0 and p = 1 there is no value of learning. As a result, there the value
function can be interpreted as being determined by the no-learning allocation.
The properties derived above are mainly concerned with on-equilibrium path behavior.
We also need to specify what happens in the event of deviations and consider behavior off-
equilibrium path. We contemplate the equivalence of a one-shot deviation in continuous
time because we think of the continuum as an idealization of discrete time. This amounts
to a worker playing the deviant action over an interval [t, t+ dt) according to the belief p at
time t, and considering the limit as dt → 0.15 This is very important because it allows us
to derive the value function for deviation. On the contrary, if the deviation only takes place
at a single point in time t, then the value function for deviation is essentially the same as
15This notion is also implicitly used in Proposition 2 of Sannikov (2007), and also in Cohen and Solan
(2009) who consider deviations from Markovian strategies in bandit problems.
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the one without deviation because no information will be extracted from just a single time
point.
The next Lemma establishes that if we consider off-the-equilibrium path deviations, we
actually derive one additional condition, which we call the no-deviation condition.
Lemma 2.5. To deter possible deviations, a necessary condition is:
W ′′H(p) = W
′′
L(p) (No-deviation condition) (2.6)
for any possible cutoff p.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that on the equilibrium path, a worker in a
neighborhood right of p accepts offers from H firms (say, p ∈ (p, p¯)) and a worker in a
neighborhood left of p accepts offers from L firms. Consider one possible one-shot deviation:
at time t, a p > p worker chooses a low type firm for dt length of time and then switches
back. On the equilibrium path, the value function is defined as before (from Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation):
(r + δ)W (p) = (r + δ)WH(p) = wH(p) + ΣH(p)W
′′
H(p).
The deviator’s new value could be written as:
W˜L(p) = E
{∫ t+dt
t
e−(r+δ)(s−t)wL(ps)ds+ e−(r+δ)dtW (pt+dt)
}
. (2.7)
Potentially, pt+dt can take any value between 0 and 1. We have to show that as dt
becomes very small, almost surely, pt+dt will be close to p such that it is in the region where
the worker will still accept offers from high type firms: Pr(pt+dt /∈ (p, p¯)) = o(dt).16
16Since the deviator’s belief updating follows a Brownian motion: dpt = sLp(1− p)dZ¯L,t, the probability
that a worker p > p will have belief pt+dt ≤ p is given by Φ
(
p−p
sLp(1−p)
√
dt
)
, where Φ(·) is the cumulative
distribution function for a standard normal distribution. Apply L’Hopital’s rule and it is straightforward to
see that
lim
dt→0
Φ
(
p−p
sLp(1−p)
√
dt
)
dt
= 0.
Use the same logic and it is easy to see that Pr(pt+dt > p¯) = o(dt).
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Notice that for any dt > 0,
WH(p) > W˜L(p) > E
{∫ t+dt
t
e−(r+δ)(s−t)wL(ps)ds
}
+ Ee−(r+δ)dt
[
WH(pt+dt)(1− Pr(pt+dt /∈ (p, p¯))) + Pr(pt+dt /∈ (p, p¯))W (0)
]
.(2.8)
The first inequality comes from the fact that there should be no profitable deviation. The
second inequality is true because we replace the value for pt+dt /∈ (p, p¯) with the lowest value
W (0) (W (·) is an increasing function by Lemma 2.3). From Ito’s Lemma, we can get for the
deviator:
EWH(pt+dt) = WH(p) + ΣL(p)W ′′H(p)dt+ o(dt).
For any dt > 0, the no deviation condition implicit in equation (2.8) implies:
E{∫ t+dt
t
e−(r+δ)(s−t)wL(ps)ds}
dt
+
E
{
e−(r+δ)dt[WH(pt+dt)(1− Pr(pt+dt /∈ (p, p¯))) + Pr(pt+dt /∈ (p, p¯))W (0)]
}−WH(p)
dt
< 0.
Let dt→ 0 and first, it follows immediately that:
lim
dt→0
E
{∫ t+dt
t
e−(r+δ)(s−t)wL(ps)ds
}
dt
= wL(p).
Second, as proved earlier,
lim
dt→0
Pr(pt+dt /∈ (p, p¯))
dt
= 0.
Finally,
lim
dt→0
E
{
e−(r+δ)dtWH(pt+dt)(1− Pr(pt+dt /∈ (p, p¯)))
}−WH(p)
dt
= lim
dt→0
(e−(r+δ)dt − 1)WH(p) + ΣL(p)W ′′H(p)dt+ o(dt)
dt
= ΣL(p)W
′′
H(p)− (r + δ)WH(p).
Therefore, the necessary condition such that a p > p worker has no incentive to deviate can
be written as:
wL(p) + ΣL(p)W
′′
H(p)− (r + δ)WH(p) = wL(p) + ΣL(p)W ′′H(p)− wH(p)− ΣH(p)W ′′H(p) < 0.
(2.9)
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The above inequality must hold for any p ∈ (p, p¯). Let p→ p and we have:17
wL(p)− wH(p) + [ΣL(p)− ΣH(p)]W ′′H(p) ≤ 0
⇒ wL(p) + ΣL(p)W ′′L(p)− (wH(p) + ΣH(p)W ′′H(p)) + (W ′′H(p)−W ′′L(p))ΣL(p) ≤ 0
⇒ W ′′H(p) ≤ W ′′L(p). (2.10)
Similarly, we can consider another possible one-shot deviation: a p < p worker matches
with a high type firm for dt and then switches back. The same logic establishes that to deter
such deviation, it must be the case that:
wH(p)− wL(p) + [ΣH(p)− ΣL(p)]W ′′L(p) < 0 (2.11)
for any p < p. As p goes to p, we should have:
wH(p)− wL(p) + [ΣH(p)− ΣL(p)]W ′′L(p) ≤ 0⇒ W ′′H(p) ≥ W ′′L(p). (2.12)
(2.10) and (2.12) imply that W ′′H(p) = W
′′
L(p).
This no-deviation condition is quite unique for the two-armed bandit problem. This
condition is absent in an one-armed bandit problem. Most of the models in the literature on
continuous time learning models (Jovanovic (1979) and Moscarini (2005)) and continuous
time games (see amongst others, Sannikov (2008)) are essentially investigating a one-armed
bandit problem. There, we can directly look at equilibria in cutoff strategies. In the one-
armed bandit problems, the safe arm essentially is an absorbing state so we only need
to worry about the potential deviation from the risky arm to the safe arm.18 Then the
no-deviation condition becomes W ′′H(p) ≥ W ′′L(p) = 0 but this is already implied by the
17As p goes to p+, notice that wL(p−) = wL(p+),ΣL(p−) = ΣL(p+). Hence, we will have: wL(p−) +
ΣL(p−)W ′′L(p−)− (wH(p+) + ΣH(p+)W ′′H(p+)) + (W ′′H(p+)−W ′′L(p−))ΣL(p−) ≤ 0.
18For example, in our model assume µHL = µLL and the return in the low type firm is deterministic.
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convexity property.19
We provide some intuition for the no-deviation condition. By assuming Sequential Ra-
tionality, i.e., the equilibrium is robust to a one-shot deviation, we basically impose that the
equilibrium wage is self-enforcing. There is no commitment to future realizations of Xt and
therefore of future beliefs p. Now we can interpret W ′′ as the marginal value of learning: W ′
is the marginal change of W with respect to the posterior p, and learning changes p and is
therefore quantified by the change in W ′ which is W ′′. The condition states that there is no
deviation if the marginal value of learning at p is the same in both firms.
Now in our two-armed bandit problem, we first need to answer the question whether
there exist non-cutoff stationary equilibria, i.e., a worker with p ∈ [p1, p2) accepts the offer
from a high type firm, with p ∈ [p2, p3) accepts the offer from a low type firm and with
p ∈ [p3, p4) accepts the offer from a high type firm again. Surprisingly, Lemmas 2.2–2.5
imply that all possible stationary competitive equilibria must be in cutoff strategies. The
next theorem therefore establishes uniqueness and sorting under supermodularity. It does
not shown existence yet, which we do in Theorem 2.3 below.
Theorem 2.1. If an equilibrium exists, PAM is the unique stationary competitive equilibrium
allocation under strict supermodularity. Likewise for NAM under strict submodularity.
To prove this theorem, we only need to prove the following Claim:
Claim 2.2. Under strict supermodularity, it is impossible to have p1 < p2 and equilibrium
value functions WH (for p ∈ [p1, p2]), WL1 (for p < p1), WL2 (for p > p2) such that:
WH(p1) = WL1(p1) and W
′′
H(p1) = W
′′
L1(p1)
WH(p2) = WL2(p2) and W
′′
H(p2) = W
′′
L2(p2)
19In a model of option pricing by Dumas (1991), there does exist a condition on the second derivative
called the “super contact” condition, which is of a very different nature. It arises as the optimal solution to
the option pricing problem with proportional cost. More discussions about this no-deviation condition can
be found in Eeckhout and Weng (2010)
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are satisfied simultaneously.
Under strict submodularity, it is impossible to have p1 < p2 and equilibrium value func-
tions WL (for p ∈ [p1, p2]), WH1 (for p < p1), WH2 (for p > p2) such that:
WL(p1) = WH1(p1) and W
′′
L(p1) = W
′′
H1(p1)
WL(p1) = WH2(p2) and W
′′
L(p2) = W
′′
H2(p2)
are satisfied simultaneously.
Proof. In Appendix.
This result states that it is not benefial for a worker of type p to learn in the high type
firm H in the middle as long as there there are still types p on both sides who work in the
low type firms. Given the above claim, it is easy to prove the theorem:
Proof. Under supermodularity, by Lemma 2.5, workers with sufficiently low p’s will accept
a low type firm’s wage offer and workers with sufficiently high p’s will accept a high type
firm’s offer. But Claim 2.2 implies it is impossible to have worker first accept low type
firm’s offer, then accept high type firm’s offer and finally accept low type firm’s offer again.
Hence, we must have some cutoff p such that p < p will accept low type firm’s offer and
p > p will accept high type firm’s offer. This is exactly a PAM allocation. Use the same
logic, NAM is the only possible stationary competitive equilibrium allocation under strict
submodularity.
Before we turn to the equilibrium distribution, we show that the no-deviation condition
in Lemma 2.5 is not just necessary but also sufficient under strict supermodularity:
Lemma 2.6. Under strict supermodularity, W ′′H(p) = W
′′
L(p) implies that no deviation will
happen for the PAM equilibrium allocation.
Proof. In Appendix.
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2.4.2 The Equilibrium Distribution
The previous section shows that under strict supermodularity (submodularity), PAM (NAM)
is the unique candidate stationary competitive equilibrium allocation. Note that this doesn’t
necessarily mean the equilibrium exists. We still need to construct such an equilibrium. To
do that, we assume strict supermodularity and worker and firm monotonicity: (µHH > µHL
and µLH > µLL).
20 Now consider a strictly positive assortative matching equilibrium such
that workers with beliefs less than p will choose L firms and workers with beliefs higher than
p will choose H firms. From equation (2.4) we hence have kL1 = 0 and kL2 > 0 for y = L
and kH2 = 0 and kH1 > 0 for y = H. Let kL = kL2, kH = kH1 and worker’s value functions
become:
WL(p) =
wL(p)
r + δ
+ kLp
αL(1− p)1−αL (2.13)
and
WH(p) =
wH(p)
r + δ
+ kHp
1−αH (1− p)αH , (2.14)
where
αy =
1
2
+
√
1
4
+
2(r + δ)
s2y
≥ 1.
To discuss market clearing conditions, we need to consider the ergodic distribution of p’s.
From the Fokker-Planck (Kolmogorov forward) equation, the stationary and ergodic density
fy should satisfy the following differential equation:
0 =
dfy(p)
dt
=
d2
dp2
[Σy(p)fy(p)]− δfy(p). (2.15)
20Monotonicity is just to help us find one particular way to divide the surplus. The whole construction of
equilibrium also goes through if we do not make this assumption.
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The general solution to this differential equation is (see also Moscarini (2005)):21
fy(p) = [fy0p
γy1(1− p)γy2 + fy1(1− p)γy1pγy2 ] (2.16)
where
γy1 = −3
2
+
√
1
4
+
2δ
s2y
> −1
and
γy2 = −3
2
−
√
1
4
+
2δ
s2y
< −2.
First, the integrability of fy requires that fy1 = 0 if 0 is included in the domain and
fy0 = 0 if 1 is included in the domain. Second, the Fokker-Planck (Kolmogorov forward)
equation is only valid for p 6= p0. Since there is a flow in of new workers, for p = p0 we
should have a kink in the density function. This also raises the issue of the relative position
between p0 and p. We first consider the case where p < p0. We then derive in abbreviated
format the result when p > p0.
Given any p0 ∈ (0, 1), if p < p0, then the density functions are:
fH(p) = [fH0p
γH1(1− p)γH2 + fH1(1− p)γH1pγH2 ]I(p < p ≤ p0) + fH2(1− p)γH1pγH2I(p > p0)
(2.17)
and
fL(p) = fL0p
γL1(1− p)γL2 . (2.18)
The density functions are subject to the following boundary conditions. The derivations
of these boundary conditions are shown in the appendix. First, once the posterior belief
reaches the equilibrium separation point p, we should have the cutoff condition:
ΣH(p+)fH(p+) = ΣL(p−)fL(p−). (2.19)
21Here the assumption that there is no heterogeneity in the prior p0 substantially simplifies the solution
to this differential equation. While there is no solution for a general distribution of priors, we have been able
to solve the stationary distribution if the priors are drawn from a beta distribution. See also Papageorgiou
(2009).
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This condition guarantees that the flow speed of agents who cross p from below is equal to
the flow speed of agents who cross from above. The implication is that since the speed from
above ΣH is larger than ΣL, the densities are not continuous: fH(p+) < fL(p−). It is worth
comparing this condition to the standard condition when there is an absorbing state (Cox
and Miller (1965), Dixit (1993), and Moscarini (2005)). In the case with only one Brownian
motion and an absorbing state, what is required is Σ(p+)f(p+) = 0 because the probability
of absorption in a time interval dt must equal the flow-in speed of the Brownian motion
which is proportional to
√
dt (see Cox and Miller (1965, p.220)).
Second, total flows in and out of the high type firms must balance:
ΣH(p0)[f
′
H(p0−)− f ′H(p0+)] = δpi +
d
dp
[ΣH(p)fH(p)]|p+.
The left-hand side of the above equation is the total inflow into high type firms, which are
new workers who enter into this economy. The right-hand side of the above equation is the
total outflows from the high type firms, which include workers who reach p and transfer to
low type firms and workers who are hit by the death shock. We manage to show that this
equation will further imply:
d
dp
[ΣL(p)fL(p)]|p− = d
dp
[ΣH(p)fH(p)]|p+
Third, the density function has to be continuous at p0:
fH(p0−) = fH(p0+).
It is customary to impose this condition as it approximates entry from a non-degenerate
distribution instead of entry of identical types p0.
Finally, usual market clearing conditions apply:
∫ 1
p
fH(p)dp = pi and
∫ p
0
fL(p)dp = 1− pi.
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In summary, when p < p0, the equilibrium is characterized by a system of eight equations
with nine unknowns (VL, VH , kL, kH , p, fH0, fH1, fH2, fL0):
22
WH(p) = WL(p) (Value-matching condition) (2.20)
W ′H(p) = W
′
L(p) (Smooth-pasting condition) (2.21)
W
′′
H(p) = W
′′
L(p) (No-deviation condition) (2.22)
ΣH(p+)fH(p+) = ΣL(p−)fL(p−) (Boundary condition) (2.23)∫ 1
p
fH(p)dp = pi (Market clearing H) (2.24)∫ p
0
fL(p)dp = 1− pi (Market clearing L) (2.25)
d
dp
[ΣL(p)fL(p)]|p− = d
dp
[ΣH(p)fH(p)]|p+ (Flow equation at p) (2.26)
fH(p0−) = fH(p0+) (Continuous density at p0) (2.27)
Fortunately, Equations (2.23)–(2.27) can be solved separately from Equations (2.20)–
(2.22). In other words, the procedure of solving this system of equation could be: first we
solve p jointly with fH0, fH1, fH2, fL0 from Equations (2.23)–(2.27) and then we plug p into
Equations (2.20)–(2.22) to pin down other unknowns.
Proposition 2.1. Equations (2.23)-(2.27) imply p < p0 if and only if:(
p0
1− p0
)γH1−γL2 δ/s2H
δ/s2L
∫ 1
p0
pγH2(1− p)γH1dp∫ p0
0
pγL1(1− p)γL2dp <
pi
1− pi . (2.28)
Moreover, if such p exists, it must be unique.
Proof. In Appendix.
22Observe that with more unknowns than variables, the solution to our system is indeterminate. In fact,
there are potentially a continuum of wages that can be supported in equilibrium, though the allocation will
be unique. This indeterminacy is as in Becker: the allocation is unique, but there may be multiple ways
to split the surplus. In all that follows, when we use the term uniqueness of equilibrium, we refer to the
allocation, not to the wages.
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The proof of Proposition 2.1 is quite straightforward. The idea of the proof is the follow-
ing: since we have 5 equations with five unknowns, we can first express fH0, fH1, fH2, fL0 as
functions of p and then use the last equation to pin down p.
The existence and uniqueness of the solution to the system require that fH0, fH1, fH2, fL0
change monotonically with p. Fortunately, this is the case as shown in the appendix. The
monotonicity guarantees that if a solution exists, it must be unique. Furthermore, it enables
us to only check the boundaries when determining whether a solution exists. Equation (2.28)
given in the Proposition is thus derived.
In the second case, p ≥ p0. Given any p0 ∈ (0, 1), if p ≥ p0, then the density functions
are:
fL(p) = fL0p
γL1(1−p)γL2I(p < p0)+[fL1pγL1(1−p)γL2+fL2(1−p)γL1pγL2 ]I(p0 ≤ p ≤ p) (2.29)
and
fH(p) = fH0(1− p)γH1pγH2 . (2.30)
Then the system of equations to determine the equilibrium is:
WH(p) = WL(p) (Value-matching) (2.31)
W ′H(p) = W
′
L(p) (Smooth-pasting) (2.32)
W
′′
H(p) = W
′′
L(p) (No-deviation) (2.33)
ΣH(p+)fH(p+) = ΣL(p−)fL(p−) (Boundary condition) (2.34)∫ 1
p
fH(p)dp = pi (Market clearing H) (2.35)∫ p
0
fL(p)dp = 1− pi (Market clearing L) (2.36)
d
dp
[ΣL(p)fL(p)]|p− = d
dp
[ΣH(p)fH(p)]|p+ (Flow equation at p) (2.37)
fL(p0−) = fL(p0+) (Continuous density at p0) (2.38)
Based on the above equations, we can prove the following Proposition, the counterpart
to Proposition 2.1, in a similar fashion:
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Proposition 2.2. Equations (2.34)-(2.38) imply p ≥ p0 if and only if:
(
p0
1− p0 )
γH1−γL2 δ/s
2
H
δ/s2L
∫ 1
p0
pγH2(1− p)γH1dp∫ p0
0
pγL1(1− p)γL2dp ≥
pi
1− pi . (2.39)
Moreover, if such p exists, it must be unique.
The idea for the proof of Proposition 2 is exactly the same as that for the proof of
Proposition 1 and the proof is also shown in the appendix. Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 together
provide the following existence and uniqueness result:
Theorem 2.2. Under strict supermodularity, for any pair (p0, pi) ∈ (0, 1)2, there exists a
unique PAM cutoff p. Moreover, p < p0 if and only if:
(
p0
1− p0 )
γH1−γL2 δ/s
2
H
δ/s2L
∫ 1
p0
pγH2(1− p)γH1dp∫ p0
0
pγL1(1− p)γL2dp <
pi
1− pi . (2.40)
One of the nice properties about Equation (2.40) is that the whole equation only depends
on p0, pi, δ/s
2
H and δ/s
2
L. This provides a feasible way to compute p. Given p0, pi, δ/s
2
H and
δ/s2L, we first need to decide the sign of
(
p0
1− p0 )
γH1−γL2 δ/s
2
H
δ/s2L
∫ 1
p0
pγH2(1− p)γH1dp∫ p0
0
pγL1(1− p)γL2dp −
pi
1− pi .
If this sign is negative, then we know that p is smaller than p0 and we can use the system of
equations in the first case to figure out p. On the contrary, if this sign is not negative, then
we know that p is larger than p0 and we can use the system of equations in the second case
to compute p. This turns out to be a convenient way to determine the equilibrium cutoff
numerically.
Before presenting the numerical results, we have a simple theoretical comparative static
result:
Corollary 2.1. p is strictly increasing in p0 and decreasing in pi.
This corollary is proved in the appendix. But the intuition is quite straightforward:
decreasing in pi means there are more low type firms in the economy and hence p has to
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Figure 2.1: Equilibrium Distribution of Posterior beliefs.
become larger such that more workers are matched with low type firms; increasing in p0
means the overall quality of the workers is becoming better in the economy and p has to go
up to make sure that low type firms are also matched with better workers.
Mathematically, it is not easy to derive comparative statics between p and δ/s2H or δ/s
2
L.
But intuitively speaking, as sL increases, the degree of supermodularity will be reduced while
the speed of learning in low type firms will increase. Both of these factors make the low type
firms more attractive and hence p should increase in sL. On the other hand, as sH becomes
higher, both the degree of supermodularity and the speed of learning in high type firms will
go up, which will lead to a reduction in p.
Figure 2.1 plots the stationary distribution of beliefs p, for the case of PAM and with
parameter values: sH = 0.15, sL = 0.05, p0 = 0.5, pi = 0.5, δ = 0.01.
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2.4.3 Equilibrium Analysis: Value Functions
Theorem 2.2 implies that under strict supermodularity, the PAM cutoff p can be uniquely
determined. But given this p, we still have the following conditions to satisfy:
WH(p) = WL(p) (Value-matching condition) (2.41)
W
′
H(p) = W
′
L(p) (Smooth-pasting condition) (2.42)
W ′′H(p) = W
′′
L(p) (No-deviation condition) (2.43)
Equations (2.41)-(2.43) are three equations for four unknowns. The equilibrium is inde-
terminate in the sense that although the allocation p is unique, there could be multiple ways
to divide the surplus. To make the system determinate, we assume firm monotonicity and
set µLL = 0. Then limited liability requires that wL(0) has to be zero and hence VL = 0.
Equations (2.41)-(2.43) thus could be written as:
µL(p)
r + δ
+ kLp
αL(1− p)1−αL = µH(p)− rVH
r + δ
+ kHp
1−αH (1− p)αH
µHL − µLL
r + δ
+ kLp
αL(1− p)1−αL( αL − p
p(1− p)) =
µHH − µLH
r + δ
+ kHp
1−αH (1− p)αH (1− αH − p
p(1− p) )
kLp
αL−2(1− p)−1−αLαL(αL − 1) = kHp−1−αH (1− p)αH−2αH(αH − 1)
This system of equations will give us a unique formula for VH :
rVH = (µLH − µLL) +
αH(αL − 1)(∆H −∆L)p
αH(αL − 1)− (1− p)(αL − αH) . (2.44)
As usual, ∆H = µHH − µLH and ∆L = µHL − µLL. Furthermore, it is easy to check that
both kH and kL are strictly larger than zero such that the option value of learning is strictly
positive.
Therefore, we finally reach our main result:
Theorem 2.3. Under strict supermodularity, the stationary competitive equilibrium is unique
in the sense that all equilibria are PAM and the allocation is uniquely determined by Theo-
rem 2.2. Moreover, assume firm monotonicity and normalize VL = 0, we can get a unique
formula for VH given by equation (2.44).
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2.4.4 Wage Gap at the Cutoff
The analysis of the value functions allows us to determine equilibrium wages. We start with
an interesting observation:
wH(p) = µH(p)− rVH = ∆Hp+ µLL −
αH(αL − 1)(∆H −∆L)p
αH(αL − 1)− (1− p)(αL − αH)
< ∆Lp+ µLL = wL(p).
This implies that the worker with posterior belief slightly higher than p will accept the high
firm’s offer even though the wage provided is lower than the wage at the low firm. This
obviously comes from the fact that the learning speed in the high firm is higher and this
would compensate the loss in the flow wages.
On the other hand, we can see that the difference in expected productivity at p is
µH(p)− µL(p) = (µHL − µLL) + (∆H −∆L)p < rVH .
This implies the high firm can enjoy a strictly positive rent from a higher learning speed. This
above result actually does not depend on the assumption VL = 0 and it can be generalized
for any possible division of surplus.23 This is illustrated by Figure 2.2:
Lemma 2.7. Under strict supermodularity, we have: wH(p) < wL(p) and rVH − rVL >
µH(p)− µL(p).
2.5 Firm-dependent Volatility: σy
A valid criticism of our approach is that we give the H firms too much of an edge under
supermodularity (likewise for the L firms under submodularity). Not only are they superior
23Generally, value matching and no-deviation conditions imply that
(r + δ)WH(p) = wH(p) + ΣH(p)W
′′
H(p) = (r + δ)WL(p) = wL(p) + ΣL(p)W
′′
L(p)
and
W ′′H(p) = W
′′
L(p).
These immediately mean that wH(p) < wL(p) and rVH − rVL > µH(p)− µL(p).
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Figure 2.2: Equilibrium wage function and value function in terms of beliefs p; Stationary
wage distribution.
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in the production of output, by assuming that the volatility σ is common to both types of
firms, effectively the signal-to-noise ratio is higher in H firms:
sH =
µHH − µLH
σ
>
µHL − µLL
σ
= sL,
from supermodularity. With firm-dependent volatility, that need not be the case. In partic-
ular, for σH sufficiently high, it may well be the case that sH < sL.
Mere observation of the value function in Equation (2.3), rWy(p) = µy(p) − Vy +
Σy(p)W
′′
y (p) − δWy(p), reveals that firm-dependent volatility will play a crucial role here.
Since Σy =
1
2
p2(1− p)2s2y, for sufficiently high σH and therefore low sH , it appears intuitive
that the value WH can be smaller than the value of WL for high p. It turns out that this
intuition is wrong. First, in this competitive equilibrium, wages are endogenous and there-
fore as the value of learning changes, so does µy(p)−Vy. Second, the no-deviation condition
requires that at the marginal type p, W ′′H = W
′′
L. It turns out that as a result these two
features, in equilibrium the learning effect is the same in both firms, no matter what the
volatility σy is.
To make this argument formal, when σH 6= σL, we generally define sy = (µHy −
µLy)/σy, y = H,L. It is trivial to show that belief updating also satisfies the formula:
dpt = pt(1− pt)sydZ¯y,t.
Furthermore, Lemmas 2.2–2.5 still hold because none of these results depend explicitly on
σy. As shown in the appendix, the statement in Claim 2.2 is generalized to any combination
of (σH , σL).
24
With the proof of Claim 2.2 in hand, the result of Theorem 2.1 immediately extends: PAM
(NAM) is the unique candidate stationary competitive equilibrium allocation under strict
supermodularity (submodularity) thus holds for any combination of (σH , σL). Surprisingly,
24The sufficiency of the no-deviation condition is also extended to include all of the combinations of
(σH , σL) by proving a generalized version of Claim 2.2 and Lemma 2.6 in the appendix.
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this implies that under strict supermodularity, even if we have an extremely high σH such
that the learning rate in high type firms is smaller than that in low type firms, we still have
PAM. It is equivalent to assert that the direct productivity consideration dominates the
learning in our model. The reason comes from the fact that the equilibrium wage schedules
adjust to offset the impact of change in learning rate. The key insight here is the no-deviation
condition. At p, the no-deviation condition requires that the second-order effect on the value
function is the same in both firms. This second-order effect W ′′y exactly captures the effect of
learning through Σy(p)W
′′
y (p) where Σy =
1
2
p2(1− p)2s2y. Because equilibrium wages adjust
to satisfy the no-deviation condition at the cutoff, the impact of differential learning rates
is completely offset by the change of wage schedule, and the equilibrium allocation is solely
determined by the productivity consideration.
2.6 The Planner’s Problem
A priori, we might expect the competitive equilibrium not to decentralize the planner’s prob-
lem. Wage contracts cannot condition on future realizations or actions and are assumed to
be self-enforcing. As a result of this lack of commitment, there is a missing market. With
incomplete markets, the competitive equilibrium in general does not necessarily decentralize
the planner’s problem. It turns out however as we show below that this market incom-
pleteness does not preclude the efficiency of the decentralized equilibrium. As will become
apparent, this efficiency result is driven by the martingale property present in all models of
learning.
We consider a planner’s problem under stationarity, i.e., in the presence of an ergodic
distribution. The planner chooses an allocation rule and as a consequence of the Kolmogorov
forward equation, the ergodic distribution associated with this allocation rule. The objective
is to maximize the aggregate flow of output. Given stationarity of the problem, the focus on
output maximization yields the same outcome as maximization of aggregate values.
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Before we state and prove the efficiency result, we need to derive the stationary distri-
bution under multiple cutoffs. Consider any allocation with multiple cutoffs:
0 < p
N
< · · · < p
1
< 1, N odd.
Without loss of generality, we assume workers with p ∈ (p1, 1] are allocated to the high type
firms while workers with p ∈ [0, pN) are allocated to the low type firms since for workers
with p = 0 or 1, there is no need for learning and it is optimal to allocate them according
to instantaneous production efficiency (PAM).25 This also implies that generically N is odd.
Denote by Ωy the set of p’s that match with firms of type y.
Formally, the planner will choose Ωy to solve the problem:
max
Ωy
S =
∫
ΩH
µH(p)fH(p)dp+
∫
ΩL
µL(p)fL(p)dp
s.t.
d2
dp2
[Σy(p)fy(p)]− δfy(p) = dfy(p)
dt
=0 Kolmogorov forward equation∫
ΩH
pfH(p)dp+
∫
ΩL
pfL(p)dp =p0 Martingale property∫
ΩL
fL(p)dp = 1− pi,
∫
ΩH
fH(p)dp =pi. Market clearing
It turns out that the martingale property enables an easier way to compare different alloca-
tions, hence the following Lemma:
Lemma 2.8. Consider two possible allocations with ergodic density functions fH(p), fL(p)
(allocation 1) and f˜H(p), f˜L(p) (allocation 2) respectively. Then allocation 1 generates higher
aggregate output than the allocation 2 if and only if
∫
ΩH
pfH(p)dp >
∫
Ω˜H
pf˜H(p)dp or alter-
natively,
∫
ΩL
pfL(p)dp <
∫
Ω˜L
pf˜L(p)dp.
Proof. In Appendix.
25This property is also established in the one-sided model of Anderson and Smith (2010). Our results
shows that not only at the extremes but also at the interior the planner’s (and the equilibrium) allocation
exhibit PAM.
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To prove that the competitive equilibrium decentralizes the planner’s stationary solution
under supermodularity, it suffices to show that the PAM allocation is better than any al-
location with multiple cutoffs because from Theorem 2.2, we know that PAM allocation is
unique and will be the same as the competitive equilibrium allocation for any combination
of (sH , sL). The key technical issue is that the ergodic distribution is endogenously deter-
mined by the allocation rule. It is infeasible to compute the ergodic density functions for
each possible allocation. Our strategy of proof is therefore to use a variational argument to
circumvent this difficulty.
The proof heavily uses the martingale property and works as follows. First we consider a
candidate allocation with 3 cutoffs. Under this candidate allocation, there will be an interior
interval of p’s that are matched to L type firms associated with some ergodic distribution.
We move the bounds of that interval slightly to the left, thus generating a new density in
this interval while keeping all other cutoffs and distributions unchanged. The new interval
is chosen by imposing market clearing conditions. Lemma 2.8 then shows that under su-
permodularity this experiment strictly increases aggregate output. This holds until cutoffs
coincide such that the interior rang of p’s matched with L firms disappears, thus reducing the
number of cutoffs to N = 1. We use a similar argument to establish that output increases
when moving from N to N − 2 cutoffs. The result then follows by induction. We derive the
result under supermodularity. The same logic applies under submodularity.
Theorem 2.4. The competitive equilibrium decentralizes the planner’s stationary solution
that maximizes the aggregate flow of output.
Proof. In Appendix.
2.7 On-the-job Human Capital Accumulation
On the job, workers and firms not only learn about their unknown innate skills, they also
accumulate human capital. In reality, human capital accumulation is an ongoing, continuous
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process. The longer the tenure of a worker, the higher her productivity. This monotonically
increasing relation between tenure and human capital experience is likely also to be concave.
For modeling purposes, here we consider a very simple form that captures this relation. With
probability λ, a worker transitions from being unexperienced to being experienced.26 Once
a worker is experienced, her productivity increases to µxy + ξx and the status of experience
is complete information.27 Now there are the same value functions for experienced workers
as before W ey .
rW ey (p) = µy(p) + ξ(p)− rVy + Σey(p)W
e′′
y (p)− δW ey (p)
where ξ(p) = pξH + (1 − p)ξL is the expected experience.28 For the unexperienced worker
there is now one additional value function. As before, there are unexperienced workers who
are matched with L firms, and who continue to match with an L firms; and there are those
who match with H firms both when unexperienced as well as when experienced. We denote
those values by W uLL,W
u
HH . There are now also some types p who match with an L firm when
unexperienced and who switch to an H firm when they become experienced, the value of
which is denoted by W uLH . This requires that the reservation type of an experienced worker
(pe) is lower than that of the unexperienced worker (pu). We start from this premise and
later verify that this is indeed the case. The value functions then are:
rW uyy(p) = µy(p)− rVy + Σuy(p)W
u′′
yy (p) + λW
e
y (p)− (δ + λ)W uyy(p)
rW uLH(p) = µL(p)− rVL + ΣuL(p)W
u′′
LH(p) + λW
e
H(p)− (δ + λ)W uLH(p)
Observe that even though experience is completely observable, it does affect the inference
from learning in the sense that the signal-to-noise ratio changes to [(µHy+ξH−µLy−ξL)]/σ2.
26Having a continuous relation between tenure and human capital renders the system of differential equa-
tions into a system of partial differential equations. Typically there is no solution. In the current setup,
there is an additional state (experienced versus unexperienced) and the model remains tractable.
27Observe that experience is worker dependent, but not firm dependent. While it is likely a realistic feature
to have experience dependent on the job type, the reason is that we would have a different level of experience
for different histories which makes the problem non-tractible.
28In this section we maintain the earlier assumption that σH = σL = σ.
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As a result, Σy depends on experience u, e.
W uyy(p) =
µy(p)− rVy
r + δ + λ
+ kuy1p
1−αuy (1− p)αuy + kuy2pα
u
y (1− p)1−αuy
+
λ
(r + δ)(r + δ + λ)
[µy(p) + ξ(p)− rVy]
+
λ
(λ+ δ + r)− (suy )2
(sey)
2 (r + δ)
[key1p
1−αey(1− p)αey + key2pα
e
y(1− p)1−αey ]
W uLH(p) =
µL(p)− rVL
r + δ + λ
+ kuL1p
1−αuL(1− p)αuL + kuL2pα
u
L(1− p)1−αuL
+
λ
(r + δ)(r + δ + λ)
[µH(p) + ξ(p)− rVH ]
+
λ
(λ+ δ + r)− (suL)2
(seH)
2 (r + δ)
[keH1p
1−αeH (1− p)αeH + keH2pα
e
H (1− p)1−αeH ]
W ey (p) =
µy(p) + ξ(p)− rVy
r + δ
+ key1p
1−αey(1− p)αey + key2pα
e
y(1− p)1−αey
where
αuy =
1
2
+
√
1
4
+
2(r + δ + λ)
(suy)
2
≥ 1
αey =
1
2
+
√
1
4
+
2(r + δ)
(sey)
2
≥ 1
There are now two cut-offs pu, pe. Since we just want to compare pu and pe, we can
consider the following thought experiment. First, we assume that pu = pe = p. Then we
can get two systems of equations: one system is the set of value-matching, smooth-pasting
and no-deviation conditions for the unexperienced workers and the other one is for the
experienced workers. Second, we can solve ∆V = VH − VL the way we did previously but
now we can get two possible values for ∆V . Denote them to be ∆V e and ∆V u. Notice that
∆V e and ∆V u are both increasing in the cutoff p. Finally, we compare ∆V e and ∆V u under
the assumption that pu = pe = p. If ∆V e > ∆V u, this means that we should decrease pe or
increase pu and hence pu > pe; on the contrary, if ∆V e < ∆V u, this means that we should
decrease pu or increase pe and hence pu < pe. We derive this in the Appendix and can show
this to hold when human capital accumulation is not too different for H and L types.
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Proposition 2.3. Assume supermodularity and ξH ' ξL. Then pe < pu.
Proof. In Appendix.
With human capital accumulation, we can now characterize the entire equilibrium, in-
cluding wage schedules and the ergodic distribution of types. Even though there are types
who gradually learn they are of low productivity, wages need not decrease over the life cycle
as they accumulate human capital.
Turnover and Tenure. We express the expected future duration of a match by tenure
τy(p). Tenure relates inversely to turnover. For p < p
e and p > pu, τy(p) satisfies the
following differential equation (see also Moscarini 2005):
Σy(p)τ
′′
y (p)− δτy(p) = −1,
with solutions:
τuH(p) =
1
δ
{
1−
(
p
pu
)1/2−√1/4+2δ/(suH)2 ( 1− p
1− pu
)1/2−√1/4−2δ/(suH)2}
;
τuL(p) =
1
δ
{
1−
(
p
pu
)1/2−√1/4−2δ/(suL)2 ( 1− p
1− pu
)1/2−√1/4+2δ/(suL)2}
;
τ eH(p) =
1
δ
{
1−
(
p
pe
)1/2−√1/4+2δ/(seH)2 ( 1− p
1− pe
)1/2−√1/4−2δ/(seH)2}
;
τ eL(p) =
1
δ
{
1−
(
p
pe
)1/2−√1/4−2δ/(seL)2 ( 1− p
1− pe
)1/2−√1/4+2δ/(seL)2}
.
If p ∈ (pe, pu), the only difference is that
Σy(p)τ
u′′
L (p)− (δ + λ)τuL(p) = −1,
since unexperienced workers will switch jobs once they become experienced. An immediate
implication of the Proposition above is the following:
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Proposition 2.4. (Tenure) Assume supermodularity and ξH ' ξL. Then, τuL(p) > τ eL(p)
for p < pe and τuH(p) < τ
e
H(p) for p > p
u. For p ∈ (pe, pu), there is a cutoff such that
τuL(p) < τ
e
H(p) for p higher than this cutoff and τ
u
L(p) > τ
e
H(p) for p smaller than this cutoff.
For the lowest types p, tenure for the unexperienced worker is longer as the experienced
workers are more likely to be hired by an H firm given positive information revelation. The
opposite is true for the highest p: the unexperienced types face a higher cut-off type and will
therefore upon bad information be more likely to switch to an L firm. In the intermediate
range, tenure depends on how close p is to either of the cut-offs.
2.8 Robustness
2.8.1 Generalized Le´vy Processes
One may suspect that our results are exclusively driven by the specific assumptions of the
Brownian motion. In the section, we illustrate that this is not the case by considering a
generalized Le´vy process, i.e., a compound Poisson process. Let λxy denote the expected
arrival rate of jumps for a type x worker in a type y firm. Following Cohen and Solan (2009),
the worker’s value function can be written as:
Wy(p) = wy(p)dt+ (1− rdt− δdt){[pλHy + (1− p)λLy]dtWy′(ph)
+ (1− [pλHy + (1− p)λLy]dt)Wy(p+ dp)
where ph =
pλHy
pλHy+(1−p)λLy and y
′ is the firm type which matches with worker ph. If no jump
occurs, the updating of the posterior belief in firm y follows:
dp = −p(1− p)(λHy − λLy)dt+ p(1− p)sydZ¯.
As usual, the value function could be rewritten as a differential equation:
(r + δ + [pλHy + (1− p)λLy])Wy(p)
= wy(p) + [pλHy + (1− p)λLy]Wy′(ph)− p(1− p)(λHy − λLy)W ′y(p) + Σy(p)W ′′y (p).
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The no-deviation condition derived earlier still holds in this situation. The proof is similar
and is omitted here.
Lemma 2.9. To deter possible deviations, a necessary condition is:
W ′′H(p) = W
′′
L(p) (No-deviation condition-Le´vy) (2.45)
for any possible cutoff p.
Consider the simplifying assumption that λLy = 0 and denote λHy by λy. Then ph is
always 1 and the value function becomes:
(r + δ + pλy)Wy(p) = wy(p) + pλyWy′(1) − p(1 − p)λyW ′y(p) + Σy(p)W ′′y (p).
The differential equation could be solved explicitly by guess and verify:
Wy(p) = Ay +Byp+ ky1p
αy1(1− p)1−αy1 + ky2pαy2(1− p)1−αy2
where Ay =
µLy−rVy
r+δ
, By =
∆y+λy(Wy′ (1)−Ay)
r+δ+λy
and
αy1 =
1
2
+
λy
s2y
+
√
(
1
2
+
λy
s2y
)2 +
2(r + δ)
s2y
> 1 + 2
λy
s2y
αy2 =
1
2
+
λy
s2y
−
√
(
1
2
+
λy
s2y
)2 +
2(r + δ)
s2y
< 0.
Obviously, the envelope of Wy is a strictly increasing and strictly convex function for
p ∈ (0, 1). First, we would like to argue that for p = 1, y′ = H. Since the function is strictly
convex, it must be the case that 0 and 1 workers are matched with different types of firms.
Now suppose y′ = L. Then since 0 workers are matched with H firms, AH > AL and hence
WL(1) =
∆L
r+δ
+ AL <
∆H
r+δ
+ AH = WH(1). A contradiction.
Therefore, the value function could be rewritten as:
(r + δ + pλy)Wy(p) = wy(p) + pλyW1(1)− p(1− p)λyW ′y(p) + Σy(p)W ′′y (p). (2.46)
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with general solution:
Wy(p) = Ay +Byp+ ky1p
αy1(1− p)1−αy1 + ky2pαy2(1− p)1−αy2 . (2.47)
Notice that the equilibrium payoffs are such that AL > AH , BL < BH and AL + BL <
AH +BH . At any cutoff p, the following three equations should hold simultaneously:
WH(p) = WL(p) (Value-matching condition) (2.48)
W
′
H(p) = W
′
L(p) (Smooth-pasting condition) (2.49)
W ′′H(p) = W
′′
L(p) (No-deviation condition) (2.50)
Then from Equation (2.46), it is immediate to get at p,
(λH − λL)pWH(p)
= wH(p)−wL(p)+(λH−λL)pWH(1)− (λH−λL)p(1−p)W ′H(p)+(ΣH(p)−ΣL(p))W ′′H(p).
Apply Equation (2.47) and the above equation could be simplified as:
0 = wH(p)− wL(p) + (r + δ + λL)[AL − AH + (BL −BH)p].
The RHS of the above equation is linear in p. Therefore, if we can prove the slope is not zero
then there cannot exist two p’s satisfying the equation simultaneously. Fortunately, this is
the case. The slope is
∆H −∆L + (r + δ + λL)(BL −BH).
Notice that BH =
∆H
r+δ
and (r + δ + λL)BL = ∆L + λL(WH(1)− AL). Hence,
∆H −∆L + (r + δ + λL)(BL −BH) = λL(AL − AH) > 0.
The following result summarizes the findings above and corresponds to Theorem 2.1 in the
Brownian motion case:
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Proposition 2.5. Given the Le´vy process and provided an equilibrium exists, PAM is the
unique stationary competitive equilibrium allocation under strict supermodularity.
Under PAM, kL1 > 0, kL2 = 0 and kH1 = 0, kH2 > 0. We can use the procedure
introduced in the previous sections to pin down the equilibrium cutoff p and derive value
functions based on p.
Notice also that under the Le´vy process, beliefs are formed through Bayesian updating.
We conjecture that PAM will always be the competitive equilibrium allocation under strict
supermodularity for any stochastic process as long as there is Bayesian updating. This
is because under Bayesian learning, the belief updating process is always a martingale.
Of course, establishing this result for general information processes is impossible because
it requires the explicit solution of the differential equations for the value function, which
generally does not exist.
2.8.2 Non-Bayesian Updating
Suppose instead that the belief updating is not a martingale. Then it must be generated by
some non-Bayesian learning process. We will now show for an example that the competitive
equilibrium can be non-PAM even if there is supermodularity.
Suppose the belief updating process in firm y is given by: dp = λypdt for p < 1, with λy
a constant, and once p reaches 1, dp = 0. We may think p as a special human capital with
1 as an upper bound on the accumulation. The value function of a worker is given by:29
(r + δ)Wy(p) = wy(p) + λypW
′
y(p)
with solution:
Wy(p) = Cyp
r+δ
λy +
∆y
r + δ − λy p+
µLy − rVy
r + δ
.
29We can write the value of a worker of type p in firm y as Wy(p) = wy(p)dt+ (1− (r + δ)dt)Wy(p+ dp).
Using a Taylor expansion Wy(p + dp) = Wy(p) + W
′
y(p)dp + o(dt) and the fact that dp = λypdt, we obtain
the expression for Wy(p).
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Suppose PAM is the equilibrium allocation, then
lim
p→1
WH(p) = WH(1) =
∆H
r + δ
p+
µLH − rVH
r + δ
,
which implies that:
CH = − λH∆H
(r + δ)(r + δ − λH) .
At the cutoff p we have:
WH(p) = WL(p) (Value-matching condition) (2.51)
W
′
H(p) = W
′
L(p), (Smooth-pasting & No-deviation condition) (2.52)
where it turns out that for this belief-updating process, the no-deviation condition coincides
with the smooth-pasting condition. We derive the no-deviation condition in the Appendix.
This is a system of equations in CL and p. Substitute CL and p could be expressed as:
∆L
r + δ
p+
µLL − rVL
r + δ
=
λL − λH
r + δ
∆H
r + δ − λH (p)
r+δ
λH + (1− λL
r + δ
)
∆H
r + δ − λH p+
µLH − rVH
r + δ
or
∆L −∆H
r + δ
p+
µLL − rVL
r + δ
=
λH − λL
r + δ
∆H
r + δ − λH [p− (p)
r+δ
λH ] +
µLH − rVH
r + δ
. (2.53)
Notice that PAM requires that the p = 0 worker has incentive to be matched with L firms.
Hence,
µLL − rVL
r + δ
>
µLH − rVH
r + δ
Also notice that
λH − λL
r + δ
∆H
r + δ − λH [p− (p)
r+δ
λH ] < 0
if λL > λH and r + δ > λH .
If we can show that
∆H −∆L
r + δ
p <
λL − λH
r + δ
∆H
r + δ − λH [p− (p)
r+δ
λH ],
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then Equation (2.53) cannot hold as equality, which is the result we are looking for. First
notice that the LHS of the inequality goes to zero as ∆H−∆L decreases to zero. Meanwhile,
the belief updating process implies the ergodic distribution only depends on λ’s and will not
depend on ∆’s. From previous sections, if PAM is indeed the equilibrium allocation, then p
should not depend on ∆’s. Therefore, fix any λL > λH and r + δ > λH and we can derive
some corresponding p ∈ (0, 1). Then, let ∆H −∆L decreases to zero and it is immediate to
see that eventually we will have:
∆H −∆L
r + δ
p <
λL − λH
r + δ
∆H
r + δ − λH [p− (p)
r+δ
λH ].
This implies that PAM cannot be an equilibrium if λL > λH and the degree of supermodu-
larity is sufficiently small.
2.9 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have proposed a competitive equilibrium model of the labor market that
unifies frictionless sorting and a learning-based theory of turnover. In equilibrium under
supermodularity, workers with better posteriors about their ability tend to sort into more
productive jobs. The main technical contribution of this paper is that we find a new con-
straint on the worker’s value function as a result of sequential rationality in the presence
of competitively determined payoffs. At the cutoff type, the second derivative of the work-
ers’ value function must equate. In addition to the standard conditions of value-matching
(zero-th derivative) and smooth-pasting (first derivative), we now also have the no-deviation
condition (second derivative).
What is possibly most surprising is that the result of positive sorting under supermodu-
larity is not determined by the speed of learning. In the trade-off between the learning speed
and instantaneous productive efficiency, productive efficiency always takes the upper hand.
As such, the equilibrium allocation does not depend on the signal-to-noise ratio (the ratio of
the average payoff gain, which measures the efficiency, over the noise term). This seems to
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indicate in this competitive environment the sorting aspect dominates the learning. Quite
surprisingly, this sorting result does not hinge on the particular information structure and
is robust to general Bayesian learning processes.
Our analysis has certain limitations and several issues remain unanswered. First, like
most experimentation models, payoffs are linear and agents are risk neutral. Non-linearity is
desirable for the economic interpretation. However, it renders the solution to the differential
equation of the value function much harder to solve.
Second, ideally we would like to extend the analysis to general distributions of worker and
firm types. Like in much of the experimentation literature the realized type is either high or
low on a risky arm. Here, in addition we have two risky arms that are correlated, since there
is learning in both types of firms. The focus on the two firm-type case (two arms) keeps
down the dimensionality of the continuous time problem. With more than two firm types,
analyzing the Brownian motion process is mathematically substantially more demanding.
Finally, our result that PAM obtains under supermodularity and that the planner’s prob-
lem can be decentralized, is established for a stationary equilibrium. While a solution of a
general non-stationary equilibrium is too complex, one can easily construct a two-period
counterexample in which PAM will not necessarily obtain in a non-stationary environment.
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Chapter 3
Learning In War of Attrition Games
3.1 Introduction
Imagine a situation where two players are bargaining over a joint decision or two political
parties are voting for a bill. The two individuals disagree with one another because of
conflicting preferences. In particular, each of the two players must choose between sticking
to his own favorable choice or conceding to the other player’s favorable choice. The return to
conceding decreases with time, but, at any time, a player earns a higher return if the other
concedes first. War of attrition games are theoretical tools widely used to characterize how
each of the two players chooses a time path of conceding in the event that the other player
has not already conceded. Continuous-time war of attrition games have been investigated
under both complete information (Hendricks, Weiss, and Wilson (1988)) and incomplete
information (Abreu and Gul (2000)).
Delay is a key feature in war of attrition games. As shown by both Hendricks, Weiss,
and Wilson (1988) and Abreu and Gul (2000), there at least exists an equilibrium such that
rational players will randomize between conceding and staying.1 As a result, it takes time
to reach an agreement. However, in many realistic situations, each player is also receiving
private information about how favorable the alternatives are while he is bargaining with the
other player. Especially in the political environment, learning by political parties is a very
1Abreu and Gul (2000) show that this is the unique sequential equilibrium when information is incomplete.
85
common phenomenon. If a player learns that his opponent’s alternative is quite favorable,
he becomes more willing to concede. In this sense, the learning process may exogenously
facilitate the players to reach an agreement. However, rational players will also respond to
such a process, which may cause a longer delay. The natural question to ask is: if there is an
exogenous information flow that facilitates an agreement, is it easier to reach an agreement
taking into account the response of the rational players?
This paper develops a dynamic war of attrition model with learning to answer the above
question. Learning is modelled in the following way: I assume at each point in time, each
player may receive a private Poisson signal that reveals the payoff for conceding. Receiving
the signal makes the player more willing to concede. This captures the idea that the flow
of information exogenously facilitates an agreement. The main result of the paper is the
following: compared to the model without learning, learning makes it more difficult to reach
an agreement. Especially when the learning rate is low, the expected concession rate in the
unique sequential equilibrium is always smaller than the expected concession rate without
learning. When the learning rate is high, there also exist periods in which the expected
concession rate is higher than the expected concession rate without learning. However, the
paper shows that there will also be some periods in which it is harder to reach an agreement
compared to the model without learning. In equilibrium, it may be easier to reach an
agreement initially but it becomes more and more difficult over time. The later decrease in
the concession rate will always offset the former increase and hence the expected expected
delay becomes longer instead of shorter. I also consider a one-sided learning model where
only one of the two players is able to learn. Interestingly, that model shows that to make
the delay shorter, it is better to allow only one player to learn than to allow both to learn.
Due to private learning, each player may have two possible rational types at each point
in time. The player could be either sure about his private payoff or still unsure. The
sure player is more willing to concede than the unsure player. I show that in the equilibrium
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when concession still takes place, only one of the following three cases is possible: 1) the sure
player is randomizing while the unsure player strictly prefers staying; 2) the unsure player is
randomizing while the sure player strictly prefers conceding; and 3) the sure player strictly
prefers conceding and the unsure player strictly prefers staying. The expected concession
rate in the first (second) scenario is strictly higher (lower) than the expected concession rate
without learning.
A player’s strategy and the learning rate determine the expected concession rate of this
player, which affects his opponent’s equilibrium play. When the learning rate is sufficiently
high, the first scenario will happen initially but eventually the second scenario will happen.
Since the sure player always concedes (weakly) before the unsure player, the posterior belief
that a player is unsure is (weakly) increasing as no concession happens. This increases
delay since more weight has to be put on the second scenario, which has a lower expected
concession rate. Interestingly, my paper shows that learning might decrease delay if learning
did not change the weight because the expected concession rate is convex in posterior beliefs.
However, delay is always increasing if I take into account the increasing in posterior beliefs.
Although it is difficult to the derive the explicit expression of the expected equilibrium delay,
a lower bound can be derived assuming the players choose the highest concession rate in all of
the three scenarios. The paper shows that even this lower bound is higher than the expected
delay without learning.
This paper is closely related to literature on bargaining and delay. The classical complete
information bargaining game developed by Rubinstein (1982) has the feature that agreement
is reached immediately. Although delay is possible in some variations of the Rubinstein bar-
gaining framework (see e.g., Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and Merlo and Wilson (1995)), many
authors have focused on incomplete information as the prime cause of delay (Kennan and
Wilson (1993)). A non-exclusive list of sequential bargaining models with incomplete infor-
mation includes Abreu and Gul (2000), Admati and Perry (1987), Chatterjee and Samuelson
87
(1987) and Damiano, Li, and Suen (2010a,b). In many of the above papers, the concession
game structure is derived from a bargaining or political environment. In this paper, I as-
sume a concession game theoretical framework by writing down the payoff matrix directly.
Private learning generates multiple rational types on the equilibrium path. Compared to
the standard incomplete information war of attrition model with only one rational type, this
increases the difficulty of characterizing the equilibrium. Still, I am able to fully characterize
the unique sequential equilibrium under some parameter values.
There are also several papers considering how public learning affects delay in the com-
plete information Rubinstein bargaining framework. For example, Avery and Zemsky (1994)
consider a situation where the players are allowed to wait for new public information about
the size of the pie before accepting or rejecting an offer. In such an environment, the players
may exercise their option value of waiting, yielding long delays with positive probability.
In my model, learning is about player’s private payoff state. For each player, there is no
option value of waiting associated with learning since learning is a martingale process. The
key driving force is that private learning generates more asymmetric information. The in-
teraction between different private types leads to a longer delay. Yildiz (2004) considers a
model where learning might increase delay in a complete information sequential bargaining
model. However, to generate this result, the players have to be excessively optimistic about
their bargaining power. Also, in that model, learning may not increase delay under some
parameter values whereas in my model, learning always increases delay.
Recently, Kim and Xu (2011) also consider learning in war of attrition games. In their
paper, learning is about the common payoff state, while, in this paper, learning is about the
private payoff state. Both papers discuss the incentive of information acquisition. In Kim
and Xu (2011), information acquisition is modelled as revealing the common payoff state
immediately after paying a sunk cost. However, in this paper, information acquisition is
modelled as choosing the learning rate by paying a flow cost. I show that if the maximum
88
achievable learning rate is sufficiently low, then nobody has an incentive to acquire any
information in the unique sequential equilibrium.
The remainder of this paper organizes as follows. Section 3.2 presents the concession game
theoretical framework. Then Section 3.3 analyzes the benchmark model without learning
about private payoff states. Section 3.4 characterizes the equilibrium where there is learning
about private payoff states and compares the expected concessions with and without learning.
Section 3.5 extends the model to investigate endogenous information acquisition. Finally,
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Model Setting
Two risk-neutral players (i = 1, 2) are playing a continuous-time war of attrition game.
There is no discounting. At each point in time, both players have to choose simultaneously
between one of two actions: to stay (S) or to quit (Q). Each player is either a commitment
type or a normal type. The commitment type player will always choose to stay. For the
normal type players, if neither of the two players chooses to quit, the game continues and
each player has to incur a flow cost of c, which reflects the cost of delay. If at least one of
the players chooses to quit, the payoff matrix is specified as the following (player 1 is the
row player and player 2 is the column player):
S Q
S (-,-) (vH , v2)
Q (v1, vH) (M,M)
If player i stays while −i quits, then player i is the winner of the game and gets a winning
payoff of vH . If player i quits first, then he is the loser and gets a losing payoff vi. The payoff
when both players quit simultaneously is M . There is common knowledge about vH and
M < vH but there is incomplete information about losing payoffs v1 and v2.
In particular, I assume that v1 and v2 follow independent and identical binary distribu-
tions. vi can be either a positive number vL < vH or zero. Throughout the paper, I will
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maintain the assumption that vL ≤ 12vH . The reason for making this technical assumption is
to guarantee the equilibrium expected concession rate is monotonic over time. Each player i
initially does not know the exact value of vi. It is common knowledge that vi = vL happens
with prior p0. It is also common knowledge that a player is normal with probability γ0.
Remark 3.1. In the current model, the flow cost of delay is fixed. An alternative way
of modelling the cost of delay is to introduce discounting. However, discounting has an
undesirable feature if I maintain the same assumption on the losing payoff vi. In particular,
if the player i knows for sure that vi = 0, there will be no cost of delay and hence the
expected delay is infinity. To avoid this issue, I have to assume that vi can be either v¯L or
vL, where 0 < vL < v¯L < vH . Under that hypothesis, I conjecture that there is a unique
sequential equilibrium, and the equilibrium has the same qualitative feature as characterized
by Theorem 3.4.
3.3 Benchmark Case: No Learning
I will first discuss the case without learning as a benchmark. Without learning, each normal
player’s belief that v = vL will stay at p0. But there is incomplete information for each player
i, since he is unsure whether his opponent is a normal player. The key is to characterize how
a normal type player chooses a time path of conceding in the event that the other player has
not already conceded. In the future, I will refer to a normal type player whenever I use the
term “player.”
A strategy for normal player 1 (2) is denoted as X1(t) (X2(t)) where X i(t) denotes the
probability that player i concedes to player −i by time t (inclusive). X i(0) is allowed to be
strictly positive such that player i concedes to player −i immediately. I use F i(t) to denote
player −i’s expected probability that player i concedes to player −i by time t. Obviously,
F i(t) = γ0X
i(t). Therefore, I can use either F i(t) or X i(t) to denote player i’s strategy.
Given player 2’s strategy F 2, player 1’s expected payoff by conceding at time t is given by:
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U1(t, F 2) =
∫
s<t
(vH − cs)dF 2(s) + (M − ct)(F 2(t)− F 2(t−)) + (p0vL − ct)(1− F 2(t)).
Here F 2(t−) = limτ↗t F 2(τ). The expected payoff from never conceding is given by:
U1(∞, F 2) =
∫
s<∞
(vH − cs)dF 2(s).
Finally, define U1(F 1, F 2) to be player 1’s expected discounted value by playing the profile
(F 1, F 2). Formally, U1(F 1, F 2) can be written as:
U1(F 1, F 2) =
∫
t∈[0,∞]
U1(t, F 2)dX1(t) =
1
γ0
∫
t∈[0,∞]
U1(t, F 2)dF 1(t).
U2(F 1, F 2) can be defined similarly. A Nash equilibrium is defined as a profile of F =
(F 1, F 2) such that F i ∈ argmaxU i(·, F−i).
The set of sequential equilibria is characterized by the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1. Without learning, there exists a unique sequential equilibrium such that:
(1) each normal type player concedes at a positive rate between time 0 and T where
T = −(vH − p0vL) log(1− γ0)
c
.
After time T , only the commitment type player stays;
(2) for each player at time t ∈ [0, T ], the expected concession rate ft = dF (t)/dt1−F (t) is a
constant c
(vH−p0vL) ; the normal type player’s concession rate xt =
dX(t)/dt
1−X(t) satisfies:
xt[1− (1− γ0)e
ct
vH−p0vL ] =
c
(vH − p0vL) .
Sketch of the proof. The proof of the above proposition is similar to the proof of proposition
1 in Abreu and Gul (2000). In particular, the key features of the candidate equilibrium are
the same as those in Abreu and Gul (2000):
(1) A normal type player will not delay conceding once he knows that his opponent will
never concede.
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(2) F i is continuous and strictly increasing.
(3) At time 0, neither of the two players concedes with a positive probability.
(4) After time 0, each player is indifferent between conceding and staying for any t before
T .
The last property implies that the expected utility of a normal type player −i who
concedes at time t is the same as p0vL for all t ∈ [0, T ]:
p0vL =
∫ t
0
(vH − cs)dF i(s) + (p0vL − ct)(1− F i(t)).
As a result, F i(·) is differentiable and f it , dF
i(t)/dt
1−F i(t) satisfies:
(vH − p0vL)f it = c.
It is straightforward to see the expected concession rate f it =
c
(vH−p0vL) for i = 1, 2.
On the other hand, since F i(t) = γ0X
i(t), f it can be shown to be x
i
tγ
i
t, where x
i
t , dX
i(t)/dt
1−Xi(t)
is normal type player i’s concession rate at time t and γit denotes the posterior belief that
player i is normal given that player i does not concede until time t.
Obviously, the rate xit is chosen such that player i’s normal opponent is indifferent between
staying and quitting and hence
γitx
i
t =
c
vH − p0vL .
γit is updated by Bayes rule:
γit =
γ0 − F i(t)
1− F i(t)
and the law of motion for γit satisfies: γ˙
i
t = −xitγit(1−γit), which implies that beginning from
γ0, γ
1
t = γ
2
t = γt for all t such that
γ˙t = − c
vH − p0vL (1− γt).
The solution to the above differential equation is given by γt = 1 − (1 − γ0)e
ct
vH−p0vL . The
normal type players will concede for sure if γt reaches zero. Therefore, for the normal type
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players, the game will last for at most T = − (vH−p0vL) log(1−γ0)
c
length of time.2 
The expected delay is infinity since the commitment type players will always choose to
stay. However, the expected delay Ω conditional on at least one of the two players being
normal is finite.Conditional on at least one of the two players being normal, with probability
2γ0−2γ20
2γ0−γ20 , the conceding times follow a truncated exponential distribution
F (t) =
1− e− ctvH−p0vL
γ0
;
with probability
γ20
2γ0−γ20 , the conceding times follow the distribution
F˜ (t) = 1− (1− F (t))2.
Therefore, the expected delay Ω is given by:
Ω =
2γ0 − 2γ20
2γ0 − γ20
∫ T
0
tdF (t) +
γ20
2γ0 − γ20
∫ T
0
td[1− (1− F (t))2]
=
1
2γ0 − γ20
∫ T
0
td(1− e− 2ctvH−p0vL ) = vH − p0vL
c(2γ0 − γ20)
[
1
2
(1− (1− γ0)2) + log(1− γ0)(1− γ0)2].
As γ0 goes to one, the limiting equilibrium is the following equilibrium in the complete
information game: each player concedes with rate c
vH−p0vL , the maximum delay time is
infinity and the expected delay is vH−p0vL
2c
.
3.4 Learning
I introduce learning by assuming that after the game starts, as long as no player concedes,
each player receives an exogenous private signal that arrives according to a Poisson process.
The Poisson processes are independent across players. The arrival rate is λ if v = vL and
zero otherwise. Therefore, after receiving this signal, player i immediately believes with
2Compared to a complete information war of attrition game, the incomplete information setting sub-
stantially reduces the set of equilibria. In a complete information war of attrition, there always exists a
degenerate equilibrium where player i concedes immediately while player −i never concedes.
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probability one that v = vL. Absence of the signal will make the player more and more
pessimistic about the probability that v = vL. In this section, I will first solve a two-sided
learning model where both players have access to the above learning technology and then
solve a one-sided model where one of the two players is able to learn.
3.4.1 Two-Sided Learning
Compared to a model without learning, learning adds more uncertainty about each player’s
type. In particular, at any time t > 0, each normal type player may have different private
beliefs about his payoff state depending on the learning outcomes. If the player has received
at least one Poisson signal, he believes v = vL for sure. I call him a sure type player. If
the player has not received any Poisson signal, his posterior belief about v = vL becomes
pt =
p0e−λt
p0e−λt+1−p0 . I call him a learning type player. I will use γ
i
t (β
i
t) to denote the posterior
belief that player i is a learning (sure) type at time t given he has not conceded by time t.
Obviously, γi0 = γ0 and β
i
0 = 0.
A strategy for the learning type player 1 (2) is denoted as X1(t) (X2(t)) where X i(t)
denotes the probability that player i concedes to player −i by time t (inclusive). A strategy
for the sure type player 1 (2) is denoted asX1(t; τ) (X2(t; τ)) where τ ≤ t is the time when the
first Poisson signal is received.3 Both X i(0) and X i(τ ; τ) are allowed to be strictly positive
such that player i concedes to player −i immediately. I use Y i to denote the combination of
sure players’ strategies: Y i(t) = (X i(t; τ))τ≤t; and Zi to denote the overall strategy of player
i: Zi = (X i(·), Y i(·)). Zi determines F i(t), which is player −i’s expected probability that
player i concedes to player −i by time t. Given player 2’s strategy Z2 and F 2 induced by
Z2, a normal player 1’s expected payoff by conceding at time t (if player 1 is still learning
at time t) is given by:
3There is a continuum of sure type players that is indexed by the arrival time of the first Poisson signal.
The sure type players are not required to use the same strategy at any time t. There might be a continuum
of equilibria by assigning different sure type players different concession rates. However, all of the equilibria
are outcome equivalent in terms of the expected concession rate.
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U1(t, Z1, Z2) =
∫
s<t
(vH − cs)(p0e−λs + 1− p0)dF 2(s)
+
∫
s<t
p0λe
−λs(1− F 2(s))(W 1(Z1, Z2; s)− cs)ds
+ (M − ct)(F 2(t)− F 2(t−)) + (ptvL − ct)(p0e−λt + 1− p0)(1− F 2(t)).
Here F 2(t−) = limτ↗t F 2(τ) and W 1(Z1, Z2; s) denote the expected discounted value for
player 1 who becomes sure at time s under the strategy profile (Z1, Z2).
Given F i and player i has not conceded by time t, I can use F i(s|t) to denote the truncated
probability of conceding after time t. The expected payoff for player 1 who is sure at time
τ and concedes at time t is given by:
W 1(t, Z2; τ) =
∫
τ≤s<t
(vH − c(s− τ))dF 2(s|τ) + (M − c(t− τ))(F 2(t|τ)− F 2(t− |τ))
+ (vL − c(t− τ))(1− F 2(t|τ)).
Similarly, the expected payoff for player 1 who is still learning at time τ and concedes at
time t (if player 1 is still learning at time t) is given by:
U1(t, Z1, Z2; τ) =
∫
τ≤s<t
(vH − c(s− τ))(pτe−λ(s−τ) + 1− pτ )dF 2(s|τ)
+
∫
τ≤s<t
pτλe
−λ(s−τ)(1− F 2(s|τ))(W 1(Z1, Z2; s)− c(s− τ))ds
+ (M − c(t− τ))(F 2(t|τ)−F 2(t−|τ)) + (ptvL− c(t− τ))(pτe−λ(t−τ) + 1− pτ )(1−F 2(t|τ)).
Finally, define U1(Z1, Z2; τ) (W 1(Z1, Z2; τ)) to be the learning (sure) type player 1’s
expected discounted value by playing the profile (Z1, Z2) after τ . Formally, U1(Z1, Z2; τ)
and W 1(Z1, Z2; τ) can be written as:
U1(Z1, Z2; τ) =
∫
t∈[τ,∞]
U1(t, Z1, Z2; τ)dX1(t|τ)
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and
W 1(Z1, Z2; τ) =
∫
t∈[τ,∞]
W 1(t, Z2; τ)dX1(t; τ).
U2(Z1, Z2; τ) and W 2(Z1, Z2; τ) can be defined similarly. A strategy profile (Z1, Z2) is a
sequential equilibrium if both U i(·, Z−i; τ) and W i(·, Z−i; τ) are maximized at any time τ
when nobody has conceded yet.
Any candidate sequential equilibrium shares the following key features of the equilibrium
without learning:
(1) A rational player will not delay conceding once he knows that his opponent will never
concede.
(2) F i (the expected distribution by i’s opponent) is continuous and strictly increasing
for 0 < t ≤ T i, where T i is the terminal time at which a normal type player i will concede
for sure.
(3) At time 0, at most one of the two players will concede with a positive probability.
The first property means that a normal player will not delay conceding once he knows
that his opponent will never concede. The most important property is the second one, which
means that F i(t) cannot have jumps or be constant in a time interval. Also the second
property implies that expected values U1(t, F 2; τ) and W 1(t, F 2; τ) are continuous.
The proofs of the above properties are similar to the proofs provided in Abreu and Gul
(2000) and hence are omitted. For both the sure and learning type players, there are three
possibilities: strictly prefer conceding, strictly prefer staying, or indifference. There are nine
different combinations in total. The next lemma shows that only three of them can happen
in any equilibrium.
Lemma 3.1. In any sequential equilibrium, at any time t such that a normal player is still
possible to concede, only one of the following three cases is possible:
(1) the learning type is indifferent between conceding and staying and the sure type strictly
prefers conceding;
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(2) the sure type is indifferent between conceding and staying and the learning type strictly
prefers staying;
(3) the sure type strictly prefers conceding but the learning type strictly prefers staying.
Proof. First, I will show that the sure type player can never strictly prefer staying in any
candidate equilibrium. Suppose on the contrary that there exists a time interval (t1, t2)
such that the sure type player 1 strictly prefers staying for any t ∈ (t1, t2). Define t? to be
the supremum of t such that player 1 strictly prefers staying for (t1, t). t
? must be finite
since there is a strictly positive probability for player 2 to stay forever. This implies that
there exists η¯ > 0 such that for all η < η¯, W 1(t, F 2; τ) > vL for any t ∈ (t?, t? + η) and
τ ∈ (t? − η, t?). From the expression of W 1(t, Z2; τ), it must be:
W 1(t, Z2; τ) =
∫
τ≤s<t
(vH − c(s− τ))dF 2(s|τ) + (vL − c(t− τ))(1− F 2(t|τ)) > vL.
For the learning type player, if he chooses to concede at time t regardless of whether he
receives a signal, the expected payoff can be written as:
U1(t, Z2; τ) =
∫
τ≤s<t
(vH − c(s− τ))dF 2(s|τ) + (vL − c(t− τ))(1− F 2(t|τ))
= pτW
1(t, Z2; τ) + (1− pτ )(
∫
τ≤s<t
(vH − c(s− τ))dF 2(s|τ)− c(t− τ)(1− F 2(t|τ))). (3.1)
The second term is strictly positive since W 1(t, Z2; τ) > vL. Therefore, it must be the case
that U1(t, Z2; τ) > pτW
1(t, Z2; τ) > pτvL. This implies that the learning type player also
prefers staying in a neighborhood left of t?. Then F 1 must be flat in a neighborhood left of
t?, which contradicts the second property.
Also, the learning type player cannot strictly prefer conceding at any time τ . Suppose
not and the learning type player strictly prefers conceding for t ∈ (τ, t¯). Then the sure type
player has to randomize for t ∈ (τ, t¯). The expected payoff for a learning type player who
concedes at t hence is given by:
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U1(t, Z2; τ) =
∫
τ≤s<t
(vH − c(s − τ))dF 2(s|τ) + (pτvL − c(t − τ))(1 − F 2(t|τ)).
Equation (3.1) immediately implies that if U1(t, Z2; τ) < pτvL, then W
1(t, Z2; τ) < vL,
which contradicts the fact that the sure type is indifferent at time t.
The above analysis leaves only three possibilities on the equilibrium path, which are listed
in the lemma.
The above lemma has very intuitive interpretations. Since the sure type player is more
optimistic about the private payoff state than the learning type, the sure type has a higher
incentive to concede. As a result, if the learning type is indifferent between conceding and
staying, the sure type must strictly prefer conceding; if the sure type is indifferent between
conceding and staying, the learning type must strictly prefer staying. In the benchmark
model without learning, the normal type must always be indifferent between conceding and
staying. Here, it is possible that neither the learning type nor the sure type is indifferent.
If the sure or learning type player −i is indifferent between conceding and staying at
time t, then F i must be differentiable at time t. In particular, the expected concession rate
f it =
dF i(t)/dt
1−F i(t) must be
c
vH−vL if the sure type player −i is indifferent and be cvH−ptvL if the
learning type player −i is indifferent. If the expected concession rate is between those two
numbers, then the sure type player −i strictly prefers conceding while the learning type
player −i strictly prefers staying. Therefore, the expected equilibrium concession rate must
be between c
vH−ptvL and
c
vH−vL . Finally, if the normal type player −i does the above, then
F−i is also differentiable such that the expected concession rate is λγtpt.
Slow Learning Case
Based on the previous lemma, I am able to show that in any sequential equilibrium with
learning, there will be some periods of time such that the equilibrium concession rate in
those periods is lower than the equilibrium concession rate without learning.
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Lemma 3.2. Fix any sequential equilibrium with learning. There exists T < ∞ such that
normal players concede with probability one by time T . Also there exists  > 0 such that for
all t ∈ (T − , T ], the expected equilibrium concession rate ft = dF (t)/dt1−F (t) is
c(1− p0 + p0e−λt)
vH(1− p0 + p0e−λt)− p0e−λtvL .
.
Proof. Suppose T is infinite. Then, with a positive probability, the normal type player has
to stay forever and get a payoff of −∞. This cannot be optimal. Therefore, T must be finite.
Also T cannot be zero. If not, then both normal type players concede with probability one.
This contradicts the third property of the sequential equilibrium. For T > 0, suppose the
statement is not true and there exists t1 < T such that the expected equilibrium concession
rate is strictly larger than
c(1− p0 + p0e−λt)
vH(1− p0 + p0e−λt)− p0e−λtvL
for all t ∈ (t1, T ]. Notice that it is impossible for the learning type to concede with probability
one by time t1. This implies that the posterior belief γt1 must be strictly positive. However,
if the expected equilibrium concession rate is strictly larger than
c(1− p0 + p0e−λt)
vH(1− p0 + p0e−λt)− p0e−λtvL
for all t ∈ (t1, T ], the learning type strictly prefers to stay. As a result, γT > 0 as well. But
since the normal type players stop waiting at T , there must be a jump in F at time T , which
leads to a contradiction.
The above lemma implies that with exogenous learning, there always exist some periods
such that the expected equilibrium concession rate is c
vH−ptvL . When the learning rate is low,
the following theorem shows that this is always the case for the unique sequential equilibrium.
Theorem 3.1. If λγ0p0 ≤ cvH−p0vL , there exists a unique sequential equilibrium such that:
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(1) each learning type player concedes with probability zero at time 0 and at a positive
rate between time 0 and T . The sure type player concedes with probability one upon receiving
the first Poisson signal;
(2) T satisfies:
γ0 = 1− e−
cT
vH
[
vH − p0vL
(vH − vL)p0e−λT + (1− p0)vH
]− cvL
λvH (vH−vL)
.
After time T , only the commitment type player stays;
(3) for each player at time t ∈ [0, T ] , the expected concession rate ft = dF (t)/dt1−F (t) is
c(1− p0 + p0e−λt)
vH(1− p0 + p0e−λt)− p0e−λtvL .
Proof. First, notice that at the beginning of the game, if only the sure type concedes with
probability one, the expected concession rate is no more than λγ0p0.
4 The assumption
that λγ0p0 ≤ cvH−p0vL implies that if only the sure type concedes, the expected concession
rate is lower than the minimum requirement of the equilibrium concession rate, which is
c
vH−p0vL . Therefore, in any candidate sequential equilibrium, it must be the case that the
sure type concedes immediately and the learning type randomizes at the beginning of the
game. Suppose the sure type continues to concede with probability one until time τ . Then
at time τ , the posterior beliefs are such that βτ = 0 and γτ < γ0.
If the learning type player stops randomizing at time τ , it must be case that at time τ ,
λγτpτ ≥ cvH−pτvL . However, for any t < τ , the law of motion for γtpt(vH − ptvL) satisfies:
dγtpt(vH − ptvL)
dt
= γ˙tpt(vH − ptvL)− γtλpt(1− pt)(vH − 2ptvL).
The first term is negative since γ˙t < 0 and the second term is negative because vH ≥ 2vL.
As a result, γtpt(vH − ptvL) is strictly decreasing over time. There cannot exist any τ such
4If the learning type player concedes with probability zero at time zero, λγ0p0 is exactly the expected
concession rate. But if the learning type player concedes with a strictly positive probability at time zero,
the expected concession rate is less than λγ0p0 since the posterior is less than γ0.
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that λγτpτ ≥ cvH−pτvL . Therefore, on the equilibrium path, the learning type is always
randomizing between time 0 and T .
Denote xt to be the equilibrium concession rate of the learning type. The indifference
condition implies that:
(γtxt + γtλpt + λpt)ptvL = −c+ γtxtvH + γtλptvH + λptvL − λpt(1− pt)vL.
Also γt is updated by Bayes rule:
γ˙t = −(λpt + xt)γt(1− γt).
As a result, it is straightforward to derive an ODE about γt and solve γt as:
1− γ0
1− γt = e
− ct
vH
[
vH − p0vL
(vH − vL)p0e−λt + (1− p0)vH
]− cvL
λvH (vH−vL)
.
T is chosen such that γT = 0 and hence T satisfies:
γ0 = 1− e−
cT
vH
[
vH − p0vL
(vH − vL)p0e−λT + (1− p0)vH
]− cvL
λvH (vH−vL)
.
The above calculation also suggests that it is impossible to have a learning type player
conceding with strictly positive probability at time zero. If player i does that, then to
guarantee that both normal players stop conceding at the same T , it must be the case that
the learning type player −i also concedes with a strictly positive probability at time zero.
This contradicts the third property of the candidate equilibrium.
The expected equilibrium concession rate is changing over time, which is different from
the model without learning. In particular, it is relatively easier to reach an agreement
initially but it becomes more and more difficult over time. Since pt < p0 for all t > 0, it is
trivial to observe:
Corollary 3.1. If λγ0p0 ≤ cvH−p0vL , compared to a model without learning, the exogenous
learning increases the expected time of delay.
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The result is quite surprising in the sense that on the equilibrium path, the sure player
who receives a Poisson signal will concede immediately. Then it seems that the exogenous
learning should facilitate agreement. However, this intuitive thinking ignores the strategic
response of the rational players. Learning as a martingale process can make the rational
player both more and less optimistic about his private payoff state. The more optimistic
player is more willing to concede, while the less optimistic player becomes less willing to
concede. If the learning rate is low, the expected equilibrium concession rate is to make the
less optimistic rational player indifferent. This implies that the rational players will overreact
to this exogenous learning process and cause a longer delay.
Intermediate Learning Case
Exogenous learning increases delay when the learning rate is low. However, if λ is sufficiently
large, the strategy profile described above is no longer an equilibrium. This is because if it is
still an equilibrium for the sure player to concede immediately, then the expected concession
rate is very high when λ is large. As a result, the learning type player can never be indifferent.
In this section, I will construct an equilibrium when the learning rate is intermediate.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose λγ0p0 ∈ ( cvH−p0vL , cvH−vL ), and the unique sequential equilibrium has
the following feature: there exists T1 < T2 such that for t ∈ (0, T1), each learning type player
concedes with probability zero and the sure type player concedes with probability one upon
receiving the first Poisson signal; for t ∈ (T1, T2), the sure type player still concedes with
probability one upon receiving the first Poisson signal and the learning type player concedes
at a positive rate.
Proof. If no player concedes with strictly positive probability at time 0, it must be the case
that the learning type player strictly prefers staying while the sure type player strictly prefers
conceding since λγ0p0 ∈ ( cvH−p0vL , cvH−vL ). As shown in the proof of the previous theorem,
γtpt(vH − ptvL) is strictly decreasing over time under the assumption vH ≥ 2vL. It is trivial
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to notice that γtpt is also strictly decreasing over time. Therefore, there exists T1 such that
λγT1pT1 =
c
vH−pT1vL
. For t < T1, λγtpt ∈ ( cvH−ptvL , cvH−vL ) and hence the learning type player
strictly prefers staying while the sure type player strictly prefers conceding. For t > T1,
λγtpt <
c
vH−ptvL and the equilibrium is characterized by the previous theorem.
The final thing to prove is that it cannot be the case that a normal player concedes with
a strictly positive probability at time 0. Suppose on the contrary that is the case. Player 1
concedes with a positive probability at time 0. Then this implies that player 2’s strategy is
such that the learning type of player is indifferent. This can only happen if the sure type of
player 2 is randomizing at time 0 since λγ0p0 >
c
vH−p0vL . However, it is impossible for player
1 to find a strategy such that the sure type of player 2 is indifferent since λγ0p0 <
c
vH−vL .
This leads to a contradiction.
When the learning rate is in the intermediate region, the sure type players will concede
for sure once they receive the Poisson signal. The learning type players will strictly prefer
staying initially and begin to concede after some period. It is hard to tell directly whether
delay increases compared to a model without learning. For t ∈ (0, T1), it is possible that the
expected concession rate is strictly larger than c
vH−p0vL if λ is sufficiently large. However, for
t > T1, the expected concession rate is strictly lower than
c
vH−p0vL .
Also in the intermediate learning case, the impact of the learning rate on delay is ambigu-
ous. When the sure player strictly prefers conceding and the learning type player strictly
prefers staying, a larger λ increases the expected concession rate λγtpt. However, when the
learning type player is randomizing, a larger λ leads to a lower expected concession rate.
Fast Learning Case
If λγ0p0 >
c
vH−p0vL , then the learning type players randomize at the beginning of the game.
The unique sequential equilibrium in this fast learning case may have two different possibil-
ities. In the first possible equilibrium, there exists T1 < T2 < T3 such that for t ∈ (0, T1),
each learning type player concedes with probability zero while the sure type player concedes
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with a strictly positive probability upon receiving the first Poisson signal and with a positive
rate afterwards; for t ∈ (T1, T2), each learning type player concedes with probability zero
while the sure type player concedes with probability one upon receiving the first Poisson
signal; for t ∈ (T2, T3), each learning type player concedes with a positive rate while the
sure type player still concedes with probability one upon receiving the first Poisson signal.
In the second possible equilibrium,there exists T1 < T2 such that for t ∈ (0, T1), each learn-
ing type player concedes with probability zero while the sure type player concedes with a
strictly positive probability upon receiving the first Poisson signal and with a positive rate
afterwards; for t ∈ (T1, T2), the learning type player concedes at a positive rate while the
sure type player concedes with probability one upon receiving the first Poisson signal.
Notice that at time t such that λγtpt =
c
vH−ptvL , the sure type players cannot switch
to strictly prefer conceding immediately. This is because there is a positive probability to
be a sure type player at time t and the distribution F i cannot have jumps. The sure type
players will continue to randomize until the posterior belief to be a sure type player reaches
zero. There are two possibilities at this point in time t′. In particular, it might be the case
that λγt′pt′ <
c
vH−pt′vL and hence the equilibrium immediately jumps to the phase where the
learning type player is randomizing.
In both types of equilibria, the expected concession rate initially is c
vH−vL , which is higher
than the expected concession rate c
vH−p0vL without learning. But eventually, the expected
concession rate will drop to c
vH−ptvL . The explicit expression for expected delay is hard
to derive since the expected concession rate is changing over time. However, I can fully
characterize the expected delay in the limiting case where λ = ∞. λ = ∞ corresponds
to the immediate revelation case, where the normal type player i starts with two possible
private types: either vi = vL or vi = 0. Each player i knows exactly what vi is but his
opponent does not know. The initial beliefs are such that vi = vL with probability γ0p0 and
vi = 0 with probability γ0(1 − p0). The next result shows that in this limiting case, the
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expected delay is longer than in the case without learning.
Theorem 3.3. Fix any pair (γ0, p0) ∈ (0, 1)2, if λ = ∞, conditional on at least one of the
two players being normal, the longest delay is higher than the longest delay without learning
and the expected delay is longer than the expected delay without learning.
Proof. The prior beliefs are such that vi = vL with probability γ0p0 and vi = 0 with prob-
ability γ0(1− p0). The unique sequential equilibrium has the following feature: the normal
type players with vi = vL will randomize first and the vi = 0 players will strictly prefer to
stay. After some time T1, the vi = vL players concede with probability one and then the
vi = 0 players begin to randomize for T2 length of time. The expected concession rate is
c
vH−vL before T1and
c
vH
after T1.
Notice that if no concession takes place before T1, the posterior beliefs are such that with
probability γ0(1−p0)
1−γ0p0 > γ0(1− p0), each player is normal. The longest delay is:
T∞ = T1 + T2 = −(vH − vL) log(1− γ0p0)
c
− vH log
1−γ0
1−γ0p0
c
.
The longest delay without learning is T = − (vH−p0vL) log(1−γ0)
c
. Obviously, T∞ > T since
log(1− γ0p0) > p0 log(1− γ0).
For the expected delay, I have to consider two different cases. Conditional on one of
the two players being normal, with probability (2−γ0p0)p0
2−γ0 , at least one of the two players has
vi = vL; with probability
2γ0(1−γ0)(1−p0)+γ20(1−p0)2
2γ0−γ20 , neither of the two players have vi = vL but
at least one has vi = 0.
The expected delay is given by:
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Ω∞ =
2(1− γ0p0)γ0p0
2γ0 − γ20
∫ T1
0
td
1− e− ctvH−vL
γ0p0
+
γ20p
2
0
2γ0 − γ20
∫ T1
0
td
[
1− (1− 1− e
− ct
vH−vL
γ0p0
)2
]
+
2γ0(1− γ0)(1− p0) + γ20(1− p0)2
2γ0 − γ20
T1 +
2γ0(1− γ0)(1− p0)
2γ0 − γ20
∫ T2
0
td
(1− γ0p0)(1− e−
ct
vH )
γ0(1− p0)
+
γ20(1− p0)2
2γ0 − γ20
∫ T2
0
td
[
1− (1− (1− γ0p0)(1− e
− ct
vH )
γ0(1− p0) )
2
]
.
The above expression can be simplified as:
Ω∞ =
vH − vL
c(2γ0 − γ20)
[
1
2
(1− (1− γ0p0)2) + log(1− γ0p0)(1− γ0)2]
+
vH
c(2γ0 − γ20)
[
1
2
((1− γ0p0)2 − (1− γ0)2) + log 1− γ0
1− γ0p0 (1− γ0p0)
2]. (3.2)
The expected delay without learning is:
Ω =
vH − p0vL
c(2γ0 − γ20)
[
1
2
(1− (1− γ0)2) + log(1− γ0)(1− γ0)2]. (3.3)
It is straightforward to observe that for any fixed γ0 > 0, Ω is linear in p0 while Ω
∞ is
concave in p0. Ω and Ω
∞ coincide when p0 is either 0 or 1. Therefore, Ω∞ > Ω for any pair
(γ0, p0) ∈ (0, 1)2.
Since c
vH−pvL is convex in p: p
c
vH−vL + (1 − p) cvH > cvH−pvL , it seems that the expected
concession rate is higher if we can fully separate the vi = vL and vi = 0 players. Then
intuitively, letting λ = ∞ will increase the expected concession rate and hence decrease
delay. The intuition is wrong because it ignores another channel affecting delay. Since in
equilibrium, the more optimistic player always concedes first, at the time when the vi = vL
players concede with probability one, the posterior belief that vi = 0 increases from γ0(1−p0)
to γ0(1−p0)
1−γ0p0 . This increase in the posterior also leads to a longer delay. If the players think
naively and do not update beliefs at time T1 (i.e., at t = T1, γt = γ0(1 − p0)), the longest
delay
T˜∞ = T1 + T2 = −(vH − vL) log(1− γ0p0)
c
− vH log(1− γ0(1− p0))
c
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is lower than the longest delay without learning.
In summary, compared to a model without learning, there are three factors affecting
delay in the limiting case of λ = ∞. First, the expected concession rate before T1 is higher
than the expected concession rate without learning, which leads to a shorter delay. Second,
the expected concession rate after T1 is lower than the expected concession rate without
learning, which leads to a longer delay. Third, since the more optimistic (vi = vL) players
concede first, the posterior belief that a player is less optimistic (vi = 0) is increasing over
time. The last effect implies that more weight has to be put on the lower expected concession
rate, which also increases delay. The above analysis shows that the first effect dominates the
second effect but is dominated by the combination of the second and third effects. Hence,
the change of posterior beliefs is an important driving force leading to a longer delay.
For an arbitrary learning rate, it is hard to get an explicit solution for the longest delay
and expected delay. But the idea of the above proof can be generalized to get a lower bound
on expected delay. The next result shows that even this lower bound is longer than the
expected delay without learning.
Theorem 3.4. Fix any pair (γ0, p0) ∈ (0, 1)2 and any learning rate λ, conditional on at least
one of the two players being normal, the longest delay with learning is higher than the longest
delay without learning and the expected delay with learning is longer than the expected delay
without learning.
Proof. Suppose the learning type players begin to concede at time t. Before time t, only
the sure type players concede. The probability of conceding before time t is x. Feasibility
requires that x ∈ [0, γ0p0]. This implies that at time t, the posterior beliefs are such that:
pt =
γ0p0−x
γ0−x and γt =
γ0−x
1−x . Before time t, an upper bound for the concession rate is
c
vH−vL ;
after time t, an upper bound for the concession rate is c
vH−ptvL . Therefore, a lower bound on
the longest delay is given by:
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Tˆ = −(vH − vL) log(1− x)
c
− (vH −
γ0p0−x
γ0−x vL) log
1−γ0
1−x
c
=
−vH log(1− γ0)
c
+
vL log(1− x)
c
+
γ0p0−x
γ0−x vL log
1−γ0
1−x
c
. (3.4)
The longest delay when there is no learning is T = − (vH−p0vL) log(1−γ0)
c
. The difference
Tˆ − T is proportional to ∆(x) = γ0 log(1 − x) − x log(1 − γ0). The first derivative of ∆(x)
is −γ0
1−x − log(1 − γ0), which is decreasing in x. It is trivial to observe that ∆′(0) > 0 but
∆′(x) could be negative if x is sufficiently large. ∆(x) possibly first increases in x and then
decreases in x. Since ∆(0) = 0 and ∆(γ0p0) > 0, it must be the case that ∆(x) ≥ 0 for all
x ∈ [0, γ0p0]. Therefore, Tˆ ≥ T for sure.
Similarly, a lower bound on the expected delay is given by:
Ωˆ(x) =
vH − vL
c(2γ0 − γ20)
[
1
2
(1− (1− x)2) + log(1− x)(1− γ0)2]
+
vH − γ0p0−xγ0−x vL
c(2γ0 − γ20)
[
1
2
((1− x)2 − (1− γ0)2) + log 1− γ0
1− x (1− x)
2]. (3.5)
Notice that the first derivative of Ωˆ is given by:
Ωˆ′(x) =
vH − vL
c(2γ0 − γ20)
[1− x− (1− γ0)
2
1− x ]
+
γ0(1− p0)vL
c(2γ0 − γ20)
[
1
2
((1− x)2 − (1− γ0)2) + log 1− γ0
1− x (1− x)
2]
+
vH − γ0p0−xγ0−x vL
c(2γ0 − γ20)
2(1− x) log 1− x
1− γ0 . (3.6)
On the RHS of the above equation, the second term is positive for sure. The first and third
terms are positive because x ≤ γ0p0. Therefore, Ωˆ(x) is increasing in x. And the expected
delay when there is no learning is
Ω =
vH − p0vL
c(2γ0 − γ20)
[
1
2
(1− (1− γ0)2) + log(1− γ0)(1− γ0)2].
Obviously, Ωˆ(0) = Ω. Then it must be the case that Ωˆ(x) ≥ Ω for all x ∈ [0, γ0p0].
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The basic idea of the above proof is that in any equilibrium, it is possible to divide
the equilibrium into two phases. In the first phase, the learning type players strictly prefer
staying; in the second phase, the learning type players is randomizing. The concession rate
in the first phase may be as high as c
vH−vL . But compared to a model without learning, it is
more difficult to reach an agreement in the second phase. Delay increases from two possible
channels. One is the Bayesian updating process which increases the posterior belief of being a
learning type; the other is the equilibrium concession rate becomes c
vH−ptvL . The combination
of these two effects in the second phase will completely offset the possible decrease in delay
in the first phase.5 As a result, the expected delay will always be increasing instead of
decreasing.
3.4.2 One-Sided Learning
Another interesting situation is one which only player 1 is able to learn. Player 2 has no
access to the exogenous learning process. Then, at any time t, player 1 has three possible
types: a sure type who is sure that v = vL, a learning type who is still unsure and a
commitment type. I use γ1t to denote the posterior belief that player 1 is a learning type,
β1t to denote the posterior belief that player 1 is a rational type, pt to denote player 1’s
posterior belief that v = vL given he is a sure type at time t and finally γ2t to denote the
belief that player 2 is a normal type.
The next result shows that conditional on at least one of the two players being normal,
the one-sided learning model has the same longest delay as the model without learning.
Theorem 3.5. In the one-sided learning model, conditional on at least one of the two players
being normal, the longest delay is always T = − (vH−p0vL) log(1−γ0)
c
.
5The change in posterior beliefs also plays an important role here. If the players update beliefs naively,
then the lower bound on longest delay with learning is
T˜ = − (vH − vL) log(1− x)
c
−
(vH − γ0p0−xγ0−x vL) log(1− γ0 + x)
c
,
which could be less than the longest delay without learning for x close to γ0p0.
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Proof. To prove the theorem, I need to consider two separate cases λγ0p0 ≤ cvH−p0vL and
λγ0p0 >
c
vH−p0vL . The unique sequential equilibrium when λγ0p0 ≤ cvH−p0vL is characterized
by the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. If λγ0p0 ≤ cvH−p0vL , there exists a unique sequential equilibrium in the
one-sided learning model satisfying:
(1) for player 1, the learning type concedes with probability zero at time 0 and at a positive
rate between time 0 and T ; the sure type player concedes with probability one upon receiving
the first Poisson signal;
(2) the normal type player 2 concedes with strictly positive probability at time 0 and at a
positive rate between time 0 and T ;
(3) T = − (vH−p0vL) log(1−γ0)
c
and after time T , only the commitment type player stays;
(4) at time t ∈ (0, T ] , player 1’s expected concession rate is c
vH−p0vL and player 2’s
expected concession rate is
c(1− p0 + p0e−λt)
vH(1− p0 + p0e−λt)− p0e−λtvL .
Proof. The proof of the equilibrium properties is very similar to the proof in the two-sided
learning model and is omitted. The assumption that λγ0p0 ≤ cvH−p0vL guarantees that the
learning type player 1 must randomize and the sure type player 1 must concede immediately
in equilibrium. Therefore, denote x1t (x2t) to be the equilibrium concession rate of the
learning type player 1 (normal type player 2). The indifference conditions imply:
(γ2tx2t + λpt)ptvL = −c+ γ2tx2tvH + λptvL − λpt(1− pt)vL.
and
(γ1tx1t + γ1tλpt)p0vL = −c+ γ1tx1tvH + γ1tλptvH .
γ1t and γ2t evolve as:
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γ˙1t = −(λpt + x1t)γ1t(1− γ1t) and γ˙2t = −x2tγ2t(1− γ2t).
Therefore, we have:
γ˙1t = − c
vH − p0vL (1− γ1t) and γ˙2t = −
c
vH − ptvL (1− γ2t).
Since pt =
p0e−λt
p0e−λt+1−p0 < p0, the expected concession rate of player 2 is smaller than the
expected concession rate of player 1. Also the learning type of player 1 and the normal type
of player 2 have to stop conceding at the same time T . As a result, the normal type of player
2 has to concede with a strictly positive probability at time 0.
T is determined by the shortest time of concession T = − (vH−p0vL) log(1−γ0)
c
and γ2t satis-
fies:
1− γ′0
1− γ2t = e
− ct
vH
[
vH − p0vL
(vH − vL)p0e−λt + (1− p0)vH
]− cvL
λvH (vH−vL)
.
At time 0, the probability of concession by the normal type of player 2 is chosen such that:
γ′0 = 1− e−
cT
vH
[
vH − p0vL
(vH − vL)p0e−λT + (1− p0)vH
]− cvL
λvH (vH−vL)
.
If λγ0p0 ≤ cvH−p0vL , then initially the sure type of player 1 will randomize such that the
expected concession rate is always c
vH−p0vL . Then at time 0, it is impossible for player 1 to
concede with a positive probability. Next, I will show that there cannot exist two disjoint
time intervals (t0, t1) and (t2, t3) such that the sure type is indifferent on both intervals and
strictly prefers conceding for t ∈ (t1, t2). If there exists such an equilibrium, at t2, it must
be the case that: λγt2pt2 ≥ cvH−p0vL . Since γt1pt1 > γt2pt2 , λγt1pt1 > cvH−p0vL . Therefore, if
a sure type player concedes with probability one at t1, his normal opponent must stay for
sure, which leads to a contradiction. Therefore, on the equilibrium path, the sure type will
first randomize until T1 and the learning type randomizes afterwards.
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At t < T1, denote γt to be the belief that player 1 is a learning type at time t and βt
to be the belief that a player is a sure type at time t. Suppose the existing sure type has a
concession rate of xt and a new sure type will concede with probability yt. The indifference
of player 2 means that:
(βtxt + γtλptyt)p0vL = −c+ (βtxt + γtλptyt)vH .
The laws of motion for βt and γt are such that:
β˙t = −xtβt(1− βt)− γtλptyt(1− βt) + γtλpt
and
γ˙t = −γtλpt + γt(βtxt + γtλptyt).
The above equations imply that:
β˙t + γ˙t = − c
vH − p0vL (1− βt − γt)
and hence
βt + γt = 1− (1− γ0)e
c
vH−p0vL .
Notice for t ≥ T1, βt = 0 and the expected concession rate for the learning type of player
is also c
vH−p0vL . Therefore, beginning from β0 + γ0 = γ0, βt + γt satisfies:
βt + γt = 1− (1− γ0)e
c
vH−p0vL
for all t ≥ 0. There is also no discontinuity in βt + γt for any t > 0. As a result, it must be
the case that T = − (vH−p0vL) log(1−γ0)
c
.
The above result implies that allowing only one player to learn is better than allowing both
players to learn in terms of delay regardless of what the initial parameters are. Compared to
a model without learning, one-sided learning does not increase the longest time of waiting if
either player 1 or player 2 is normal. In particular, the expected equilibrium concession rate
of player 1 is exactly the same as the case without learning.
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3.5 Endogenous Information Acquisition
This section briefly discusses the implications of the above results on endogenous information
acquisition. In particular, following the setup in Bonatti and Ho¨rner (2009), I assume that
a player can achieve arrival rate λ with flow cost c(λ) with c(0) = 0 and c′(·) > 0. The
information acquisition decision is made at every instant of time given there is no concession
by time t. Formally, normal player i’s information acquisition decision is denoted as ci :
[0,∞) × {0, 1} → [0, λ¯]. 0 means player i has not yet received any Poisson signal, and 1
means player i has received at least one signal. Obviously, if player i has received one signal
at time τ , then cit = 0 for all t ≥ τ . λ¯ is the maximum achievable learning rate. Given the
information acquisition strategy, the total cost of information acquisition from time 0 to t is
given by Ci(t) =
∫ t
0
e−rscisdt. Also define Λ
i(t) =
∫ t
0
λisdt.
Given player 2’s strategy Z2, a normal player 1’s expected payoff by conceding at time t
is given by:
U1(t, Z1, Z2) =
∫
s<t
(vH − cs− C1(s))(p0e−Λ1(s) + 1− p0)dF 2(s)
+
∫
s<t
(W 1(Z1, Z2; s)− cs− C1(s))p0λ1se−Λ
1(s)(1− F 2(s))ds
+ (M − ct− C1(t))(F 2(t)− F 2(t−))
+ (1− F 2(t))(ptvL − ct− C1(t))(p0e−Λ1(t) + 1− p0).
Player 2’s expected payoff can be defined similarly.
The paper shows that when the maximum achievable learning rate is not high enough, the
unique sequential equilibrium is such that no player acquires information on the equilibrium
path. Then the unique sequential equilibrium is the same as the equilibrium in the no
learning case.
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Proposition 3.3. If the maximum achievable learning rate λ¯ satisfies:
λ¯ ≤ c
γ0p0(vH − p0vL) ,
then the unique sequential equilibrium is such that each player chooses λit = 0 almost every-
where.
Proof. Suppose the statement is not true. Then there exists a time interval [t1, t2] such that
at least of one the two normal type players begins to acquire information at time t1 and then
stops at t2: ∫ t2
t1
c(λs)ds > 0.
Since the player has not acquired any information before time t1, pt1 = p0. The assumption
λ¯ < c
γ0p0(vH−p0vL) guarantees that for t ∈ [t1, t2], the learning type has to randomize between
conceding and staying. This implies that if the learning type player i concedes at t2, the
expected payoff at t1 can be written as:
p0vL −
∫
s<t2
Ci(s)(p0e
−Λi(s) + 1− p0)dF−i(s|t1)
−
∫
s<t2
Ci(s)p0λ
i
se
−Λi(s)(1− F−i(s|t1))ds− (1− F−i(t2|t1))(p0e−Λi(t2) + 1− p0)Ci(t2).
Obviously, the expected value of playing the war of attrition game at t1 is always p0vL
regardless of whether this player acquires information or not. Therefore, the learning type has
no incentive to acquire information and the equilibrium arrival rate is zero almost everywhere
in the endogenous learning model.
3.6 Conclusion
Delay is a pervasive phenomenon in bargaining and voting environments. It is natural to
ask whether there is any way to reduce delay since delay is usually costly. This paper devel-
ops a continuous-time incomplete information war of attrition model with private learning
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investigate whether delay will become shorter if there is an exogenous information flow that
facilitates an agreement. It turns out that this exogenous private learning makes delay longer
instead of shorter. Also, to minimize delay, it is better to allow one player to learn than to
allow both to learn. The result that private learning may lead to a longer delay is quite ro-
bust to some changes in the model specifications. For example, similar results can be derived
if the Poisson signal is such that it reveals vi = 0 for sure, or exogenous learning is about the
winning payoff vH instead of the losing payoff. The key insight is that this private Bayesian
learning is a martingale process and generates multiple normal types. Due to learning, it
is always possible for a normal player to become less optimistic about the payoff state over
time. In equilibrium, there must exist some periods such that the less optimistic players are
randomizing. Compared to the benchmark model without learning, the concession rate in
these periods will be smaller and the expected delay will be longer.
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Appendix A
Appendices
A.1 Appendix to Chapter 1
A Admissible Strategies
Before formally defining admissible Markovian strategies, we define admissibility for general
strategies. First denote an outcome h to be
h , ({ait, Nit}ni=1, Pt)0≤t<∞ ;
and H is the set of all possible outcomes. A sub-outcome h− ⊂ h only includes information
about purchasing decisions and lump-sum payoffs:
h− , ({ait, Nit}ni=1)0≤t<∞ ;
and H− is the set of all possible sub-outcomes.
In general, a strategy can be viewed as a map from the set of outcomes to actions.
We focus on strategies which are independent of previous prices since allowing pricing as
a function of previous prices may generate more complicated problems.1 The monopolist’s
pricing decision is given by the mapping:
P : H− × [0,∞)→ R;
1For example, any decreasing price path is consistent with the pricing function P (h, t) = infτ<t Pτ .
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and the buyers’ acceptance decision is given by the mapping:
αi : H × [0,∞)→ {0, 1}.
P (h−, t) is the price charged by the monopolist at time t, and αi(h, t) is the purchasing
decision made by buyer i at time t. Assumptions A1 and A2 stated below guarantee the
strategies are well defined.
Denote vector a = (a1, · · · , an) and vector N = (N1, · · · , Nn). A metric on the sets of
outcomes is defined as:
D−(hˆ−t , h˜
−
t ) =
∫ t
0
[
d(aˆτ , a˜τ ) + d(Nˆτ , N˜τ )
]
dτ
and
D(hˆt, h˜t) =
∫ t
0
[
d(aˆτ , a˜τ ) + d(Nˆτ , N˜τ )
]
dτ + |Pˆt − P˜t|
where d is the Euclidean norm. In particular, the previous prices do not enter in the definition
of D(hˆt, h˜t); only the current price matters. The metric D (D
−) determines a Borel σ-algebra
BH (BH−). The first restriction on strategies is that:
A1. P is a BH− × B[0,∞) measurable function and αi is a BH × B[0,∞) measurable function.
The second restriction requires the strategies take the same actions if two histories are
almost the same:
A2. For all t, and hˆ, h˜ ∈ H such that D(hˆt, h˜t) = 0, then P (hˆ−, t) = P (h˜−, t) and αi(hˆ, t) =
αi(h˜, t).
A1 and A2 are two natural restrictions on strategies. Additional conditions have to
be imposed to guarantee the induced outcome is unique. Before doing that, we define an
outcome h to be compatible with a given strategy profile {P, α} if h satisfies: P (h−, t) = Pt
and αi(h, t) = ait. A straightforward modification of the argument in Bergin and McLeod
(1993) shows the following:
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Proposition A.1. A strategy profile (P, α) generates a unique distribution over compatible
outcomes if it satisfies:
1. for any outcomes hˆ and h˜ and any time t such that D(hˆt, h˜t) = 0 and Nˆt = N˜t,
lim
↘0
P (hˆ, t+ ) = lim
↘0
P (h˜, t+ );
and
2. for any hˆ and h˜ and any t such that D(hˆt, h˜t) = 0, Nˆt = N˜t and lim↘0 Pˆt+ =
lim↘0 P˜t+, then there exists  > 0 and a ∈ {0, 1} such that αi(hˆ, t˜) = αi(h˜, t˜) = a for
any t˜ ∈ (t, t+ ).
We say a strategy profile (P, α) is weakly admissible if it satisfies conditions 1 and 2
in proposition A.1. In proposition A.1, condition 2 is the key condition. This condition
is slightly different from the inertia condition proposed in Bergin and McLeod (1993). The
modification is needed to handle the possible situation when the arrival of a lump-sum payoff
at time t results in the purchasing decisions at to be not right continuous in time.
Any Markovian strategy profile (P, α) which induces a weakly admissible strategy profile
generates a unique distribution over compatible outcomes. But the notion of weak admis-
sibility does not guarantee that the induced outcome allows us to use equations (1.1) and
(1.2) to update beliefs.
Definition A.1. A Markovian strategy profile (P, α) is strongly admissible in the good news
case if it satisfies:2
1. P (ρ) is left continuous and non-decreasing when it is continuous: for each ρ ∈ Σ and
δ > 0, there exists some  > 0 s.t. P (ρ′) ≤ P (ρ) and |P (ρ′)−P (ρ)| ≤ δ for all feasible
ρ′ ≤ ρ such that ||ρ′ − ρ|| ≤ ;3
2For the bad news case, condition 1 should be changed to require that P is piecewise non-increasing.
3We write (x1, · · · , xn) ≤ (y1, · · · , yn) if xi ≤ yi for i = 1, · · · , n, and || · || is the Euclidean norm.
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2. αi(ρ, P ) is left continuous: for each ρ ∈ Σ and δ > 0, there exists some ′ > 0 s.t.
αi(ρ
′, P ′) = αi(ρ, P ) for all feasible (ρ′, P ′) ≤ (ρ, P ) such that ||(ρ′, P ′)− (ρ, P )|| ≤ ′;
and
3. if h is a history compatible with (P, α), C(t;h) < ∞ for t < ∞, where C(t;h) denotes
the number of times τ before t such that purchasing behavior aτ is discontinuous.
It is straightforward to check that conditions 1 and 2 in definition A.1 are sufficient to
guarantee that (P, α) induces a weakly admissible strategy profile. More than that, these
two conditions imply any outcome induced by the Markovian strategy profile (P, α) is well
behaved in the sense that the purchasing decisions ait and pricing decisions Pt are right
continuous functions when there is no arrival of lump-sum payoffs. This enables us to use
equations (1.1) and (1.2) to update beliefs. In the good news case, condition 1 implies Pt
is decreasing when it is continuous but it also allows jumps in the price path. Condition
3 requires that each buyer can change actions no more than a finite number of times in a
finite time interval, since condition 2 does not preclude the possibility of an infinite number
of changes on any time interval. This additional condition is needed to simplify the analysis
of the equilibrium.
Definition A.1 is too strong in the sense that even cutoff strategies may not be strongly
admissible.4 We use the completion argument in Bergin and McLeod (1993) to overcome
this issue. First define a metric on the space of strongly admissible strategies. A Markovian
strategy profile (P, α) is admissible if there exists strongly admissible Markovian strategy
profiles {(Pk, αk)}∞k=1 such that limk→∞(Pk, αk) = (P, α). An outcome h is consistent with
an admissible strategy profile (P, α) if there exists strongly admissible Markovian strategy
profiles {(Pk, αk)}∞k=1 and outcomes {hk}∞k=1 satisfying the following three conditions: i) for
4For example, consider a cutoff strategy such that the cutoff price for buyer i is strictly increasing in
beliefs and buyer i takes the risky product at the cutoff price. This strategy violates the condition that αi
is left continuous in beliefs.
119
each k, hk is compatible with (Pk, αk), ii) limk→∞(Pk, αk) = (P, α) and iii) limk→∞ hk = h.
An admissible Markovian strategy profile (P, α) may not generate a unique distribution over
compatible outcomes. But the proof of theorem 2 in Bergin and McLeod (1993) applies here
as well to show that each admissible Markovian strategy profile (P, α) is identified with a
unique distribution over consistent outcomes. When referring to outcomes generated by an
admissible Markovian strategy profile (P, α), we restrict to the consistent outcomes.
In the definition of Markov perfect equilibrium, we allow the deviating strategies to be
non-Markovian. Additional conditions on the non-Markovian strategies are also needed to
make sure that the induced outcome is well behaved even off the equilibrium path. The
conditions imposed are counterparts of conditions 1-3 in definition A.1.
Definition A.2. Define time t as a regular time for outcome h if there is no arrival of lump-
sum payoffs at time t. A weakly admissible strategy profile (P, α) is strongly admissible in
the good news case if it satisfies:
1. P is right continuous and non-increasing when continuous at any regular time: for any
outcomes h and any regular time t,
lim
↘0
P (h, t+ ) = P (h, t);
and there exists ¯1 > 0 such that P (h, t+ ) ≤ P (h, t) for all  ≤ ¯1;
2. for any h and any regular t such that Pt is right continuous and non-increasing at time
t, there exists ¯2 > 0 and a ∈ {0, 1} such that αi(h, t˜) = αi(h, t) for any t˜ ∈ (t, t+ ¯2);
and
3. if h is a history compatible with (P, α), C(t;h) <∞ for t <∞.
A non-Markovian strategy profile (P, α) is admissible if there exists strongly admissible
non-Markovian strategy profiles {(Pk, αk)}∞k=1 such that limk→∞(Pk, αk) = (P, α). For an
admissible non-Markovian strategy profile (P, α), we also restrict to the consistent outcomes
which can be similarly defined.
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B Proofs of Results from Section 3
B.0 General Solution to Linear First Order Ordinary Differential Equations
The following observation is widely used throughout the paper to solve linear first order
ordinary differential equations.
Observation A.1. Given that f and g are continuous functions on an interval I, the ordi-
nary differential equation y′ + f(x)y = g(x) has a general solution
y(x) =
H(x)
h(x)
where h(x) = eR(x), R(x) is an antiderivative of f(x) on I and H(x) is an antiderivative of
h(x)g(x) on I.5
Proof. Multiply both sides of differential equation y′ + f(x)y = g(x) by h(x). Then the
original differential equation becomes
d
dx
(h(x)y(x)) = h(x)g(x).
After integration, it is straightforward to see that the general solution is y(x) = H(x)
h(x)
.
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1.1
Proof. Before proving the proposition, we first show the socially optimal allocation is indeed
symmetric.
Claim A.1. The socially optimal allocation is symmetric when buyers are homogeneous.
Proof. For any posteriors ρ, denote the social surplus to be Ω(ρ). The social planner’s
problem can be written as:
Ω(ρ) = sup
α(·)∈{0,1}n
E
{∫ h
t=0
re−rt
n∑
i=1
[αi(ρt)ρitq(ρt)g + (1− αi(ρt))s]dt+ e−rhΩ(ρh | α)
}
.
5An antiderivative of a function f(x) is defined as any function F (x) whose derivative is f(x): F ′(x) =
f(x).
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Consider any ρ˜ which is a permutation of ρ. Naturally, the social surplus should be the
same: Ω(ρ) = Ω(ρ˜) since the strategies α can be permuted as well. Suppose buyers are
homogeneous with the same prior ρ0 and denote ρ0 = (ρ0, · · · , ρ0). From the HJB equation,
it is socially optimal for buyer i to purchase the risky product if and only if:
rρ0q0g + ρ0q0λH(Ω1(ρ0)− Ω(ρ0))− λHρ(1− ρ)
∂Ω(ρ0)
∂ρi
> rs.
Since Ω(ρ) = Ω(ρ˜), for any j 6= i, we can switch i and j without affecting the partial deriva-
tives. In other words, the partial derivatives are identical when buyers are homogeneous:
∂Ω(ρ0)
∂ρi
= ∂Ω(ρ0)
∂ρj
. Therefore, it is socially optimal for buyer i to purchase the risky product
if and only if it is also optimal for buyer j to purchase. This implies the socially optimal
allocation is symmetric.
Notice in equation
rnρq(ρ)g + nρq(ρ)λHΩ1(ρ) = (r + nρq(ρ)λH)ns, (A.1)
Ω1(·) is a piece-wise function since W (·) is a piece-wise function. The next result claims that
ρeS is always larger than ρ
e
I such that Ω1(ρ
e
S) > (n− 1)s+ g.
Claim A.2. Beginning from any combination of ρ0 < 1 and q0 < 1, the efficient cutoff in the
social learning phase will always be larger than the efficient cutoff in the individual learning
phase: ρeS > ρ
e
I .
Proof. We first substitute the expression Ω1(ρ) = g + (n− 1)W (ρ) into equation (A.1) and
get
rnρq(ρ)g + nρq(ρ)λH [g + (n− 1)W (ρ)] = (r + nρq(ρ)λH)ns. (A.2)
By contradiction, assume ρeS ≤ ρeI and W (ρeS) = s by definition. Equation (A.2) then gives
us a cutoff ρ˜eS satisfying
ρ˜eSq(ρ˜
e
S) = ρ
e
I =
rs
(r + λH)g − λHs.
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As q(ρ˜eS) < 1, the above equation implies that: ρ˜
e
S > ρ
e
I , which contradicts the assumption
ρeS ≤ ρeI . Therefore, it must be true that ρeS > ρeI and thus W (ρeS) > s.
From claim A.2, ρeS should satisfy equation (A.2) where q(ρ
e
S) is given by equation (1.6).
Given the priors, the efficient cutoffs (ρeS(ρ0, q0), q
e
S(ρ0, q0)) can be solved jointly:
qeS =
rs
ρeS[(r + λH)g + (n− 1)λHW (ρeS)− nλHs]
. (A.3)
qeS =
(1− ρ0)nq0
(1− ρ0)nq0 + (1− ρeS)n(1− q0)
. (A.4)
Clearly, W (ρeS) is increasing in ρ
e
S and thus q
e
S is decreasing in ρ
e
S from equation (A.3).
Equation (A.4) describes how ρ and q evolve jointly over time: since both ρ and q decrease
over time, qeS is increasing in ρ
e
S. Hence the intersection of equations (A.4) and (A.3) is
unique. Equation (A.3) describes the stopping curve such that it is socially efficient to keep
experimenting if
ρq >
rs
(r + λH)g + (n− 1)λHW (ρeS)− nλHs
.
Finally, we still have to check that it is indeed the case that ρeS > ρ
e
I . Notice that ρ
e
S is
decreasing in qeS on the stopping curve. If q = 1, it is easy to check the unique cutoff ρ
e
S is
the same as ρeI =
rs
(r+λH)g−λHs . And for q
e
S < 1, we should have ρ
e
S > ρ
e
I .
B.2 Proof of Proposition 1.2
Proof. In the individual learning phase, denote ρ to be the common posterior belief about the
unknown buyer’s idiosyncratic uncertainty. Denote PI(ρ) as the price set by the monopolist
for ρ > ρ?I , where ρ
?
I is the equilibrium cutoff. Then, the value function for the unknown
buyer satisfies
rUI(ρ) = r(gρ− PI(ρ)) + ρλH(s− UI(ρ))− λHρ(1− ρ)U ′I(ρ).
Certainly, a profit-maximizing monopolist always sets prices PI(ρ) = gρ − s such that
UI(ρ) = s. The monopolist’s problem is to choose between charging a low price gρ − s to
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keep experimenting and charging a high price g−s to extract the full surplus from the known
buyer. Obviously, this is an optimal stopping problem with HJB equation
rJI(ρ) = max {r(g − s), 2r(gρ− s) + ρλH(2(g − s)− JI(ρ))− λHρ(1− ρ)J ′I(ρ)} . (A.5)
On the RHS of equation (A.5), g − s is the value if the monopolist only sells to the
good buyer by charging g − s; if the monopolist decides to continue experimentation, she
not only receives instantaneous revenue 2(gρ − s) by selling to both buyers but also may
receive a future value of 2(g − s) if the unknown buyer receives a lump-sum payoff. From
the value matching and smooth pasting conditions, it is straightforward to characterize the
equilibrium cutoff as
ρ?I =
r(g + s)
2rg + λH(g − s) .
The equilibrium value function JI(ρ) could be solved as:
JI(ρ) =
{
2(gρ− s) + (g + s− 2gρ?I) 1−ρ1−ρ?I [
(1−ρ)ρ?I
(1−ρ?I )ρ ]
r/λH if ρ > ρ?I
g − s otherwise.
The known buyer only needs to pay PI(ρ) = gρ− s < g − s before ρ reaches ρ?I , but has
to pay g − s afterwards. The value function for this buyer is given by differential equation
rVI(ρ) = r(g(1− ρ) + s) + ρλH(s− VI(ρ))− λHρ(1− ρ)V ′I (ρ) (A.6)
for ρ > ρ?I =
r(g+s)
2rg+λH(g−s) and VI(ρ) = s for ρ ≤ ρ?I =
r(g+s)
2rg+λH(g−s) . Equation (A.6) is
an ordinary differential equation with boundary condition: VI(ρ
?
I) = s. This gives us the
expression of VI(ρ) in the proposition.
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B.3 Characterize limh→0
US(ρ)−Uˆ(ρ;h)
h
Lemma A.1. Fix a pair of priors (ρ0, q0) such that ρ
?
S is the equilibrium cutoff in the social
learning phase. In a mass market, for any ρ > ρ?S,
lim
h→0
US(ρ)− Uˆ(ρ;h)
h
= 2(r + λHρq)(US(ρ)− s) + λHρ(1− ρ)U ′S(ρ)
+ (r + λHρ)g(1− ρ)q((1− ρ)ρ
?
I
ρ(1− ρ?I)
)r/λH − λHgρ(1− ρ)q
−
[
r + λHρ
?
S
1− ρ?S
(
ρ?I
1− ρ?I
)r/λH − λH( ρ
?
S
1− ρ?S
)1+r/λH
]
g(1− ρ)2q(1− ρ
ρ
)r/λH . (A.7)
In a niche market, for ρ?S < ρ ≤ ρ?I ,
lim
h→0
US(ρ)− Uˆ(ρ;h)
h
= 2(r + λHρq)(US(ρ)− s) + λHρ(1− ρ)U ′S(ρ)
− rg
r + λH
λHρ(1− ρ)q + rλHg
r + λH
ρ?S(1− ρ)2q
1− ρ?S
(
(1− ρ)ρ?S
ρ(1− ρ?S)
)r/λH ; (A.8)
and for ρ > ρ?I ,
lim
h→0
US(ρ)− Uˆ(ρ;h)
h
= 2(r + λHρq)(US(ρ)− s) + λHρ(1− ρ)U ′S(ρ)
+ (r + λHρ)g(1− ρ)q((1− ρ)ρ
?
I
ρ(1− ρ?I)
)r/λH − λHgρ(1− ρ)q
− r
[
r + λH + λHρ
?
I
(r + λH)(1− ρ?I)
(
ρ?I
1− ρ?I
)r/λH − λH
r + λH
(
ρ?S
1− ρ?S
)1+r/λH
]
g(1− ρ)2q(1− ρ
ρ
)r/λH . (A.9)
Proof. First notice that if limh→0
US(ρ)−UD(ρ,ρh)
h
exists, limh→0
US(ρ)−Uˆ(ρ;h)
h
can be written as:
lim
h→0
US(ρ)− Uˆ(ρ;h)
h
= (r + λHρq(ρ))(US(ρ)− s) + lim
h→0
US(ρ)− UD(ρ, ρh)
h
. (A.10)
The main issue is to evaluate UD(ρ, ρh) for ρ > ρh. We proceed in the following steps:
1. Decompose off-equilibrium-path value function
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Fix h > 0 to be sufficiently small and the monopolist will still sell to both buyers after
an h-deviation.6 Therefore, there exists h¯′ such that for all h′ ≤ h¯′, we have:
UD(ρ, ρh) = E
∫ h′
t=0
re−rt(ρtqtg − P˜t)dt
+ ρq˜h(1− e−λHh′)e−rh′VI(ρh+h′) + ρhq˜h(1− e−λHh′)e−rh′s
+ [1− ρq˜h(1− e−λHh′)− ρhq˜h(1− e−λHh′)]e−rh′U(ρh′ , ρh+h′). (A.11)
In the above expression, ρt is the posterior about the deviator and starts from ρ0 =
ρ; q˜h is the posterior about the product characteristic after an h-deviation: q˜h =
q0(1−ρ0)2
q0(1−ρ0)2+(1−q0)(1−ρ)(1−ρh) ; and P˜t is the off-equilibrium-path price set by the monopolist
after an h-deviation.
By purchasing the risky product, the non-deviator gets value
UND(ρ, ρh) = E
∫ h′
t=0
re−rt(ρ′tqtg − P˜t)dt
+ ρq˜h(1− e−λHh′)e−rh′s+ ρhq˜h(1− e−λHh′)e−rh′VI(ρh′)
+ [1− ρq˜h(1− e−λHh′)− ρhq˜h(1− e−λHh′)]e−rh′U(ρh+h′ , ρh′), (A.12)
where ρ′t is the posterior about the non-deviator and starts from ρh.
Obviously, the off-equilibrium-path value function UD(ρ, ρh) can be decomposed as
UD(ρ, ρh) = U
ND(ρ, ρh) + Z(ρ, ρh)
where Z(ρ, ρh) = U
D(ρ, ρh)− UND(ρ, ρh).
The fact that the ρh buyer purchases the risky product means that it is not profitable
6If the monopolist only sells to the deviator, the loss from not selling to the non-deviator is proportional
to JS(ρh) where JS > 0 is the equilibrium value for the monopolist in the social learning phase but the gain
is proportional to ρ− ρh. As h goes to zero, the loss always dominates the gain.
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for her to have “one-shot” deviations:
UND(ρ, ρh) ≥ U˜(h′) =
∫ h′
t=0
re−rtsdt+ ρq˜h(1− e−λHh′)e−rh′s
+ [1− ρq˜h(1− e−λHh′)]e−rh′U(ρh, ρh′). (A.13)
Since the ρh buyer is more pessimistic about the probability of receiving lump-sum
payoffs, the optimal off-equilibrium-path price P˜ is set such that the ρh buyer has
incentives to experiment.
Denote U˜(ρ; ρh) as U
ND(ρ, ρh) for a fixed ρh since ρh does not change in the expression
of U˜(h′). The fact that
lim
h′→0
UND(ρ, ρh)− U˜(h′)
h′
= (r + λHρq˜h)U˜(ρ; ρh)− (r + λHρq˜h)s+ λHρ(1− ρ)U˜ ′(ρ; ρh)
is left-continuous in ρ and ρh implies that in equilibrium, the following equation is
satisfied:7
lim
h′→0
UND(ρ, ρh)− U˜(h′)
h′
= 0.
Thus we derive an ordinary differential equation for U˜(ρ; ρh)
(r + λHρq˜h)U˜(ρ; ρh) = (r + λHρq˜h)s− λHρ(1− ρ)U˜ ′(ρ; ρh) (A.14)
where the expression for q˜h is provided by equation (1.5)
q˜h(ρ) =
q0(1− ρ0)2
q0(1− ρ0)2 + (1− q0)(1− ρ)(1− ρh) .
The off-equilibrium-path value function UD(ρ, ρh) can be further decomposed as:
UD(ρ, ρh) = U˜(ρ; ρh) + Z(ρ, ρh).
7The proof is similar to the proof of lemma A.2. If it is strictly larger than zero, we can find a neighborhood
of beliefs to increase price P˜ (ρ, ρh) but the buyers will still purchase the risky product. This constitutes a
profitable deviation for the monopolist.
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2. Solve for the off-equilibrium-path value function U˜(ρ; ρh).
Equation (A.14) is an ordinary differential equation with general solution:
U˜(ρ; ρh) = s+ Ch × (1− ρ)q˜h(1− ρ
ρ
)r/λH .
When ρ = ρh, the two buyers are identical and it goes back to the equilibrium path:
U˜(ρh; ρh) = US(ρh). This boundary condition implies:
Ch =
US(ρh)− s
(1− ρh)qh(1−ρhρh )r/λH
; (A.15)
where qh satisfies: qh =
q0(1−ρ0)2
q0(1−ρ0)2+(1−q0)(1−ρh)2 .
Since on the equilibrium path, experimentation stops at ρ?S, the unknown buyer receives
a value less than the outside (US(ρ) < s) for ρ < ρ
?
S. Equation (A.15) implies that the
non-deviator’s posterior will never be lower than ρ∗S no matter how large h is. In other
words, the monopolist always stops selling to both buyers if (ρ, ρh) = (f(ρ
?
S;h), ρ
?
S),
where
f(ρ?S;h) =
ρ?S
ρ?S + e
−λHh(1− ρ?S)
corresponds to the deviator’s posterior when the non-deviator’s posterior drops to ρ?S.
3. Solve for the off-equilibrium-path value function Z(ρ, ρh).
Denote
Z(t) = Z(ρ(t), ρh(t)) = U(ρ(t), ρh(t))− U(ρh(t), ρ(t))
where ρ(t) and ρh(t) are posterior beliefs after t length of time beginning from ρ and
ρh (given that no lump-sum payoff is received during this period). The posteriors can
be expressed as:
ρ(t) =
ρe−λH t
ρe−λH t + (1− ρ) , ρh(t) =
ρhe
−λH t
ρhe−λH t + (1− ρh) ,
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and
q˜h(t) =
q0(1− ρ0)2
q0(1− ρ0)2 + (1− q0)(1− ρ(t))(1− ρh(t)) .
Given any t < h′, the monopolist would also make a sale to both buyers ρ(t) and ρh(t).
Subtract equation (A.12) from (A.11) yields:
Z(t) = E
∫ h′′
0
re−rτ (ρτqτg − ρ′τqτg)dτ
+ e−rh
′′
(1− e−λHh′′) {ρ(t)q˜h(t)[VI(ρh(t+ h′′))− s] + ρh(t)q˜h(t)[s− VI(ρ(t+ h′′))]}
+ e−rh
′′
[
1− ρ(t)q˜h(t)(1− e−λHh′′)− ρh(t)q˜h(t)(1− e−λHh′′)
]
Z(t+ h′′). (A.16)
Let h′′ go to 0 and we get an ordinary differential equation about Z(t):
(r + λHρ(t)q˜h(t) + λHρh(t)q˜h(t))Z(t)− Z˙(t) = H(t) (A.17)
where
H(t) = r(ρ(t)− ρh(t))q˜h(t)g + λHρ(t)q˜h(t)(VI(ρh(t))− s)− λHρh(t)q˜h(t)(VI(ρ(t))− s).
Next, the explicit expression for Z can be derived for mass and niche markets, respec-
tively.
In a mass market, both ρ(t) and ρh(t) are larger than ρ
?
I . In that case,
VI(ρ) = s+ g(1− ρ)(1− [ (1− ρ)ρ
?
I
ρ(1− ρ?I)
]r/λH )
and
H(t) = r(ρ(t)− ρh(t))q˜h(t)g + λHρ(t)q˜h(t)g(1− ρh(t))(1− [ (1− ρh(t))ρ
?
I
ρh(t)(1− ρ?I)
]r/λH )
− λHρh(t)q˜h(t)g(1− ρ(t))(1− [ (1− ρ(t))ρ
?
I
ρ(t)(1− ρ?I)
]r/λH ).
The solution to differential equation (A.17) is
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Z(t) = (ρ(t)− ρh(t))q˜h(t)g
− [(1− ρh(t))(1− ρh(t)
ρh(t)
)r/λH − (1− ρ(t))(1− ρ(t)
ρ(t)
)r/λH ]q˜h(t)g(
ρ?I
1− ρ?I
)r/λH
+ Cert(1− ρ(t))(1− ρh(t))q˜h(t). (A.18)
From the expressions of ρ(t) and ρh(t), time t can be inversely expressed as either
− 1
λH
log[
(1− ρ)ρ(t)
ρ(1− ρ(t)) ] or −
1
λH
log[
(1− ρh)ρh(t)
ρh(1− ρh(t)) ].
As a result, Cert(1− ρ(t))(1− ρh(t))q˜h(t) can be written as:
D˜1(1−ρ(t))(1−ρh(t))q˜h(t)(1− ρh(t)
ρh(t)
)r/λH + D˜2(1−ρ(t))(1−ρh(t))q˜h(t)(1− ρ(t)
ρ(t)
)r/λH .
When the two buyers are identical, there should be no difference in the values:
Z(ρ(t), ρh(t)) = 0
for ρ(t) = ρh(t). This implies D˜1 = −D˜2 = Dh. Drop the time index t to transform
Z(t) back into Z(ρ, ρh):
Z(ρ, ρh) = (ρ− ρh)q˜hg − [(1− ρh)(1− ρh
ρh
)r/λH − (1− ρ)(1− ρ
ρ
)r/λH ]q˜hg(
ρ?I
1− ρ?I
)r/λH
+Dh(1− ρ)(1− ρh)q˜h[(1− ρh
ρh
)r/λH − (1− ρ
ρ
)r/λH ]. (A.19)
Observe that: after the non-deviator stops purchasing the risky product, the deviator
always receives the outside option. This implies a boundary condition for Z(ρ, ρh):
Z(f(ρ?S;h), ρ
?
S) = 0. The constant Dh can be pinned down by the boundary condition:
Dh = −(e
λHh − 1)g
1− e−rh (
ρ?S
1− ρ?S
)1+r/λH+
[
1 + (eλHh − 1)ρ?S − e−rh
]
g
(1− ρ?S)(1− e−rh)
(
ρ?I
1− ρ?I
)r/λH . (A.20)
Summing up UND and Z yields an expression for UD(ρ, ρh):
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UD(ρ, ρh) = s+ (ρ− ρh)q˜hg +
(1− ρ)q˜h(1−ρρ )r/λH
(1− ρh)qh(1−ρhρh )r/λH
(US(ρh)− s)
− [(1− ρh)(1− ρh
ρh
)r/λH − (1− ρ)(1− ρ
ρ
)r/λH ]q˜hg(
ρ?I
1− ρ?I
)r/λH
+Dh(1− ρ)(1− ρh)q˜h[(1− ρh
ρh
)r/λH − (1− ρ
ρ
)r/λH ], (A.21)
where Dh is given by equation (A.20).
In a niche market, the value function Z can be derived by a backward procedure.
First, if both ρ(t) and ρh(t) are smaller than ρ
?
I , then both VI(ρ(t)) and VI(ρh(t)) are
s and H(t) = r(ρ(t)− ρh(t))q˜h(t)g. It is straightforward to solve differential equation
(A.17):
Z(t) =
rg
r + λH
(ρ(t)− ρh(t))q˜h(t) + Cert(1− ρ(t))(1− ρh(t))q˜h(t). (A.22)
Repeating the above procedure yields
Z3(ρ, ρh) =
rg
r + λH
(ρ−ρh)q˜h+Dh3(1−ρ)(1−ρh)q˜h[(1− ρh
ρh
)r/λH−(1− ρ
ρ
)r/λH ], (A.23)
where
Dh3 = − rg
r + λH
eλHh − 1
1− e−rh (
ρ?S
1− ρ?S
)1+r/λH .
Second, if ρ(t) > ρ?I and ρh(t) ≤ ρ?I , then
H(t) = r(ρ(t)− ρh(t))q˜h(t)g − λHρh(t)q˜h(t)g(1− ρ(t))(1− [ (1− ρ(t))ρ
?
I
ρ(t)(1− ρ?I)
]r/λH ).
Similarly, we solve Z as:
Z2(ρ, ρh) =
rg
r + λH
(ρ− ρh)q˜h − λHg
r + λH
ρh(1− ρ)q˜h + ρh(1− ρ)q˜hg[ (1− ρ)ρ
?
I
ρ(1− ρ?I)
]r/λH
+Dh2(1− ρ)(1− ρh)q˜h(1− ρ
ρ
)r/λH . (A.24)
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Dh2 is determined such that Z2 and Z3 coincide when ρ = ρ
?
I . This gives us
Dh2 = − rg
r + λH
[
(e(r+λH)h − erh)( ρ
?
S
1− ρ?S
)1+r/λH + e−λHh(
ρ?I
1− ρ?I
)1+r/λH
]
.
Finally, if both ρ(t) and ρh(t) are larger than ρ
?
I , then we have already solved
Z1(ρ, ρh) = (ρ− ρh)q˜hg− [(1− ρh)(1− ρh
ρh
)r/λH − (1− ρ)(1− ρ
ρ
)r/λH ]q˜hg(
ρ?I
1− ρ?I
)r/λH
+Dh1(1− ρ)(1− ρh)q˜h[(1− ρh
ρh
)r/λH − (1− ρ
ρ
)r/λH ]. (A.25)
Dh1 is determined such that Z1 and Z2 coincide when ρh = ρ
?
I :
Dh1 =
[
1
ρ?I
+
(r + λH)e
−rh − λH − re−(r+λH)h
(r + λH)(1− e−rh) +
r(eλHh − 1)
(r + λH)(1− e−rh)
]
(
ρ?I
1− ρ?I
)1+r/λH
+Dh3.
After solving for UD(ρ, ρh), limh→0
US(ρ)−UD(ρ,ρh)
h
can be evaluated directly. Substitute
the results into equation (A.10) and we get the equations stated in lemma A.1.
B.4 “Binding” Incentive Constraint
Lemma A.2. Fix a pair of priors (ρ0, q0) such that ρ
?
S is the equilibrium cutoff in the social
learning phase. For ρ > ρ?S, we must have:
lim
h→0
US(ρ)− Uˆ(ρ;h)
h
= 0.
Proof. First, it is obvious that
lim
h→0
US(ρ)− Uˆ(ρ;h)
h
≥ 0
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since US(ρ) ≥ Uˆ(ρ;h) for h ≤ h¯. Suppose by contradiction that there exists ρ1 such that
F (ρ1) , lim
h→0
US(ρ1)− Uˆ(ρ1;h)
h
= c > 0.
From lemma A.1, F (ρ) is left continuous in ρ, which implies that if F (ρ1) = c > 0, then
there exists h† and 1 such that for all h < h† and ρ1 − 1 < ρ′ < ρ1,
US(ρ
′)− Uˆ(ρ′;h) > hc/2.
Choose 2 to satisfy
ρ1 −  = ρ1e
−λHh†
ρ1e−λHh
† + (1− ρ1)
and define ˆ = min{1, 2}. Now define a new pricing strategy such that
P˜S(ρ) =
{
PS(ρ) +
c
2
if ρ1 − ˆ < ρ ≤ ρ1
PS(ρ) otherwise.
Obviously, under this new pricing strategy, the unknown buyer will still purchase the risky
product since
US(ρ
′)− Uˆ(ρ′;h) > hc/2.
But the monopolist obtains a higher profit and hence this constitutes a profitable deviation
for the monopolist. Therefore, it is impossible to have
lim
h→0
US(ρ)− Uˆ(ρ;h)
h
> 0
in equilibrium.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 1.3
Proof. The necessity part directly comes from lemma A.1 and lemma A.2. To prove the
sufficiency part, the first step is to show there does not exist profitable one-shot deviations.
Lemma A.3. The value functions derived are sufficient to deter one-shot deviations: it is
not profitable for an experimenting buyer to deviate for any h ≥ 0 length of time.
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Proof. After a buyer deviates h length of time, the monopolist can either make a sell to
both buyers or sell only to the deviator. If the latter is the continuation play, UD(ρ, ρh) = s
since the optimal price only needs to satisfy the deviator’s participation constraint. Since
US(ρ) > s, it is immediate to see that it is not profitable to deviate. Therefore, the interesting
case happens when the monopolist makes a sell to both buyers after an h-deviation.
In a mass market, the value associated with an h > 0 deviation is given by:
Uˆ(ρ;h) =
∫ h
t=0
re−rtsdt+ ρq(1− e−λHh)e−rhs+ [1− ρq(1− e−λHh)]e−rhUD(ρ, ρh)
where UD(ρ, ρh) satisfies equation (A.21).
Rearranging terms yields
Uˆ(ρ;h)− s = e−rh[1− ρq(1− e−λHh)](UD(ρ, ρh)− s). (A.26)
Using the expressions that
ρh =
ρe−λHh
1− ρ(1− e−λHh) and q˜h =
q[1− ρ(1− e−λHh)]
1− ρq(1− e−λHh) ,
we can directly evaluate US(ρ)− Uˆ(ρ;h) and get
US(ρ)− Uˆ(ρ;h) =
[
λH(1− e−(2r+λH)h)
2r + λH
− e−rh(1− e−λHh)
]
gρ(1− ρ)q
+ (eλHh − 1− λH(1− e
−rh)
r
)
[
(
ρ?S
1− ρ?S
)r/λH − ( ρ
?
I
1− ρ?I
)r/λH
]
gq(1− ρ)2 ρ
?
S
1− ρ?S
(
1− ρ
ρ
)r/λH .
A sufficient condition for US(ρ)− Uˆ(ρ;h) ≥ 0 is that both
S(h) , λH(1− e
−(2r+λH)h)
2r + λH
− e−rh(1− e−λHh)
and
T (h) , (eλHh − 1− λH(1− e
−rh)
r
)
are larger than zero. Notice S(0) = 0, S ′(0) = 0 and S ′′(h) > 0. Therefore, S(h) is a convex
function which achieves its minimum at h = 0. As a result, S(h) ≥ 0 for all h ≥ 0. Similarly,
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it can be shown that T (0) = 0, T ′(0) = 0 and T ′′(h) > 0. Therefore, T (h) ≥ 0 as well.
Hence, for any h > 0, there is no profitable one-shot deviation.
In a niche market, we have to consider the following two cases.
Case 1. ρ ≤ ρ?I . In this case, it is straightforward to show
Uˆ(ρ;h)− s =
[
rλHe
−(2r+λH)h
(2r + λH)(r + λH)
+
re−rh(1− e−λHh)
r + λH
]
gρ(1− ρ)q
−
[
e−rhλH + r(eλHh − 1)
]
g
r + λH
(1− ρ)2qρ?S
1− ρ?S
[
(1− ρ)ρ?S
ρ(1− ρ?S)
]r/λH +Dq(1− ρ)2(1− ρ
ρ
)2r/λH
and
US(ρ)− s = rλH
(2r + λH)(r + λH)
gρ(1− ρ)q − λHg
r + λH
(1− ρ)2qρ?S
1− ρ?S
[
(1− ρ)ρ?S
ρ(1− ρ?S)
]r/λH
+Dq(1− ρ)2(1− ρ
ρ
)2r/λH .
In order to show Uˆ(ρ;h) ≤ U(ρ), it suffices to prove for all h ≥ 0, S(h) ≥ 0 and T (h) ≥ 0,
which have been shown already.
Case 2. ρ > ρ?I . In this case, ρh > ρ
?
I for h sufficiently small and we have:
US(ρ)− Uˆ(ρ;h) =
[
λH(1− e−(2r+λH)h)
2r + λH
− e−rh(1− e−λHh)
]
gρ(1− ρ)q
+
(
r(eλHh − 1)− λH(1− e−rh)
r + λH
)
[
(1− ρ)ρ?S
ρ(1− ρ?S)
]1+r/λHgρ(1− ρ)q
−
[
(r + 2λH)e
−rh − 2λH + r(eλHh − e−(r+λH)h − 1)
r + λH
]
[
(1− ρ)ρ?I
ρ(1− ρ?I)
]1+r/λHgρ(1− ρ)q.
Notice ρh > ρ
?
I implies that [
(1−ρ)ρ?I
ρ(1−ρ?I )]
1+r/λH < (e−λHh)1+r/λH . Hence, US(ρ)− Uˆ(ρ;h) ≥ 0 if
S(h)e(r+λH)h +
rT (h)
r + λH
(
[
(1− ρ?I)ρ?S
ρ?I(1− ρ?S)
]1+r/λH − 1
)
− (r + λH)e
−rh − λH − re−(r+λH)h
(r + λH)
≥ 0.
We have shown that T (h) ≥ 0. It is straightforward to check that
X(h) , e(r+λH)hS(h)− rT (h)
r + λH
− (r + λH)e
−rh − λH − re−(r+λH)h
r + λH
≥ 0.
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This implies that it is not profitable to deviate in a niche market as well.
The next step is to show after some deviations, both the deviator and the non-deviator
do not want to have another deviation.
Lemma A.4. Given the deviator has deviated h length of time in total such that the posterior
beliefs are ρ and ρh, respectively, it is not profitable for both buyers to have another deviation.
Proof. First, assume after the deviation, the monopolist is selling only to the deviator. Then
setting UD(ρ, ρh) = s is sufficient to deter deviations. If the monopolist is making a sell to
both buyers, then given the expressions of off the equilibrium path value function UD(ρ, ρh),
we are also able to show it is not profitable to deviate for h′ length of time. The proof is
similar to the tedious proof of lemma A.3 and is omitted.
Second, for the non-deviator, if the monopolist is only selling to the deviator, it is not
profitable for the non-deviator to purchase the risky product since she is more pessimistic.
We only need to show, if the monopolist is selling to both buyers, the ρh buyer will not
deviate for any h′ length of time. Notice that it suffices to consider h′ ≤ h because lemma
A.4 already implies that it is not optimal to deviate any longer once h′ exceeds h. The value
associated with an h′-deviation is provided by:
U˜(h′) =
∫ h′
t=0
re−rtsdt+ ρq˜h(1− e−λHh′)e−rh′s+ [1− ρq˜h(1− e−λHh′)]e−rh′UND(ρh, ρh′).
Given
UND(ρ, ρh) = s+ Ch × (1− ρ)q˜h(1− ρ
ρ
)r/λH ,
it is straightforward to show: UND(ρ, ρh) ≥ U˜(h′) for all h′ ≤ h.
Finally, we are in a position to show any admissible deviation is not profitable. Suppose
on the contrary, there exists another admissible strategy α˜1 (could be Non-Markovian) for
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buyer 1 such that the value under this strategy is higher than the equilibrium value for some
ρ
U1(α˜1, P
∗, α∗2; ρ)− US(ρ) =  > 0.
Notice by the definition of admissible strategies, α˜1 can be written as the limit of a sequence
of strongly admissible strategies α˜k1. Take T sufficiently large and define a new strategy αˆ1
as:
αˆ1 =
{
α˜1 if t < T ;
α∗1 if t ≥ T .
For T sufficiently large, this new strategy also generates a value higher than US(ρ).
8 Similarly
define αˆk1 and obviously, αˆ1 is the limit of αˆ
k
1. For each αˆ
k
1, there can be at most a finite
number of deviations in a finite time interval [0, T ). Lemma A.3 and lemma A.4 together
imply that any finite deviation is not profitable: U1(αˆ
k
1, P
∗, α∗2; ρ)−US(ρ) ≤ 0 for all k. But
by the construction of admissible strategies,
U1(αˆ1, P
∗, α∗2; ρ) = lim
k→∞
U1(αˆ
k
1, P
∗, α∗2; ρ) ≤ US(ρ),
which leads to a contradiction.
B.6 Proof of Proposition 1.4
Proof. In a niche market, US(ρ
?
S) = s and equation (1.21) implies
D =
λH
2r + λH
(
ρ?S
1− ρ?S
)1+2r/λH .
Substituting this expression into equation (1.26) yields
PS(ρ
?
S) = ρ
?
Sq(ρ
?
S)g − s.
Then boundary conditions
JS(ρ
?
S) = 0 and J
′
S(ρ
?
S) = 0
8Notice the value each buyer is able to get cannot exceed g. Therefore, we can choose T such that
e−rT g = /2.
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immediately imply that ρ?S should satisfy equation
ρq(ρ) =
rs
rg + λHg − λHs =
rs
rg + λH(VI(ρ) + JI(ρ))− λHs.
In a mass market, similarly we get ρ?S should also satisfy
ρq(ρ) =
rs
rg + λH(VI(ρ) + JI(ρ))− λHs.
Thus, the equilibrium cutoff ρ?S is characterized by equation (1.29) regardless of whether it
is a mass or niche market. Since ρq(ρ), VI(ρ) and JI(ρ) are all increasing in ρ, the solution
to the above equation is unique given a pair of priors (ρ0, q0).
Furthermore, a mass market appears (ρ?S > ρ
?
I) if and only if
ρ?Iq(ρ
?
I) <
rs
rg + λH(VI(ρ?I) + JI(ρ
?
I))− λHs
or equivalently,
q0(1− ρ0)2
q0(1− ρ0)2 + (1− q0)(1− ρ?I)2
<
ρeI
ρ?I
.
Rearrange terms and we get the condition stated in the proposition.
From proposition 1.1, the efficient cutoff ρeS is characterized by equation
ρq(ρ) =
rs
(r + λH)g + λHW (ρ)− 2λHs.
First, JI(ρ) +VI(ρ) + s represents the total equilibrium surplus in the individual learning
phase, and hence must be strictly less than the socially optimal surplus Ω1(ρ) = g + W (ρ)
for any ρ > ρeI since equilibrium is inefficient in the individual learning phase. Therefore,
rg + λH(VI(ρ) + JI(ρ))− λHs < (r + λH)g + λHW (ρ)− 2λHs. (A.27)
Second, it cannot be the case that ρ?S ≤ ρeI for q0 < 1. Otherwise, VI(ρ?S) = s, JI(ρ?S) =
g − s and VI(ρ?S) + JI(ρ?S) = g imply
ρ?S × q(ρ?S) = ρeI =
rs
rg + λH(g − s) . (A.28)
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The above equation contradicts the assumption that ρ?S ≤ ρeI .
Since W (·) is a strictly increasing function for ρ > ρeI , inequality (A.27) implies that
ρ?S > ρ
e
S.
B.7 Proof of Proposition 1.5
Proof. Given the monopoly price PS(q) (notice ρ = 1 and we should switch to use q as the
state variable), the value function for a representative unknown buyer can be written as
rUS(q) = r(gq − PS(q)) + nqλH(s− US(q))− nλHq(1− q)U ′S(q). (A.29)
Participation constraint implies that US(q) ≥ s and there is also an incentive compatibility
constraint which means “one-shot deviations” are not profitable:
US(q) ≥ Uˆ(q;h) =
∫ h
t=0
re−rtsdt+ e−rhq(1− e−(n−1)λHh)s+ e−rh(1− q + qe−(n−1)λHh)US(qh)
for any h > 0 where qh =
qe−(n−1)λHh
1−q+qe−(n−1)λHh . Let h go to zero and the incentive constraint is
binding such that the following differential equation is satisfied:
US(q) = s+
n− 1
r
[qλH(s− US(q))− λHq(1− q)U ′S(q)]
for q ≥ q?S. The general solution is
US(q) = s+DS(1− q)(1− q
q
)r/((n−1)λH).
On the other hand, given price PS(ρ), the monopolist’s value function is given by:
rJS(q) = nrPS(q)dt+ nqλH(n(g − s)− JS(q))− nλHq(1− q)J ′S(q). (A.30)
At the optimal stopping cutoff q?S, value matching and smooth pasting conditions are
satisfied:
US(q
?
S) = s, JS(q
?
S) = 0 and J
′
S(q
?
S) = 0. (A.31)
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Boundary conditions (A.31) imply that US(q
?
S) = s for some q
?
S < 1. As a consequence, it
must be the case that DS = 0 and US(q) is always s. From equation (A.29), the equilibrium
price is PS(q) = gq − s. Substituting the price expression into equation (A.30) yields
rJS(q) = nr(gq − s) + nqλH(n(g − s)− JS(q))− nλHq(1− q)J ′S(q).
This is an ordinary differential equation with boundary conditions
JS(q
?
S) = 0 and J
′
S(q
?
S) = 0.
It is easy to solve q?S as:
q?S = q
e
S =
rs
nλH(g − s) + rg .
Therefore, the Markov perfect equilibrium is efficient.
B.8 Proof of Theorem 1.1
Proof. In the individual learning phase, denote ρ?k to be the equilibrium cutoff such that at
this belief, the monopolist would stop selling to the unknown buyers when k ≥ 1 buyers
have received lump-sum payoffs. Let Vk, Uk and Jk be the equilibrium value functions for
the known buyers, the unknown buyers and the monopolist, respectively, when k ≥ 1 buyers
have received lump-sum payoffs. Finally, let Pk denote the price charged by the monopolist.
From a backward procedure, it could be shown that:
Lemma A.5. The equilibrium cutoffs satisfy
ρ?k =
nrs+ kr(g − s)
nrg + (n− k)λH(g − s)
and
ρeI < ρ
?
k < ρ
?
k+1
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 2.
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Proof. If all of the buyers turn out to be good, then it is optimal for the monopolist to
charge g − s and fully extract the total surplus. If all but one buyers have already received
lump-sum payoffs, the monopolist faces the same tradeoff of exploitation and exploration
as in the two-buyer case. The monopolist has to charge gρ − s to keep the unknown buyer
experimenting and her value function from selling to the unknown buyer is written as:
(r + ρλH)Jn−1(ρ) = nr(gρ− s) + nρλH(g − s)− λHρ(1− ρ)J ′n−1(ρ);
with boundary conditions
Jn−1(ρ?n−1) = (n− 1)(g − s) and J ′n−1(ρ?n−1) = 0.
It is straightforward to see that:
ρ?n−1 =
rs+ (n− 1)rg
λH(g − s) + nrg
and
Jn−1(ρ) = max {(n− 1)(g − s),
n(gρ− s) + [(n− 1)g + s− ngρ?n−1] 1− ρ1− ρ?n−1
[
(1− ρ)ρ?n−1
(1− ρ?n−1)ρ
]r/λH}
.
Meanwhile, the value for the known buyers is given by:
Vn−1(ρ) = max
{
s, s+ g(1− ρ)(1− [ (1− ρ)ρ
?
n−1
ρ(1− ρ?n−1)
]r/λH )
}
.
If all but two buyers have received lump-sum payoffs, the value function for the monopolist
becomes:
Jn−2(ρ) = max
{
(n− 2)(g − s), nPn−2(ρ) + 2ρλH
r
[Jn−1(ρ)− Jn−2(ρ)]− λHρ(1− ρ)
r
J ′n−2(ρ)
}
.
If the monopolist sells to the unknown buyers, the price Pn−2 is set such that the unknown
buyers have an incentive to keep experimenting:
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rPn−2(ρ) = r(ρg − Un−2(ρ)) + λHρ(s− Un−2(ρ))
+ λHρ(Vn−1(ρ)− Un−2(ρ))− λHρ(1− ρ)U ′n−2(ρ).
Value matching and smooth pasting conditions mean that at the equilibrium cutoff ρ?n−2,
Un−2(ρ?n−2) = s, U
′
n−2(ρ
?
n−2) = 0, Jn−2(ρ
?
n−2) = (n− 2)(g − s) and J ′n−2(ρ?n−2) = 0.
The above equations imply that ρ?n−2 satisfies equation
(n− 2)(g − s) = n
{
ρ?n−2g − s+
ρ?n−2λH
r
[
Vn−1(ρ?n−2)− s
]}
+
2ρ?n−2λH
r
[
Jn−1(ρ?n−2)− (n− 2)(g − s)
]
.
If ρ?n−2 > ρ
?
n−1, then Vn−1(ρ
?
n−2) > s and Jn−1(ρ
?
n−2) > (n− 1)(g − s). But this implies
(n− 2)(g − s) > n(ρ?n−2g − s) +
2ρ?n−2λH
r
(g − s)
=⇒ ρ?n−2 <
2rs+ (n− 2)rg
2λH(g − s) + nrg < ρ
?
n−1 =
rs+ (n− 1)rg
λH(g − s) + nrg .
This contradicts the assumption that ρ?n−2 > ρ
?
n−1. Therefore, it must be the case that
ρ?n−2 ≤ ρ?n−1 such that Vn−1(ρ?n−2) = s and Jn−1(ρ?n−2) = (n− 1)(g− s). It is straightforward
to see
ρ?n−2 =
2rs+ (n− 2)rg
2λH(g − s) + nrg .
For general 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1, assume
ρ?k =
nrs+ kr(g − s)
nrg + (n− k)λH(g − s)
for k ≥ j + 1. At ρ?j ,
j(g − s) = n
[
(ρ?jg − s) +
λHρ
?
j
r
(Vj+1(ρ
?
j)− s)
]
+
(n− j)λHρ?j
r
[
Jj+1(ρ
?
j)− j(g − s)
]
.
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It is similar to show by contradiction that it is impossible to have ρ?j > ρ
?
j+1 and hence the
equilibrium cutoff can be solved as
ρ?j =
nrs+ jr(g − s)
nrg + (n− j)λH(g − s) .
Standard induction argument then implies that for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1, we would have
ρ?k =
nrs+ kr(g − s)
nrg + (n− k)λH(g − s)
and it is trivial to check that
ρeI < ρ
?
k < ρ
?
k+1
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 2.
Lemma A.5 means the equilibrium is inefficient in the individual learning phase. From
the boundary conditions, the equilibrium cutoff ρ?S in the social learning phase should satisfy
ρ?Sq(ρ
?
S) =
rs
rg + λH [V1(ρ?S) + J1(ρ
?
S) + (n− 1)U1(ρ?S)]− nλHs
.
The inefficiency in the individual learning phase means
V1(ρ) + J1(ρ) + (n− 1)U1(ρ) < g + (n− 1)W (ρ) = Ω1(ρ)
for ρ > ρeI and hence
rg + λH [V1(ρ) + J1(ρ) + (n− 1)U1(ρ)]− nλHs < (r + λH)g + λH(n− 1)W (ρ)− nλHs.
This implies that the equilibrium is inefficient in the social learning phase as well: ρ?S >
ρeS.
C Proofs of Results from Section 4
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1.7
Proof. Notice the derivative of
r
λH
log(
ρ
1− ρ) + log(
q0(1− ρ0)n + (1− q0)(1− ρ)n
(1− ρ)n )
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is r+λHnρq
λHρ(1−ρ) . From observation A.1, a general solution to differential equation (1.32) is
ΩS(ρ) =
∫
h(x) rn[A−xq(x)B]+λHnxq(x)[(n−1)W (x)+s]
λHx(1−x) dx
h(ρ)
where
h(ρ) = (
ρ
1− ρ)
r/λH
q0(1− ρ0)n + (1− q0)(1− ρ)n
(1− ρ)n .
First, we show ρeI is always smaller than ρ
e
S.
Lemma A.6. Given any q0 < 1, the efficient cutoff for starting experimentation in the social
learning phase is larger than the efficient cutoff in the individual learning phase: ρeS > ρ
e
I .
Proof. For ρ ≤ ρeI ,
W (ρ) = A− λHA+ rB − λHs
r + λH
ρ.
We solve for ΩS(ρ) using integration by parts:
ΩS(ρ) =
∫
h(x) rn[A−xq(x)B]+λHnxq(x)[(n−1)W (x)+s]
λHx(1−x) dx
h(ρ)
= n
[
A− λH
r + λH
ρq(
rB
λH
+ A− s)
]
+
C
h(ρ)
.
Since 0 is included in the domain of ΩS(·), the constant term C must be 0 to guarantee
ΩS(·) is bounded away from infinity. Therefore,
ΩS(ρ) = n
[
A− λH
r + λH
ρq(
rB
λH
+ A− s)
]
.
Suppose on the contrary, we have ρeS ≤ ρeI , then ρeS should satisfy
n
[
A− λH
r + λH
ρeSq(ρ
e
S)(
rB
λH
+ A− s)
]
= ns =⇒ ρeSq(ρeS) = ρeI .
This leads to a contradiction since q < 1.
For ρ > ρeI , W (ρ) = s and by observation A.1,
ΩS(ρ) =
∫ ρ
ρeI
h(x) rn[A−xq(x)B]+λHn
2xq(x)s
λHx(1−x) dx+ C
h(ρ)
.
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The constant C is chosen such that ΩS(ρ) is continuous at ρ
e
I :
C = h(ρeI)ΩS(ρ
e
I) = h(ρ
e
I)n
[
A− λH
r + λH
ρeIq(ρ
e
I)(
rB
λH
+ A− s)
]
> 0.
At the efficient starting cutoff ρeS(q0), ΩS(ρ
e
S; q0) = ns. Substituting the expression of
ΩS(ρ) into the above equation yields:
C − h(ρeI)ns+
∫ ρeS
ρeI
h(x)
rn[A− xq(x)B − s]
λHx(1− x) dx = 0.
Notice
C − h(ρeI)ns = h(ρeI)n
[
A− s− λH
r + λH
ρeIq(ρ
e
I)(
rB
λH
+ A− s)
]
> 0
doesn’t depend on ρeS. This implies: if an interior solution ρ
e
S(q0) exists, it must be the case
that ∫ ρeS
ρeI
h(x)
rn[A− xq(x)B − s]
λHx(1− x) dx < 0
and hence A− λHρeSq0B − s < 0. Suppose for a given q0, there exist two efficient cutoffs ρ1
and ρ2 > ρ1. Then we have∫ ρ1
ρeI
h(x)
rn[A− xq(x)B − s]
λHx(1− x) dx =
∫ ρ2
ρeI
h(x)
rn[A− xq(x)B − s]
λHx(1− x) dx,
which is impossible since
h(x)
rn[A− xq(x)B − s]
λHx(1− x) < 0
for x ∈ (ρ1, ρ2). Therefore, if there exists some ρeS satisfying ΩS(ρeS; q0) = ns, such ρeS must
be unique. When there does not exist ρeS satisfying
C − h(ρeI)ns+
∫ ρeS
ρeI
h(x)
rn[A− xq(x)B − s]
λHx(1− x) dx = 0,
just set ρeS = 1 since it is always beneficial to take the risky product. To summarize, for any
q0, there is a unique ρ
e
S(q0) such that it is socially efficient to start experimentation if and
only if ρ ≤ ρeS(q0).
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C.2 Proof of Theorem 1.2
Proof. When k buyers have already received lump-sum damages, the monopolist chooses to
sell to the unknown buyers if:
Jk(ρ) = (n− k)(A− ρB − s) + 1
r
[(n− k)λHρ(Jk+1(ρ)− Jk(ρ))− λHρ(1− ρ)J ′k(ρ)] ≥ 0.
Induction argument is used to solve the equilibrium cutoffs. First,
Jn−1(ρ) = A− s−
λH(A− s+ rBλH )
r + λH
ρ ≥ 0
if and only if ρ ≤ ρ?n−1 = ρeI . We can guess that
Jk(ρ) = (n− k)
[
A− s− λH(A− s+
rB
λH
)
r + λH
ρ
]
.
Suppose this is true for j = k + 1, · · · , n− 1, then solving differential equation
Jk(ρ) = (n− k)(A− ρB − s) + 1
r
[(n− k)λHρ(Jk+1(ρ)− Jk(ρ))− λHρ(1− ρ)J ′k(ρ)]
yields
Jk(ρ) = (n− k)
[
A− s− λH(A− s+
rB
λH
)
r + λH
ρ
]
.
The conjecture about Jk(ρ) hence is justified by induction.
Obviously,
Jk(ρ) = (n− k)
[
A− s− λH(A− s+
rB
λH
)
r + λH
ρ
]
≥ 0
if and only if ρ ≥ ρeI for all k ≥ 1. Therefore, the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium
is efficient in the individual learning phase. In the social learning phase, for ρ ≤ ρeI , the
monopolist’s value function is
JS(ρ) = n (A− ρqB − s) + 1
r
[nλHρq(J1(ρ)− JS(ρ))− λHρ(1− ρ)J ′S(ρ)] .
The solution to the above differential equation is given by:
JS(ρ) = n(A− s)− nρq(ρ) λH
r + λH
(A− s+ rB
λH
).
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It is easy to check that for any q < 1, JS(ρ) > 0 for all ρ ≤ ρeI and hence the equilibrium
cutoff in the social learning phase must be larger than ρeI . For ρ > ρ
e
I ,
JS(ρ) = n [A− ρqB − s]− 1
r
[nλHρqJS(ρ) + λHρ(1− ρ)J ′S(ρ)] .
Solving the above differential equation yields
JS(ρ) =
∫ ρ
ρeI
h(x) rn(A−xq(x)B−s)
λHx(1−x) dx+D
h(ρ)
where
h(ρ) = (
ρ
1− ρ)
r/λH
q0(1− ρ0)n + (1− q0)(1− ρ)n
(1− ρ)n .
The constant D is chosen such that JS(·) is continuous at ρeI . This implies: D = C −
h(ρeI)ns, where C is the constant given in the proof of proposition 1.7. From integration by
parts,
∫ ρ
ρeI
h(x)
rn(A− xq(x)B − s)
λHx(1− x) dx
=
∫ ρ
ρeI
h(x)
rn(A− xq(x)B) + λHn2xq(x)s
λHx(1− x) dx− ns(h(ρ)− h(ρ
e
I)).
As a consequence, JS(ρ) = ΩS(ρ)− ns.
For a fixed q0, the monopolist starts selling her product as long as JS(ρ0; q0) ≥ 0, which
implies that the equilibrium cutoff ρ?S(q0) must be the same as ρ
e
S(q0). Therefore, the sym-
metric Markov perfect equilibrium is efficient in the social learning phase as well.
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A.2 Appendix to Chapter 2
Proof of Lemma 2.2
Proof. The worker p ∈ (0, 1) always has the choice that stays in one firm y forever. Then
the value is µy(p)−rVy
r+δ
. But obviously, this is not an optimal choice (Suppose not, then all of
the workers will stay in one type of firms and the market is not cleared). So we have that
the equilibrium value function Wy(p) must satisfy: Wy(p) >
µy(p)−rVy
r+δ
. This immediately
implies:
Σy(p)Wy
′′(p) = (r + δ)Wy(p)− (µi(p)− rV i) > 0.
So the equilibrium value functions Wy convex for p ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Lemma 2.3
Proof. Suppose workers with p ∈ [0, p) are employed by type y firm. This implies that
Wy(p) =
µy(p)−rVy
r+δ
+ ky2p
αy(1 − p)1−αy since 0 is included in the domain. It is easy to see
that Wy
′(0) = µHy−µLy
r+δ
> 0 and since Wy is strictly convex, W
′
y(p) > 0 for all p ∈ [0, p).
At p, worker will transfer to type −y firm but smooth pasting condition implies W ′−y(p) =
W ′y(p) > 0. Strict convexity implies W
′
y′(p) > 0 so on and so forth. Therefore, we must have
the equilibrium value functions Wy are strictly increasing.
Proof of Claim 2.2
Proof. We will actually prove a more general claim, i.e., that the result holds for any com-
bination (sH , sL), including sH < sL. This makes the proof also applicable to the case of
σH 6= σL. Under strict supermodularity, for any combination of (sH , sL), it is impossible to
have p1 < p2 and equilibrium value functions WH (for p ∈ [p1, p2]), WL1 (for p < p1), WL2
(for p > p2) such that:
WH(p1) = WL1(p1) and W
′′
H(p1) = W
′′
L1(p1)
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WH(p2) = WL2(p2) and W
′′
H(p2) = W
′′
L2(p2)
are satisfied simultaneously.
Suppose on the contrary the equations described above hold simultaneously. Then from
Equation (2.3), we should get:
wH(p1) + ΣH(p1)W
′′
H(p1) = wL(p1) + ΣL(p1)W
′′
L1(p1)
and
wH(p2) + ΣH(p2)W
′′
H(p2) = wL(p2) + ΣL(p2)W
′′
L2(p2)
since
WH(p2) = WL2(p2) and WH(p1) = WL1(p1).
Notice that
W ′′H(p2) = W
′′
L2(p2) and W
′′
H(p1) = W
′′
L1(p1),
by Lemma 2.5 and hence:
ΣH(p1)− ΣL(p1)
ΣH(p1)
(r + δ)WH(p1) = wL(p1)− ΣL(p1)
ΣH(p1)
wH(p1) (A.32)
and
ΣH(p2)− ΣL(p2)
ΣH(p2)
(r + δ)WH(p2) = wL(p2)− ΣL(p2)
ΣH(p2)
wH(p2). (A.33)
By definition,
ΣH(p1)− ΣL(p1)
ΣH(p1)
=
ΣH(p2)− ΣL(p2)
ΣH(p2)
=
s2H − s2L
s2H
.
First, if s2H = s
2
L, Equations (A.32) and (A.33) imply that: wH(p1)−wL(p1) = wH(p2)−
wL(p2) = 0 which cannot hold simultaneously for p1 6= p2 since wH(·) and wL(·) are linear
functions with different slopes ∆H and ∆L.
Second, if s2H > s
2
L, then Equations (A.32) and (A.33) could be simplified as:
s2H − s2L
s2H
(r + δ)(WH(p2)−WH(p1)) = wL(p2)− wL(p1)− ΣL(p2)
ΣH(p2)
(wH(p2)− wH(p1)).
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Under strict supermodularity, the LHS of the above equation is strictly larger than
s2H−s2L
s2H
(r + δ)W ′H(p1)(p2 − p1) by the convexity of the value function. And
s2H − s2L
s2H
(r + δ)W ′H(p1)(p2 − p1) ≥
s2H − s2L
s2H
∆L(p2 − p1)
by Lemma 2.4. Meanwhile, the RHS of the above equation is strictly smaller than
∆L(p2 − p1)− ΣL(p2)
ΣH(p2)
∆H(p2 − p1)) = s
2
H − s2L
s2H
∆L(p2 − p1)
which contradicts the fact that LHS is the same as RHS. The impossibility in s2H < s
2
L case
could be proved similarly and is thus omitted. By contradiction, we immediately know the
claim at the beginning of the proof is correct.
For the strict submodularity case, it suffices to relabel ‘H’ by ‘L’ and ‘L’ by ‘H’. The
claim is obviously correct given we have already proved the strict supermodularity result.
Proof of Lemma 2.6
Proof. We will actually prove a more general Lemma, i.e., that the result holds for any
combination (sH , sL), including sH < sL. This makes the proof also applicable to the case
of σH 6= σL. First of all, we want to show all of the one-shot deviations are ruled out by our
no-deviation condition as dt→ 0.
Under strict supermodularity, PAM is the only candidate equilibrium allocation by The-
orem 2.1. The value functions thus are given by:
WL(p) =
wL(p)
r + δ
+ kLp
αL(1− p)1−αL
and
WH(p) =
wH(p)
r + δ
+ kHp
1−αH (1− p)αH .
Let
GL(p) = kLpαL(1− p)1−αL( αL − p
p(1− p)) > 0
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and
GH(p) = kHp1−αH (1− p)αH (1− αH − p
p(1− p) ) < 0
be the first derivatives for the non-linear parts of the value functions. Smooth pasting at p
implies:
∆L
r + δ
+ GL(p) = ∆H
r + δ
+ GH(p).
From the proof of Lemma 2.5, it suffices to show that inequality (2.11) holds for p < p
and inequality (2.9) holds for p > p.
For p < p, define:
ZL(p) = wH(p)− wL(p) + s
2
H − s2L
s2L
((r + δ)WL(p)− wL(p)). (A.34)
Obviously, we have limp↗p ZL(p) = 0 from Lemma 2.5. If we can show that ZL(p) is
increasing in p as p increases from 0 to p, then we are done since ZL(p) < ZL(p) = 0. Notice
that
Z ′L(p) = ∆H −
s2H
s2L
∆L +
s2H − s2L
s2L
(r + δ)W ′L(p)
and W ′L(p) lies between
∆L
r+δ
and ∆L
r+δ
+ GL(p) for p ∈ [0, p].9
If s2H ≥ s2L, then
Z ′L(p) ≥ ∆H −
s2H
s2L
∆L +
s2H − s2L
s2L
(r + δ)
∆L
r + δ
= ∆H −∆L > 0;
if s2H < s
2
L, then
Z ′L(p) ≥ ∆H −
s2H
s2L
∆L +
s2H − s2L
s2L
(r + δ)[
∆L
r + δ
+ GL(p)]
= ∆H − s
2
H
s2L
∆L +
s2H − s2L
s2L
(r + δ)[
∆H
r + δ
+ GH(p)]
=
s2H
s2L
(∆H −∆L) + s
2
H − s2L
s2L
(r + δ)GH(p) > 0.
9This comes from the fact that WL(·) is a strictly convex function.
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Therefore, we conclude that Z ′L(p) > 0 for both sH ≥ sL and sH < sL cases, which
implies that ZL(p) < 0 for all p < p and hence there is no profitable one-shot deviation as
dt is sufficiently small.
For p > p, similarly define:
ZH(p) = wL(p)− wH(p) + [ΣL(p)− ΣH(p)]W ′′H(p). (A.35)
Under PAM equilibrium, we have ZH(p+) = 0 from Lemma 2.5. Notice that
ZH(p) = wL(p)− wH(p) + [ΣL(p)− ΣH(p)]W ′′H(p)
= wL(p)− wH(p) + s
2
L − s2H
s2H
((r + δ)WH(p)− wH(p)),
with W ′H(p) lies between
∆H
r+δ
+GH(p) and ∆Hr+δ for p ∈ [p, 1]. Similar to the proof for p < p
case, if s2L > s
2
H
Z ′H(p) ≤ ∆L −∆H < 0;
and if s2L ≤ s2H
Z ′H(p) ≤ ∆L −
s2L
s2H
∆H +
s2L − s2H
s2H
(r + δ)(
∆L
r + δ
+ GL(p)) < 0.
Therefore, Z ′H(p) < 0 for both sH ≥ sL and sH < sL cases and hence ZH(p) < 0 for all
p > p.
Second, since there is no one-shot deviation for any p, obviously there will be no any other
deviation for any p. Consider any deviation starting at p. Then the above result says it is
better not to deviate for at least dt time. Suppose after dt, we achieve a new p′. Similarly,
there should be no profitable deviation for at least dt′ time. Keep using the same logic and
we can conclude that any deviation is not profitable.
Derivation of the Boundary Conditions
Here, we just investigate the boundary conditions for the first case: p < p0. The derivation
is similar for the second case.
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In a stationary equilibrium, both the total measure
∫ 1
0
fy(p, t)dp and the expectations∫ 1
0
pfy(p, t)dp are constant over time. Hence, it must be the case that
∫ 1
0
∂fy(p,t)
∂t
dp = 0 and∫ 1
0
p∂fy(p,t)
∂t
dp = 0
From
∂fy(p, t)
∂t
=
d2
dp2
[Σy(p)fy(p, t)]− δfy(p, t),
we should have:
∫ p
0
{ d
2
dp2
[ΣL(p)fL(p)]− δfL(p)}dp = 0
and ∫ p0
p
{ d
2
dp2
[ΣH(p)fH(p)]− δfH(p)}dp+
∫ 1
p0
{ d
2
dp2
[ΣH(p)fH(p)]− δfH(p)}dp = 0.
The above two equations give us:
d
dp
[ΣL(p)fL(p)]|p− = δ(1− pi)
and
ΣH(p0)[f
′
H(p0−)− f ′H(p0+)] =
d
dp
[ΣH(p)fH(p)]|p+ + δpi
since the market clearing conditions imply:∫ p
0
fL(p)dp = 1− pi∫ 1
p
fH(p)dp = pi
and there is continuity at p0:
fH(p0−) = fH(p0+).
Meanwhile, notice that inflow at p0 must be the same as δ, which implies that ΣH(p0)[f
′
H(p0−)−
f ′H(p0+)] = δ. This immediately gives us the flow equation at p:
d
dp
[ΣL(p)fL(p)]|p− = d
dp
[ΣH(p)fH(p)]|p+.
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Now apply similar logic and we can get:∫ p
0
{
p
d2
dp2
[ΣL(p)fL(p)]− pδfL(p)
}
dp+
∫ 1
p
{
p
d2
dp2
[ΣH(p)fH(p)]− pδfH(p)
}
dp = 0.
Notice that ∫ p
0
pδfL(p)dp+
∫ 1
p
pδfH(p)dp = δp0
by the martingale property. Meanwhile, we still have: ΣH(p0)[f
′
H(p0−) − f ′H(p0+)] = δ.
Hence,after some tedious algebra, we can get:{
p
d
dp
[ΣL(p)fL(p)] + ΣL(p)fL(p)
}
|p− =
{
p
d
dp
[ΣH(p)fH(p)] + ΣH(p)fH(p)
}
|p+
which gives us the boundary condition at p:
ΣH(p+)fH(p+) = ΣL(p−)fL(p−).
Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof. First, we can express fH0, fH1, fH2, fL0 as functions of p. Equations (2.25) and (2.27)
imply:
fL0 =
1− pi∫ p
0
pγL1(1− p)γL2dp.
and
fH2 = fH0(
p0
1− p0 )
γH1−γH2 + fH1
From Equations (2.23) and (2.26), fH0 and fH1 as could be written as:
fH0 =
ηH + ηL
2ηH
s2L
s2H
(
p
1− p)
ηL−ηHfL0
and
fH1 = −ηL − ηH
2ηH
s2L
s2H
(
p
1− p)
ηL+ηHfL0.
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Here,
ηL =
√
1
4
+
2δ
s2L
> ηH =
√
1
4
+
2δ
s2H
> 1/2.
Next, we want to show that both fH0 and fH1 are decreasing in p.
Rewrite fH0 as:
fH0 =
ηH + ηL
2ηH
s2L
s2H
(
p
1− p)
ηL−ηH 1− pi∫ p
0
pγL1(1− p)γL2dp.
and it suffices to show that (
p
1−p)
ηL−ηH 1−pi∫ p
0 p
γL1 (1−p)γL2dp is decreasing in p. Notice that
(
p
1− p)
ηL−ηH =
∫ p
0
[(
p
1− p)
ηL−ηH ]′dp =
∫ p
0
(ηL − ηH)( p
1− p)
ηL−ηH−1(
1
1− p)
2dp.
Let G1(p) = p
γL1(1− p)γL2 and G2(p) = ( p1−p)ηL−ηH−1( 11−p)2 such that:
G1(p)
G2(p)
= p−
1
2
+ηH (1− p)− 12−ηH
is increasing in p. Therefore, we could derive:
(
p
1− p)
ηL−ηH 1− pi∫ p
0
pγL1(1− p)γL2dp
is decreasing in p10 and hence fH0 is decreasing in p as well.
Similarly, we can rewrite fH1 as:
fH1 = −ηL − ηH
2ηH
s2L
s2H
(
p
1− p)
ηL+ηH
1− pi∫ p
0
pγL1(1− p)γL2dp.
Similarly,
(
p
1− p)
ηL+ηH =
∫ p
0
(ηL + ηH)(
p
1− p)
ηL+ηH−1(
1
1− p)
2dp.
Let G3(p) = (
p
1−p)
ηL+ηH−1( 1
1−p)
2 and we have:
G1(p)
G3(p)
= p−
1
2
−ηH (1− p)− 12+ηH
10Actually, we are using the result that if G2(p)G1(p) is decreasing in p, then
∫ p
0 G2(p)dp∫ p
0 G1(p)dp
will also be decreasing in
p. This is true because by the definition of Riemann integral,
∫ p
0 G1(p)dp and
∫ p
0 G2(p)dp could be written as
the limit of Riemann sum. The ratio of two Riemann sums is always decreasing in p since G2(p)G1(p) is decreasing
in p.
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is decreasing in p. Therefore, it must be the case that
−( p
1− p)
ηL+ηH
1− pi∫ p
0
pγL1(1− p)γL2dp
is decreasing in p and hence fH1 is also decreasing in p.
Finally, it is immediate that
fH2 = fH0(
p0
1− p0 )
γH1−γH2 + fH1
is also decreasing in p. Therefore, we can expressing fH0, fH1 and fH2 as ξ0(p), ξ1(p) and
ξ2(p) respectively such that ξ0
′ < 0, ξ1′ < 0 and ξ2′ < 0.
Hence, the market clearing condition (2.24) implies:
H(p) =
∫ p0
p
[ξ0(p)p
γH1(1− p)γH2 + ξ1(p)pγH2(1− p)γH1 ]dp+
∫ 1
p0
ξ2(p)p
γH2(1− p)γH1dp = pi.
It is easy to check that H ′ < 0 since ξ0′ < 0, ξ1′ < 0 and ξ2′ < 0. There exists p ∈ (0, p0)
such that H(p) = pi if and only if limp→0H(p) > pi and limp→p0 H(p) < pi.
As p→ 0, fH0 = ξ0(p)→∞ and fH1 = ξ1(p)→ 0, which imply:
lim
p→0
H(p)→∞ > pi.
Meanwhile, when p→ p0, it is obvious that H(p)→
∫ 1
p0
fH2p
γH2(1− p)γH1dp. Notice that
fH2 = fH0(
p0
1− p0 )
γH1−γH2 + fH1 → s
2
L
s2H
(
p0
1− p0 )
ηL+ηH
1− pi∫ p0
0
pγL1(1− p)γL2dp
as p→ p0.
As a result, limp→p0 H(p) < pi if and only if:
s2L
s2H
(
p0
1− p0 )
ηL+ηH
1− pi∫ p0
0
pγL1(1− p)γL2dp
∫ 1
p0
pγH2(1− p)γH1dp < pi,
which establishes Equation 2.28 in the proposition. Moreover, since H(·) is strictly decreas-
ing, the solution to H(p) = pi must be at most one. This completes our proof of Proposition
2.1.
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Proof of Corollary 2.1
Proof. To make the proof, we have to redefine the H(·) function in the proof of Proposition
2.1 as H(p; pi, p0) with equilibrium cutoff p satisfying H(p; pi, p0) = pi. It is obviously to verify
that H is linear in (1− pi). So as pi increases, pi/(1− pi) increases and we have to decrease p
to balance the equation. On the other hand,
∂H
∂p0
= ξ0(p)p
γH1
0 (1− p0)γ
H
2 + ξ1(p)p
γH2
0 (1− p0)γ
H
1 − ξ2(p)pγ
H
2
0 (1− p0)γ
H
1
+
∫ 1
p0
∂ξ2(p)
∂p0
pγ
H
2 (1− p)γH1 dp.
It is easy to verify that the first line on the RHS is zero while the second line is strictly
positive. Hence H(p; pi, p0) is increasing in p0 and we have to increase p to keep the equation
as p0 increases.
The proof for the comparative statics for p > p0 case is similar and hence is omitted.
Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proof. First, from equation (2.35), we have:
fH0 =
pi∫ 1
p
pγH2(1− p)γH1dp.
Second, Equations (2.34) and (2.37) imply:
fL1 =
ηL − ηH
2ηL
s2H
s2L
(
p
1− p)
−ηL−ηHfH0
and
fL2 =
ηL + ηH
2ηL
s2H
s2L
(
p
1− p)
ηL−ηHfH0.
Here,
ηL =
√
1
4
+
2δ
s2L
> ηH =
√
1
4
+
2δ
s2H
> 1/2.
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It is easy to verify that fH0, fL1, fL2 are increasing in p and hence fL0 = fL1 + fL2(
p0
1−p0 )
−2ηL
is also increasing in p by Equation (2.38).
Hence, we can express fL0, fL1, fL2 as ξ0(p), ξ1(p) and ξ2(p) respectively such that ξ0
′ > 0,
ξ1
′ > 0 and ξ2′ > 0.
Finally, the market clearing condition (2.36) implies:
H(p) =
∫ p0
0
ξ0(p)p
γL1(1− p)γL2dp+
∫ p
p0
[ξ1(p)p
γL1(1− p)γL2 + ξ2(p)pγL2(1− p)γL1 ]dp = 1−pi.
Obviously, H(·) is strictly increasing, which guarantees the solution is unique if it exists
and limp→p0 H(p) ≤ 1− pi will give us Equation (2.39) in Proposition 2.2.
Proof of Lemma 2.8
Proof. By substituting µH(p) and µL(p), the total expected surplus for allocation 1 could be
written as:
S1 =
∫
ΩH
(∆Hp+ µLH)fH(p)dp+
∫
ΩL
(∆Lp+ µLL)fL(p)dp.
From market clearing and martingale property conditions, we can furthermore rewrite
S1 as:
S1 = (∆H −∆L)
∫
ΩH
pfH(p)dp+ ∆Lp0 + piµLH + (1− pi)µLL.
And similarly,
S2 = (∆H −∆L)
∫
Ω˜H
pfH(p)dp+ ∆Lp0 + piµLH + (1− pi)µLL.
Therefore, S1 > S2 if and only if∫
ΩH
pfH(p)dp >
∫
Ω˜H
pf˜H(p)dp
or alternatively,
∫
ΩL
pfH(p)dp <
∫
Ω˜L
pf˜L(p)dp.
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Proof of Theorem 2.4
Proof. We establish the proof of Theorem 2.4 under supermodularity. The same logic goes
through for submodularity. The proof is constructed in the following three steps: 1. for
N = 3 we show that the planner can increase output when changing the cutoffs; 2. for
N = 3 no allocation dominates PAM; 3. For any N , the allocation with N − 2 cutoffs
dominates that with N cutoffs.
1. For N = 3, output increases from changing the cutoffs
Consider any allocation with three cutoffs 0 < p
3
< p
2
< p
1
< 1 such that workers
with p ∈ (p
1
, 1] and p ∈ (p
3
, p
2
) are allocated to the high type firms while workers with
p ∈ [0, p
3
) and p ∈ (p
2
, p
1
) are allocated to the low type firms. Furthermore, denote the
ergodic density function for this allocation to be fy and for p close to 0, let the density
function be fL(p) = f˜L0p
γL(1 − p)1−γL while the ergodic density function for p close to 1 is
denoted by fH(p) = f˜H0p
1−γH (1 − p)γH where f˜L0 and f˜H0 are constants. Correspondingly,
denote the ergodic density under the PAM allocation to be f ∗y with the unique cutoff p.
1. Suppose the planner changes the allocation by moving the interval to the left: (p
2
, p
1
)→
(p′
2
, p′
1
) where (p′
2
, p′
1
) = (p
2
− 2, p1 − 1). Choose 1, 2 such that market clearing is
satisfied: ∫ p
1
p′
1
fH(p)dp =
∫ p
2
p′
2
fH(p)dp.
2. Given the new cutoffs, the Kolmogorov forward equation will pin down a new density fˆL
in the interval (p′
2
, p′
1
). Globally, we need to satisfy market clearing and the martingale
property conditions. The market clearing condition for the H types is satisfied by the
construction. For the L type firms it requires that:∫ p′
1
p′
2
fˆL(p)dp =
∫ p
1
p
2
fL(p)dp.
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The martingale property condition requires that EΩ′Hp+ EΩ′Lp = p0 or:∫ p3
0
pfL(p)dp+
∫ p′2
p3
pfH(p)dp+
∫ p′1
p′2
pfˆL(p)dp+
∫ 1
p′1
pfH(p)dp = p0.
Above are a system of two linear equations about the distributional parameters for fˆL
and fˆL could be solved as a result.
11
3. Then comparing the original allocation to the new one, we get
EΩ′Hp− EΩHp =
∫ p
1
p′
1
pfH(p)dp−
∫ p
2
p′
2
pfH(p)dp > 0
since by construction ∫ p
1
p′
1
fH(p)dp =
∫ p
2
p′
2
fH(p)dp
and the interval [p′
2
, p′
1
] is strictly to the left of [p
2
, p
1
]. From Lemma 2.8, EΩ′Hp > EΩHp
implies the planner prefers allocation Ω′ over Ω.
4. Similarly, we can consider another transform which is to move the interval to the right:
(p
3
, p
2
) → (p′
3
, p′
2
) where (p′
3
, p′
2
) = (p
3
+ 2, p2 + 1). This can also lead to output
increases. Keep on doing such transformations and eventually, we can have both the
distance and the measure between p′
3
and p′
1
arbitrarily small while the new (p′
1
, p′
2
, p′
3
)
allocation strictly dominates the original (p
1
, p
2
, p
3
) allocation.
2. For N = 3, no allocation dominates PAM
1. We now show by contradiction that no allocation dominates PAM for N = 3. Sup-
pose on the contrary that there exists an allocation with cutoffs p˜1, p˜2 and p˜3 which
dominates the PAM allocation. Then by Lemma 2.8, we should have:∫ 1
p˜1
pfH(p)dp+
∫ p˜2
p˜3
pfH(p)dp >
∫ 1
p
pf ∗H(p)dp (A.36)
11Things are slightly different if we have p0 ∈ (p′2, p′1). Then we have four new distribution coefficients but
we also have two more equations: fˆL(p0−) = fˆL(p0+) and ΣL(p0)(fˆ ′L(p0−)− fˆ ′L(p0+)) = δ. We can use this
system of four linear equations to pin down the four parameters.
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and ∫ p˜1
p˜2
pfL(p)dp+
∫ p˜3
0
pfL(p)dp <
∫ p
0
pf ∗L(p)dp. (A.37)
From Step 1, we can first fix p˜3 and make p˜
′
2 move towards p˜3, which is efficiency
improving. p˜1 could be extended to the left until it reaches pˆ1:
∫ 1
pˆ1
fH(p)dp = pi. Since∫ 1
p˜′1
fH(p)dp < pi, it must be the case that pˆ1 < p˜
′
1. If p˜
′
2 is sufficiently close to p˜3, we
will have p˜′2 < pˆ1. By hypothesis:∫ 1
pˆ1
pfH(p)dp >
∫ 1
p˜′1
pfH(p)dp+
∫ p˜′2
p˜3
pfH(p)dp >
∫ 1
p
pf ∗H(p)dp.
On the other hand, it is also efficiency improving by fixing p˜1 and making p˜
′
2 move
towards p˜1. Similarly define pˆ3 as:
∫ pˆ3
0
fL(p)dp = (1 − pi) such that pˆ3 > p˜′3. By
hypothesis, ∫ pˆ3
0
pfL(p)dp <
∫ p
0
pf ∗L(p)dp.
since we can make p˜′2 sufficiently close to p˜1.
2. The next step of the proof requires Lemma A.7 below. The Lemma implies that we
should have p˜′3 < pˆ3 < p < pˆ1 < p˜
′
1 to guarantee that∫ 1
pˆ1
pfH(p)dp >
∫ 1
p
pf ∗H(p)dp and
∫ pˆ3
0
pfL(p)dp <
∫ p
0
pf ∗L(p)dp.
Therefore, inequalities (A.36) and (A.37) only hold when p˜′1 − p˜′3 > pˆ1 − pˆ3 > 0 which
contradicts that fact that we can make the distance between p˜′1 and p˜
′
3 arbitrarily small
while still keeping the inequalities (A.36) and (A.37). Hence, no allocation with N = 3
cutoffs could be better than the PAM allocation in terms of aggregate surplus.
3. For N cutoffs, the allocation is dominated by any allocation with N−2 cutoffs.
Consider three adjacent cutoffs p
n−1, > pn > pn+1 such that workers with p ∈ (pn−1, pn−2)
and p ∈ (p
n+1
, p
n
) are allocated to high type firms; workers with p ∈ (p
n
, p
n−1) and p ∈
(p
n+2
, p
n+1
) are allocated to low type firms. Suppose the density functions are such that the
market clears and the expectation of p’s is p0. Then we just need to choose κ such that
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∫ p
n−1
p
n−1−κ
fH(p)dp =
∫ p
n
p
n+1
fH(p)dp.
Now p
n−1, pn and pn+1 converge to pn−1 − κ but pn+2 is kept to be the same. The market
clearing condition requires that∫ p
n−1−κ
p
n+2
f˜L(p)dp =
∫ p
n−1
p
n
fL(p)dp+
∫ p
n+1
p
n+2
fL(p)dp.
Meanwhile, the martingale property condition requires that:∫ 1
p
1
pfH(p)dp+ · · ·+
∫ p
n−2
p
n−1−κ
pfH(p)dp+
∫ p
n−1−κ
p
n+2
pf˜L(p)dp+ · · ·+
∫ p
N
0
pfL(p)dp = p0.
Similar to Step 1, we have a system of two linear equations about two distributional
coefficients and density f˜L could be solved. As before,
EΩHp =
∫
ΩH
pfH(p)dp
must become higher and this allocation with N − 2 cutoffs will generate a higher aggregate
payoff.
Finally, by the standard induction argument, we can conclude that the PAM allocation
with one cutoff dominates any allocation with N ≥ 3 cutoffs in aggregate surplus.
Lemma A.7
Lemma A.7. Let pˆ1 be such that
∫ 1
pˆ1
fH(p)dp = pi, where fH(p) satisfies the Kolmogorov
forward equation, then
∫ 1
pˆ1
pfH(p)dp is increasing in pˆ1. Let pˆ3 be such that
∫ pˆ3
0
fL(p)dp =
(1 − pi), where fL(p) satisfies the Kolmogorov forward equation, then
∫ pˆ3
0
pfL(p)dp is also
increasing in pˆ3.
Proof. We just prove the case that pˆ1 > p0. The other cases are similar. Let fH(p) =
CH(1− p)γH1pγH2 where
γH1 = −3
2
+ ηH and γH2 = −3
2
− ηH .
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From Kolmogorov forward equation,∫ 1
pˆ1
fH(p)dp =
1
δ
∫ 1
pˆ1
d2
dp2
[ΣH(p)fH(p)] = pi
or
ηH + pˆ1 − 12
pˆ1(1− pˆ1) ΣH(pˆ1)fH(pˆ1) = δpi.
Notice that ∫ 1
pˆ1
pfH(p)dp =
1
δ
∫ 1
pˆ1
p
d2
dp2
[ΣH(p)fH(p)]dp
and could be simplified as:
pipˆ1 +
pipˆ1(1− pˆ1)
ηH + pˆ1 − 12
=
pipˆ1(ηH +
1
2
)
ηH + pˆ1 − 12
which is increasing in pˆ1 since
ηH =
√
1
4
+
2δ
s2y
>
1
2
.
On the Job Human Capital Accumulation
Under the assumption of pu = pe = p, the value functions could be written as:
W uy (p) =
µy(p)− rVy
r + δ + λ
+ kuy1p
1−αuy (1− p)αuy + kuy2pα
u
y (1− p)1−αuy
−
λ
(suy )
2
(sey)
2
(r + δ + λ)[(λ+ δ + r)− (suy )2
(sey)
2 (r + δ)]
[µy(p) + ξ(p)− rVy]
+
λ
(λ+ δ + r)− (suy )2
(sey)
2 (r + δ)
W ey (p)
and
W ey (p) =
µy(p) + ξ(p)− rVy
r + δ
+ key1p
1−αey(1− p)αey + key2pα
e
y(1− p)1−αey
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where
αuy =
1
2
+
√
1
4
+
2(r + δ + λ)
(suy)
2
≥ 1
αey =
1
2
+
√
1
4
+
2(r + δ)
(sey)
2
≥ 1.
Boundary conditions
W eL(p) = W
e
H(p), W
e′
L (p) = W
e′
H (p), W
e′′
L (p) = W
e′′
H (p)
would imply (by normalizing VL = 0 as usual):
rV˜ eH = (µLH − µLL) +
αeH(α
e
L − 1)(∆H −∆L)p
αeH(α
e
L − 1)− (1− p)(αeL − αeH)
.
And from
W uL(p) = W
u
H(p), W
u′
L (p) = W
u′
H (p), W
u′′
L (p) = W
u′′
H (p),
another equilibrium payoff V˜ uH could be derived as:
rV˜ uH = (µLH −
AL
BL
BH
AH
µLL)− BH
AH
λξL
r + δ + λ
(
1− AH
BH
− 1− AL
BL
)
+
BH
AH
αuH(α
u
L − 1)(DH −DL)p
αuH(α
u
L − 1)− (1− p)(αuL − αuH)
,
where
DH =
AH
BH
∆H − 1− AH
BH
λ∆ξ
r + δ + λ
DL =
AL
BL
∆L − 1− AL
BL
λ∆ξ
r + δ + λ
AH = 1− (s
u
H)
2
(seH)
2
BH = (λ+ δ + r)− (s
u
H)
2
(seH)
2
(r + δ)
AL = 1− (s
u
L)
2
(seL)
2
BL = (λ+ δ + r)− (s
u
L)
2
(seL)
2
(r + δ).
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Proof of Proposition 2.3
Proof. Supermodularity is equivalent to ∆H > ∆L, and ξH ' ξL is equivalent to ∆ξ =
ξH − ξL → 0. The proof can be divided into three parts. As a sufficient condition,
1.
(µLH − AL
BL
BH
AH
µLL)− BH
AH
λξL
r + δ + λ
(
1− AH
BH
− 1− AL
BL
) < (µLH − µLL)
2.
BH
AH
(DH −DL) < ∆H −∆L
and
3.
αuH(α
u
L − 1)p
αuH(α
u
L − 1)− (1− p)(αuL − αuH)
<
αeH(α
e
L − 1)p
αeH(α
e
L − 1)− (1− p)(αeL − αeH)
should be satisfied simultaneously.
First of all, notice that
(suH)
2
(seH)
2 >
(suL)
2
(seL)
2 since ∆H > ∆L. As a result,
AH
BH
< AL
BL
and
1−AH
BH
> 1−AL
BL
. The first inequality holds since µLH− ALBL
BH
AH
µLL < µLH−µLL and ALBL
BH
AH
µLL)−
BH
AH
λξL
r+δ+λ
(1−AH
BH
− 1−AL
BL
) > 0. The second inequality could be proved similarly.
For the last inequality, we just need to compare:
αuH(α
u
L − 1)[αeH(αeL − 1)− (1− p)(αeL − αeH)]
and
αeH(α
e
L − 1)[αuH(αuL − 1)− (1− p)(αuL − αuH)].
To prove 3, it suffices to show
αuH(α
u
L − 1)(αeL − αeH) > alphaeH(αeL − 1)(αuL − αuH).
The direct proof is not easy. But notice from the expressions of α’s:
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(αeL − αeH)(αeL + αeH − 1) = 2(r + δ)[
σ2
(∆L + ∆ξ)2
− σ
2
(∆H + ∆ξ)2
]
and
(αuL − αuH)(αuL + αuH − 1) = 2(r + δ + λ)[
σ2
∆2L
− σ
2
∆2H
].
Hence, when ∆ξ = 0,
αeL − αeH
αuL − αuH
=
r + δ
r + δλ
αuL + α
u
H − 1
αeL + α
e
H − 1
.
The original inequality is transformed to compare:
(r + δ)αuH(α
u
L − 1)(αuL + αuH − 1)
and
(r + δ + λ)αeH(α
e
L − 1)(αeL + αeH − 1).
Meanwhile, we have:
(r + δ)αuH(α
u
L − 1)αuL = (r + δ)αuH
2(r + δ + λ)
∆2L
> (r + δ + λ)αeH(α
e
L − 1)αeL = (r + δ + λ)αeH
2(r + δ)
∆2L
and
(r + δ)αuH(α
u
L − 1)(αuH − 1) = (r + δ)(αuL − 1)
2(r + δ + λ)
∆2H
> (r + δ + λ)αeH(α
e
L − 1)(αeH − 1) = (r + δ + λ)(αeL − 1)
2(r + δ)
∆2H
since αuy > α
e
y. This implies:
αuH(α
u
L − 1)(αeL − αeH) > αeH(αeL − 1)(αuL − αuH)
and therefore,
αuH(α
u
L − 1)p
αuH(α
u
L − 1)− (1− p)(αuL − αuH)
<
αeH(α
e
L − 1)p
αeH(α
e
L − 1)− (1− p)(αeL − αeH)
.
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Notice from the above proof, 3 holds only when ∆ξ is small and will not hold as ∆ξ becomes
sufficiently large.
Finally, we can conclude that V˜ uH < V˜
e
H when ξH ' ξL, and as a result pe < pu.
No-deviation condition for the non-Bayesian learning example
Under the non-Bayesian learning case, suppose it is optimal for a p worker to choose firm
y, the value function for this worker should be such that (from Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation):
(r + δ)Wy(p) = wy(p) + λypW
′
y(p).
Suppose there is a cutoff p such that workers with p > p are matched with H firms and vice
versa.
Then the absence of deviation implies that a p > p worker has no incentive to deviate,
rematch with a L firm and switch back after dt time:
WH(p) > W˜L(p) = E
{∫ t+dt
t
e−(r+δ)(s−t)wL(ps)ds+ e−(r+δ)dtW (pt+dt)
}
.
For dt sufficiently small, pt+dt is still close to p such that it is optimal for a pt+dt worker
to choose firm H as well. It is immediate to see that:
lim
dt→0
WH(p)− W˜L(p)
dt
= wH(p)− wL(p) + (λH − λL)pW ′H(p),
and hence no deviation implies that:
wH(p)− wL(p) + (λH − λL)pW ′H(p) > 0
for all p > p. Let p→ p+ and we have by applying the value matching condition:
wH(p+)− wL(p−) + (λH − λL)pW ′H(p+) = λLp(W ′L(p−)−W ′H(p+)) ≥ 0
or equivalently W ′L(p−) ≥ W ′H(p+). On the other hand, a p < p worker also has no incentive
to deviate, rematch with a H firm and switch back after dt time. Similarly, no deviation
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implies that:
wL(p)− wH(p) + (λL − λH)pW ′L(p) > 0
for all p < p. Let p→ p− and it could be shown:
wL(p−)− wH(p+) + (λL − λH)pW ′L(p−) = λHp(W ′H(p+)−W ′L(p−)) ≥ 0
or equivalentlyW ′H(p+) ≥ W ′L(p−). Therefore, at p, it must be the case thatW ′H(p) = W ′L(p)
and no-deviation condition coincides with the smooth-pasting condition.
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